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Abstract
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is more prone to security threats than other
wired and wireless networks because of the distributed nature of the network.
Conventional MANET routing protocols assume that all nodes cooperate without
maliciously disrupting the operation of the protocol and do not provide defence
against attackers. Blackhole and flooding attacks have a dramatic negative impact
while grayhole and selfish attacks have a little negative impact on the performance
of MANET routing protocols.
Malicious nodes or misbehaviour actions detection in the network is an impor-
tant task to maintain the proper routing protocol operation. Current solutions
cannot guarantee the true classification of nodes because the cooperative nature
of the MANETs which leads to false exclusions of innocent nodes and/or good
classification of malicious nodes. The thesis introduces a new concept of Self-
Protocol Trustiness (SPT) to discover malicious nodes with a very high trustiness
ratio of a node classification. Designing and implementing new mechanisms that
can resist flooding and blackhole attacks which have high negative impacts on
the performance of these reactive protocols is the main objective of the thesis.
The design of these mechanisms is based on SPT concept to ensure the high
trustiness ratio of node classification. In addition, they neither incorporate the
use of cryptographic algorithms nor depend on routing packet formats which make
these solutions robust and reliable, and simplify their implementations in different
MANET reactive protocols.
Anti-Flooding (AF) mechanism is designed to resist flooding attacks which relies
on locally applied timers and thresholds to classify nodes as malicious. Although
AF mechanism succeeded in discovering malicious nodes within a small time, it
has a number of thresholds that enable attacker to subvert the algorithm and
cannot guarantee that the excluded nodes are genuine malicious nodes which was
the motivation to develop this algorithm. On the other hand, Flooding Attack
Resisting Mechanism (FARM) is designed to close the security gaps and overcome
the drawbacks of AF mechanism. It succeeded in detecting and excluding more
than 80% of flooding nodes within the simulation time with a very high trustiness
ratio.
Anti-Blackhole (AB) mechanism is designed to resist blackhole attacks and relies
on a single threshold. The algorithm guarantees 100% exclusion of blackhole nodes
and does not exclude any innocent node that may forward a reply packet. Although
AB mechanism succeeded in discovering malicious nodes within a small time, the
only suggested threshold enables an attacker to subvert the algorithm which was
the motivation to develop it. On the other hand, Blackhole Resisting Mechanism
(BRM) has the main advantages of AB mechanism while it is designed to close
the security gaps and overcome the drawbacks of AB mechanism. It succeeded in
detecting and excluding the vast majority of blackhole nodes within the simulation
time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) play an essential role in wireless communica-
tions research due to their infrastructure-less and characteristics. MANETs are used
in many applications such as military, emergency and rescue operations and sensor
networks. Routing protocols, security, medium access scheme, energy management,
quality of service and scalability are major challenges that need to be considered
in the design of MANETs. Mobility is the major issue that causes frequent link
failures in MANETs, resulting in performance failure especially in situations of high
node mobility. MANET nodes act as nodes and routers as well although their lim-
ited resources which imposes a burden to these nodes. MANETs are more prone to
security threats than other wired and wireless networks because of the lack of any
infrastructure.
1.1 Thesis Scope
Designing a secured routing protocol in MANETs is challenging because of the lim-
itations and characteristics of the network. Current MANET routing protocols are
designed based on an absence of any centralized authority and an assumption that
nodes cooperate without maliciously disrupting the routing protocol. MANETs are
more vulnerable to security attacks than other wired and wireless networks due to
their inherent characteristics such as the wireless nature, node mobility, an absence
of a centralized authority or trusted third party, and limited resources that impose a
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difficulty to implement cryptography algorithms. So, MANETs have many security
challenges that motivate researchers to resist different types of attacks from passive
eavesdropping to active interfering.
1.2 Research Motivation
Reactive MANET routing protocols are vulnerable to a dramatic collapse of network
performance under different attacks. Security solutions for wired networks cannot
be applied directly to MANETs because of the nature of the network and because of
an absence of a centralized authority. Current solutions can be mainly classified as
prevention mechanisms, and detection and reaction mechanisms. Prevention mech-
anisms are designed based on the cryptographic algorithms which do not suit the
MANET characteristics. In addition, these solutions succeed in discovering some
attacks and fail in others especially the flooding attacks. On the other hand, detec-
tion and reaction mechanisms are used to discover malicious nodes or misbehaviour
actions in the network to maintain the proper routing protocol operation. These
solutions cannot guarantee the true classification of nodes because the cooperative
nature of the MANETs which leads to false exclusion of innocent nodes and/or good
classification of malicious nodes. Moreover, many solutions of both types are de-
signed to suit a specific MANET routing protocol, as these solutions depend on the
routing packet format of this protocol, which decreases the opportunity to use these
solutions in other MANET routing protocols.
Figure 1.1: SPT and Mechanisms Relationship
This thesis introduces a new concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) to dis-
cover malicious nodes with a very high trustiness ratio of a node classification. This
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is because detecting a malicious intruder is based on an implied avowal of its ma-
licious behaviour. SPT-based solutions do not require expensive cryptography or
authentication mechanisms, or modifications to the packet formats of the underly-
ing protocol which make these solutions able to be implemented in different MANET
reactive protocols. SPT is used an underlying concept in designing mechanisms to
resist both flooding and blackhole attacks as they have the most dramatic effect
of the network performance. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the SPT
concept and different solutions. Objectives of the thesis are:
1. Study and investigate the impacts of some attacks on the MANET reac-
tive routing protocols that represent different types of attacks. Flooding,
blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks are selected to represent modifica-
tion, impersonation and fabrication of the routing packets.
2. Designing and implementing new mechanisms that can resist flooding and
blackhole attacks which have the high negative impacts on the performance
of these reactive protocols. The design of these mechanisms should be based
on SPT concept to ensure the high trustiness ratio of node classification. In
addition, it should not incorporate the use of cryptographic algorithms to
suit the limited resources of the MANET nodes and it should not depend
on routing packet formats to allow implementation in different MANET
reactive protocols.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The thesis has the following contributions:
1. Analysis and evaluation of the performance of AODV, DSR, AOMDV and
SAODV routing protocols under the blackhole, grayhole, selfish and flooding
attacks. These analyses concluded that the blackhole and flooding attacks
have dramatic negative impact while grayhole and selfish attacks have little
negative impact on the performance of MANET routing protocols. The
thesis concludes also that the highest negative impact of malicious nodes
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in all these different attacks usually appears on static networks and this
effect decreases as node mobility increases. The thesis concludes as well
that AOMDV achieves a higher resistance to different attacks than other
reactive protocols. While SAODV succeeded in resisting blackhole, grayhole
and selfish attacks, it suffered performance degradation under the flooding
attack. On the other hand, while SAODV achieves a moderate performance
compared to the other protocols, its routing overhead is higher due to the
cost of its security features.
2. Introducing a new concept in securing multi-hop networks such as MANETs
called Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT). This concept clarifies that a detection
of a malicious intruder is accomplished by complying with the normal pro-
tocol behaviour and luring the malicious node to give an implicit avowal of
its malicious behaviour.
3. Designing and implementing an Anti-Flooding (AF) mechanism to resist
flooding attacks which can be incorporated into any reactive routing pro-
tocol. It does not require expensive cryptography or authentication mecha-
nisms, but relies on locally applied timers and thresholds to classify nodes
as malicious. No modifications are made to the packet formats and hence
do not incur any additional overhead. The proposed mechanism succeeded
in discovering malicious nodes that attempt to flood the network regardless
of the number of malicious nodes.
4. Designing and implementing the Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism
(FARM) to resist flooding attacks. It has the main advantages of AF
mechanism while it is designed to close the security gaps and overcome the
drawbacks of AF mechanism. FARM mechanism uses our new concept of
Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) to discover malicious intruders. It succeeded
in detecting and excluding a high ratio of flooding nodes in a short time.
FARM succeeded in detecting and excluding more than 80% of malicious
neighbours in the simulation time.
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5. Designing and implementing the Anti-Blackhole (AB) mechanism to resist
blackhole attacks which can be incorporated into any reactive routing pro-
tocol. It is designed based on our new concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness
(SPT) in addition to some thresholds to discover a blackhole node. The al-
gorithm neither adds new routing packets nor modifies the existing ones and
it does not require expensive cryptography or authentication mechanisms.
The algorithm guarantees 100% exclusion of only blackhole nodes and does
not exclude any victim node that may forward a reply packet.
6. Designing and implementing the Blackhole Resisting Mechanism (BRM) to
resist blackhole attacks. It has the main advantages of AB mechanism while
it is designed to close the security gaps and overcome the drawbacks of
AB mechanism that enable malicious nodes to subvert it. It succeeded in
detecting and excluding a high ratio of blackhole nodes in a short time.
1.4 Organisation of the thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2: Introduces the literature overview of the MANET and its charac-
teristics and discusses MANET routing protocols and their classifications. Then,
it presents MANET routing attacks, a brief discussion about cryptographic al-
gorithms and existing MANET secured routing protocols. Finally, systems mod-
elling techniques are discussed.
Chapter 3: Introduces the research environment of the thesis. It presents the
details about the selected MANET routing protocols, selected MANET routing
attacks and the selected simulation tool. It discusses as well the reasons for
selection for each item.
Chapter 4: Studies the behaviour of different routing protocols under various
attacks. It analyses the behaviour of AODV, DSR, AOMDV and SAODV in
the presence of flooding, blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks under different
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node mobility. Then, it outlines the comparison between these protocols in static
networks.
Chapter 5: Discusses resisting the flooding attacks in MANETs. It begins with
an overview of the existing solutions for these attacks mentioning the drawbacks
of them. Then, it introduces our first solution, the Anti-Flooding (AF) mecha-
nism to detect the flooding attacks that use some thresholds and timers to classify
nodes as malicious. Later, it introduces our second solution to detect the flood-
ing attacks which is called the Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM)
that is designed to close the security gaps and overcome the drawbacks of AF
mechanism. FARM uses our new concept in discovering malicious nodes called
Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT). Finally, a simulation approach, parameters and
results of simulating our solutions and comparing the results to the existing one
are presented.
Chapter 6: Discusses resisting the blackhole attacks in MANETs. It begins with
an overview of the existing solutions for these attacks discussing their drawbacks.
Then, it introduces our first solution Anti-Blackhole (AB) mechanism to detect
the blackhole attacks that is designed using SPT concept. Later, it introduces
our second solution to detect the blackhole attacks which is called the Black-
hole Resisting Mechanism (BRM) that is designed to close the security gaps and
overcome the drawbacks of AB mechanism. Finally, a simulation approach, pa-
rameters and results of simulating our solutions and comparing the results with
the existing solutions are presented.
Chapter 7: Provides a summary of the thesis, highlights the contributions and
suggests future work.
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Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) have been an important research area due
to its infrastructure-less, self-configuration and self-maintenance characteristics [1]
throughout the last two decades. Application domains include military operations,
emergency and rescue operations, wireless mesh and sensor networks and collabo-
rative and distributed computing [2]. Routing protocols, security, medium access
scheme, energy management, quality of service and scalability are major challenges
that need to be considered when a MANET is designed.
A number of routing protocols [3] for MANET have been proposed over the past
years. Routing protocols exchange routing information such as hop count, sequence
number, signal strength, and geographical information, and establish an efficient and
feasible route to a destination node. The major issues involved in designing a routing
protocol for ad hoc wireless networks are node mobility, bandwidth constrained wire-
less channel, resource constrained nodes, and error prone shared broadcast wireless
channel. MANET routing protocols cope well with dynamically changing topology
but are not designed to provide defence against malicious attackers [2]. Current
routing protocols are not able to thwart common security threats. Most of these
protocols do not incorporate any security and are highly vulnerable to attacks.
MANET is highly exposed to security attacks in comparison to traditional wired
networks. There are a large number of existing attacks against MANET routing
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protocols [4]. Malicious nodes and attackers inject erroneous routing information,
replaying old routing information or distort routing information in order to partition
a network or overload a network with retransmissions, thereby causing congestion,
and hence a Denial of Service (DoS) attack can be launched. Detection of these
malicious nodes through routing information is difficult due to the dynamic topology
of MANET. Lack of central authority, shared broadcast channel, limited bandwidth
and limited resource availability are some unique characteristics of MANET that
cause difficulty in the designing of secured routing protocol.
Secure communication is very important in applications like military environ-
ments. Recently, several research efforts have been introduced to counter against
malicious attacks on MANETs [2]. Most of the previous research has focused mainly
on providing preventive schemes to protect the routing protocol in MANET. These
schemes are designed based on key management or encryption techniques to pre-
vent unauthorized nodes from joining the network and to discover misbehaviours.
In general, the main drawback of these approaches is that they introduce a heavy
traffic load to exchange and verify keys which is very expensive in terms of the band-
width constraint for MANET nodes that have limited battery and computational
capabilities.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents an intro-
duction to Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). In Section 2.3, Mobile Ad Hoc
Network characteristics are presented. Section 2.4 MANET routing protocols and
their classifications are discussed. In Section 2.5, MANET routing attacks are pre-
sented. Section 2.6 introduces a brief discussion about cryptographic algorithms and
existing secured MANET routing protocols. In Section 2.7, a summary is presented.
2.2 Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs)
Wireless networks can be classified into two types; Infrastructure or Infrastructure
less. In an infrastructure wireless network, devices such as access points and base
stations are located throughout the network. Mobile nodes can maintain their con-
nection with the network by disconnecting from the range of a base station and con-
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necting to another base station. On the other hand, in infrastructure-less networks
devices are connected without any fixed base stations. Mobile nodes dynamically
establish and maintain routing among themselves as nodes act as routers. Figure
2.1 [5] presents an example of Mobile Ad Hoc Network.
Figure 2.1: Mobile Ad hoc Network [5]
A MANET is a decentralized network in which there is no infrastructure to
manage the information traffic between existing nodes. MANET can be defined
as a collection of wireless mobile nodes that communicate with each other without
centralized control or established infrastructures [6]. In a MANET, a wireless device
(node) communicates directly with other wireless device inside their radio range in
a peer-to-peer nature. If a source node needs to communicate with a destination
node which is outside the source’s range, it has to use intermediate nodes within its
radio range to forward data to the destination. Each node in a MANET acts as a
router and as a host. Node mobility is one of main features of MANET which causes
network topology to change that requires frequent updating of routing information.
In addition, MANET nodes are characterised by their limited resources such as
power and computational capabilities.
2.3 MANET Characteristics
MANETs have become a major field of research in recent years because of the
challenging problems they pose. The links in a MANET are more susceptible to
transmission errors than wired links [6]. In addition, the mobility of the nodes leads
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to links breaking and new links being formed as the nodes move in and out of range.
MANETs have many challenges that impact on its performance, and as we focus in
the thesis on MANET security, we can notice the impact of these challenges on its
security in the following sections. These challenges can be summarized as follows:
2.3.1 Distributed Operation
Nodes in MANET have to cooperate with each other acting as a relay to implement
functions such as routing and security. The lack of centralized management makes
conventional trust management for nodes impossible and makes the detection of
attacks difficult especially in a highly dynamic and large scale MANET [6].
2.3.2 Dynamic Topologies
Since the nodes are mobile, the network topology is susceptible to rapid and unpre-
dictable changes. Mobility is one of the most important characteristics of MANETs
which leads to a dynamic network topology. Mobility is the major issue that causes
frequent link failures in MANETs, resulting in performance failure especially in high
node mobility [3]. Dynamic topology forces nodes to continuously update their
routing tables and share this routing information among them. Network topology
changes as well may disturb any trust relationship among nodes especially if some
nodes have been detected as malicious nodes.
2.3.3 Node-Constrained Resources
MANET nodes are mobile devices with limited CPU processing capability, small
memory size, bandwidth and low power storage [2]. Therefore algorithms need
to be optimized to minimize resource consumption which imposes a difficulty to
implement cryptographic algorithms [4]. In addition, most of the nodes usually use
batteries which may tempt a node to behave in a selfish manner when using its
limited power supply.
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2.3.4 Limited Physical Security
MANETs are generally more prone to physical security threats than other wireless
networks because of their distributed system nature [3]. Routing algorithms for
MANETs usually assume that nodes are cooperative and non-malicious [2]. As
a result a malicious attacker can easily become an important routing agent and
disrupt network operation. MANETs have an increased possibility of eavesdropping,
spoofing, masquerading, and DoS type attacks.
2.4 MANET Routing Protocols
MANETs introduce more challenges in designing routing protocols than wired net-
works. Many protocols have been designed and developed to route data from a
source to a destination under the limitations of these networks. A route is needed
by a source whenever data needs to be transmitted to a destination through other
intermediate nodes. MANET routing protocols are designed based on an absence
of a centralized entity to create loop-free routes while keeping the communication
overheads to a minimum as the topology changes [3]. Basically, routing protocols
can be classified into [3]:
(a) Proactive Protocols
(b) Reactive Protocols
(c) Hybrid Protocols
(d) Multipath Protocols
2.4.1 Proactive Routing Protocols
Proactive MANET protocols are table-driven protocols that actively determine the
layout of the network [3]. Each node maintains one or more tables containing routing
information to other nodes in the network. A node frequently updates these tables to
maintain the latest view of the network topology by propagating periodic updates
to minimize route selection time. Mobility of nodes in MANET produces many
11
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stale routes as the topology changes. So, these protocols are designed to optimize
solutions that resolve the trade-off between maintaining an updated view of the
network topology and a large amount of traffic overhead generated when processing
these stale routes. Thus, proactive MANET protocols best suit small networks that
have low node mobility. Some of the proactive routing protocols are presented in
the following sections.
2.4.1.1 Destination Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV)
Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) [7] is one of the earliest MANET
routing protocols which is based on the Bellman Ford algorithm. A node maintains
a routing table that includes a destination, a distance in hops to that destination
and a sequence number which is assigned by the destination. Sequence numbers
are used to determine stale and loop-free routes. A node periodically broadcasts
its routing table to its neighbours using either a full or incremental dump. While
a node sends its entire routing in full dump, it sends only those routes which have
been changed since the last full dump as an incremental dump. Full dumps are
preferable when there is little movement in the network and updates are infrequent.
On the other hand, incremental dump is more efficient when the network is stable.
Broken links can be detected by missing transmissions. A node discovers a broken
link has to broadcast an update packet to inform others about this broken link.
2.4.1.2 Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP)
Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [8] is also based on the Bellman-Ford algorithm.
A routing table includes a destination, a distance in hops to that destination and
a cost metric to use this route which is usually the minimum cost of all the routes.
To maintain a routing table, a node has to periodically send update packets to its
neighbours that contain the recent route changes in its routing table. A node sends
an empty HELLO packet if there is no route changes in its routing table to keep a
link to a neighbour alive.
12
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2.4.1.3 Fisheye State Routing (FSR)
Fisheye State Routing (FSR) [9] is designed based on the link state routing to
reduce routing overhead in dynamic environments. Link state routing broadcasts
the updated information throughout the network. A node has to update its routing
table by the most accurate routing information about its closest neighbours only
and exchange this information periodically with its neighbours. That ensures that
a packet is routed along the most accurate route to a destination.
2.4.1.4 Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [10] is designed based on the link state
routing. This protocol suggests that a node elects a set of one-hop neighbours to act
as multipoint relays (MPR). MPR has to be chosen such that its range covers all its
two-hop neighbours. MPR forwards messages during the route information flooding
process, generates link state information and reports links between themselves and
their MPR electors. Non-MPR nodes process packets but do not forward those as
the forward process is assigned only to MPRs. Bidirectional links can be determined
by periodic HELLO packets containing information about all neighbours and their
link status. A route is a sequence of hops from a source to a destination through
MPRs within the network.
2.4.2 Reactive Routing Protocols
Reactive MANET protocols are on-demand protocols that are initiated by a source
[11]. Routes are created whenever a source node requires to send data to a desti-
nation node. The source node initiates a route discovery procedure by transmitting
route requests throughout the network and waits until receiving a reply from the
destination node or an intermediate node that has a fresh route to that destination.
An established route is maintained as long as it is required through a route mainte-
nance procedure. The overheads added by these protocols include significant delay
before the packet can be transmitted and a significant amount of control traffic.
13
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Thus, reactive MANET protocols suit the networks that have high node mobility.
Some reactive routing protocols are presented in the following sections.
2.4.2.1 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [11] is a source routing protocol which means that a
data packet has to include a list of nodes representing the route to be followed. When
a source node wants to send data to a destination, it firstly checks its route cache.
If the required route is available, the source node includes the routing information
inside the data packet before sending it. Otherwise, the source node initiates a
route discovery by broadcasting a route request RREQ packet. Receiving a route
request packet, a node checks its route cache. If the node does not have routing
information for the requested destination, it appends its own address to the route
before rebroadcasting the RREQ. The destination or an intermediate nodes generate
a route reply RREP packet that includes the list of addresses received in RREQ and
unicasts it back along this path to the source. Route maintenance in DSR can be
achieved through sending RERR to the source node so it can initiate a new route
discovery.
2.4.2.2 Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [12] is designed to combine the features
of both DSR and DSDV routing protocols. When a source node requires to send data
to a destination and does not have a fresh route to this destination, it initiates a route
discovery by broadcasting a route request RREQ packet. Each node that receives
RREQ sets up a reverse route towards the source unless it has a fresher one. The
destination or an intermediate node that has a fresh route to the destination unicasts
a RREP packet which travels along the reverse path established at intermediate
nodes during the route discovery process. Then the source node starts sending data
to the destination through the neighbour node that first responded with a RREP.
Route maintenance is accomplished by sending a route error RERR packet to the
source if either the destination or one of the intermediate node moves away. Once
the source node receives RERR, it re-initiates the route discovery process. AODV
14
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uses a destination sequence number to ensure the freshness of a routing packet such
as DSDV protocol.
2.4.2.3 Associativity-Based Routing (ABR)
Associativity Based Routing (ABR) [13] considers route stability as the most im-
portant factor in selecting a route. ABR maintains the routing table by using an
associativity ticks mechanism. Periodic HELLO packets are exchanged between
neighbour nodes. Every node keeps an associativity table, in which it records the
connection stability between itself and its neighbours over time. A node that receives
a HELLO increases the associativity tick of its source. Therefore, the link with a
higher associativity tick is more stable than the one with a lower associativity tick.
When a neighbour node moves out, the node resets its respective associativity tick.
Routes are discovered by sending a broadcast query request packet which enables
the destination to be aware of all possible routes between itself and the source. Once
a destination has received the broadcast query packets, it selects the route with the
highest degree of associativity.
2.4.3 Hybrid Routing Protocols
Hybrid routing protocols are designed to achieve advantages of both reactive and
proactive routing protocols. These protocols use proactive protocols in areas that
have low mobility nodes while they use reactive protocols in areas that have high
mobility nodes. The hybrid protocols are proposed to reduce the control overhead
of proactive routing approaches and decrease the latency caused by route search
operations in reactive routing approaches. Some of the hybrid routing protocols are
presented in the following sections.
2.4.3.1 Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP)
Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [14] consists of two routing protocols, Intra-zone Rout-
ing protocol (IARP) and Inter-zone Routing Protocol (IERP). Proactive protocol
is used inside routing zones while reactive protocol is used between routing zones.
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Neighbour discovery is accomplished by IARP to maintain up-to-date routing ta-
bles. IERP is used as a reactive protocol for connecting with nodes in different zones.
ZRP is suitable for large networks to achieve a high performance by optimizing the
transmission ranges of the nodes.
2.4.3.2 Core Extraction Distributed Ad hoc Routing Protocol (CEDAR)
Core Extraction Distributed Ad hoc Routing Protocol (CEDAR) [15] defines a subset
of nodes in the network as “core”. Routing messages are only broadcast among cores
that can use any routing protocol. So, if a source node wishes to send data to a
destination, it sends a route request packet to its local core asking for a route to
the destination. The core is determined according to a distributed algorithm and
the number of core nodes is kept small. To select core nodes, neighbouring nodes
periodically exchange link state messages. Every mobile node in the network must
be adjacent to at least one core node and picks this core node as its dominator. The
algorithm guarantees that there is a core node at most 3 hops away from another
core node.
2.4.4 Multipath Routing Protocols
Reactive routing protocols suffer a lot within large networks. Excessive routing
overhead, high delay, unreliable data transfer and energy inefficiency are the main
reasons for scalability problems of reactive routing protocols. Multipath routing is
designed to improve the reliability by establishing multiple paths between a source
and a destination [16]. These protocols generate disjoint paths which can be classi-
fied as node-disjoint paths and link-disjoint paths. While node-disjoint paths share
only the source and the destination nodes in different links, link-disjoint paths do
not share links but intermediate nodes might be shared. So, the route discovery
mechanism of these protocols is designed to discover a maximum number of node-
disjoint or link-disjoint paths [17]. After discovering all node-disjoint or link-disjoint
paths, a node select a primary path from all these discovered paths. Some of the
multipath protocols are presented in the following sections.
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2.4.4.1 Ad hoc On-demand Multipath Distance Vector Routing
(AOMDV)
Ad hoc On demand Multipath Distance Vector (AOMDV) [18], is an extension to
the AODV routing protocol that is designed to create multiple loop-free and link-
disjoint paths. AOMDV computes the multiple paths during the route discovery and
it consists of two main components: a rule to create and maintain multiple paths at a
node, and a distributed protocol to calculate the link-disjoint paths. Paths between
a source and a destination are considered as disjoint paths if all intermediate nodes
along the paths are different. Each route request and route reply packet received by
a node has to be using a different route from the source to the destination. AOMDV
uses one of the alternative paths to forward packets if a path to this destination is
broken.
2.4.4.2 Scalable Multipath On-demand Routing (SMORT)
Scalable multipath on-demand routing protocol (SMORT) [19] is a multipath ex-
tension to AODV protocol. A primary path from a source to a destination is set up
which is usually the shortest path and multiple paths are created as fail-safe paths.
A fail-safe path is auxiliary to the primary path that bypasses at least one interme-
diate node on the primary path. Fail-safe path is used to send data when one or
more of the bypassed nodes on the primary path leave the network. While a node
can receive multiple copies of a Route Request (RREQ) packet, it rebroadcasts only
the first copy of the RREQ if it has not a route to the destination. An intermediate
node or a destination node can reply to multiple copies of RREQ. A node sending
a RREP to the source has to select the best reverse path from the paths stored in
the request table. Source node clarifies the first received RREP as the primary path
and stores it in the routing table.
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2.5 MANET Security
MANETs are more vulnerable to security attacks than fixed networks due their in-
herent characteristics. MANET mobility imposes a challenge that security services
have to be provided regardless of a network topology change. Mobility adds as
well a difficulty to distinguish between stale routes and fake routes and its dynamic
topology changes add more opportunities for attacks. Security solutions of wired
networks cannot be applied directly to MANETs because of the nature of the net-
work and because of an absence of a fixed or central infrastructure which eliminates
the possibility of establishing a centralized authority or trusted third party. Mobile
nodes in MANETs have limited computation and limited battery power capabilities
that impose another difficulty to implement cryptography and key management al-
gorithms which need high computations such as public key algorithms. So, MANETs
have security challenges that motivate researchers to resist different types of attacks
from passive eavesdropping to active interfering. A malicious node can attack in
different ways, such as replaying routing messages several times and fabricating fake
routing information to disrupt routing operations.
MANET routing protocols are designed based on the assumption that all nodes
cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation of the protocol. However,
the existence of malicious nodes cannot be ignored especially in MANETs because of
the wireless nature of the network. Routing protocols in MANET can be disrupted
by internal or external malicious nodes. An internal malicious node can be any
legitimate node of the network while an external malicious node is any other node.
However, external malicious nodes can be prohibited using cryptographic solutions
such as digital signatures to authenticate the nodes. Internal malicious nodes have
the capability to fully access the wireless link to propagate erroneous routing in-
formation, or to replay old routing information in order to partition a network or
overload a network with retransmissions, thereby causing congestion, and hence a
DoS. Detection of these malicious nodes through routing information is also difficult
due to the dynamic topology of MANETs.
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MANET routing protocols determine how data is forwarded from a source to
a destination through a number of intermediate nodes. A routing protocol must
encapsulate an essential set of security mechanisms that help prevent, detect, and
respond to security attacks. Security requirements such as availability, confidential-
ity, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation [20] can be applied in designing
routing protocols to limit these risks and to maintain a reliable and secure data
transmission. MANET routing protocols cannot apply some of these goals due to
the nature of the network.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is sometimes called secrecy or privacy. It ensures
a protection of information from being exposed to unauthorized access. The wireless
nature of MANET introduces an opportunity to nodes within the direct transmis-
sion range to obtain the data. In addition, intermediate nodes which act as routers
receive this data, so they can easily eavesdrop. MANET routing protocols do not in-
clude confidentiality as routing packets need to be processed by intermediate nodes
before forwarding to other nodes in the network [21].
Availability: It ensures that a network service or resources are available to legiti-
mate users when required in a timely manner and the network is survivable under
malicious behaviours. For example, MANETs routing protocols can provide alter-
native routes to resist the DoS attack.
Authentication: It verifies the identity of a node to prevent impersonation. In
wired networks and infrastructure-based wireless networks, it is possible to imple-
ment a central authority at a point such as a router, base station, or access point.
On the other hand, MANETs cannot authenticate an entity because the lack of a
central authority in these networks.
Integrity: It ensures that data has been not illegally altered during transmission.
Due to the wireless nature of MANET, routing information such as hop count can
be modified or deleted by a malicious node during transmission. A malicious node
can also resend stale data which is known as a replay attack.
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Non-repudiation: It ensures that a node cannot falsely deny having received or
sent certain data. This is helpful when a node has proven its involvement in a
malicious behaviour and its identity is sent to other nodes to ignore its upcoming
data.
2.5.1 MANET Routing Attacks
Absence of a centralized authority and the assumption that nodes cooperate without
maliciously disrupting the routing protocol make the process of securing routing
protocols in MANET a challenging issue. MANET routing protocols do not have a
clear line of defence to these attacks although these networks are accessible to both
legitimate users and malicious attackers because of their wireless nature. Deliberate
non-cooperation is mainly caused by either a selfish node that aims to save its
power or a malicious node that is attempting to attack the network. Analysing
various types of attacks that can be fabricated by either malicious or selfish nodes
is always the key step towards developing good security solutions. MANET routing
protocols are exposed to both active and passive attacks.
2.5.2 Passive Attacks
A Passive Attack does not disrupt the operation of a routing protocol, but tries to
discover valuable information by eavesdropping data exchanged in a network without
altering it. Therefore, a passive attack is a threat to data confidentiality. Detection
of these attacks is impossible in most situations since the date being transmitted is
not altered and hence defending against this type of attacks is complicated. Even if
it is not possible to identify the exact location of a node, one may be able to discover
information about the network topology, using these attacks. Some of these passive
attacks are presented below.
2.5.2.1 Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis is used to achieve information on which nodes communicate with
each other and how much data is processed.
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2.5.2.2 Traffic Monitoring
Traffic Monitoring is used to identify the two communicating nodes and functionality
which could provide information to launch further attacks.
2.5.2.3 Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping usually happens in MANETs to obtain some confidential information
that should be kept secret during the communication. This information may include
the location, public key, private key or even passwords of the nodes.
2.5.3 Active Attacks
An Active attack occurs when a malicious node actively intercepts the data and
attempts to modify, delete, add or redirect this data to disrupt the operation of the
protocol. These attacks can be launched by external malicious nodes that do not
belong to the network or by internal legitimate nodes that attempt to misbehave.
A malicious node aims to cause congestion, propagate fake routing information
or disturb nodes from providing services in external attacks. On the other hand,
a malicious node aims to gain normal access of the network and shares network
activities by impersonating legitimate node in internal attacks. Internal attacks are
more severe and harder to detect than external attacks as they have legitimate access
to the network. Routing protocols should be able to secure themselves against both
types of attacks. Active attacks against MANET routing protocols are classified
based on modification, impersonation or fabrication.
2.5.3.1 Modification-based Attacks
Modification Attacks [4] aim to violate data integrity by modifying routing packets
to redirect them to specific nodes. Some of these attacks are presented below.
2.5.3.1.1 Redirection Attack
A destination always selects a route to a destination that depends on a metric value
such as sequence number, hop count, delay etc. A malicious node in the redirection
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attack [22] usually changes one or more of these metrics to spoof its neighbours that
it has an optimum route to a destination in order to redirect the traffic.
2.5.3.1.2 Misrouting Attack
A malicious node in the misrouting attack [23] sends a data packet to the wrong
destination. This type of attack is carried out by modifying the final destination
address of the data packet or by forwarding a data packet to the wrong next hop in
the route to the destination.
2.5.3.1.3 Detour Attack
A malicious node in a detour attack [24] adds a number of nodes to a route during
the route discovery phase which diverts the traffic through these nodes that might
include malicious nodes which could launch other attacks.
2.5.3.1.4 Blackmail Attack
Blackmail attack [22] causes false identification of a good node as a malicious node.
MANET nodes usually keep information of discovered malicious nodes in a blacklist.
A malicious node may blackmail a good node by telling other nodes in the network
to add that node to their blacklists as well, thus avoiding this victim node in future
routes.
2.5.3.1.5 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
A malicious node in the DoS attack [25] aims a complete destruction of the rout-
ing function. A malicious node intercepts the route packet and modifies it before
forwarding it to a next node which can cause the dropping of network traffic, redi-
recting to a different destination or to a longer route to reach to destination that
causes unnecessary communication delay. Also a DoS attack can be implemented if
a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest
path to a destination which is a consequence to blackhole attack.
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2.5.3.2 Impersonation-based Attacks
Impersonation attacks are a severe threat to the authenticity and confidentiality of
MANET. Since current MANET routing protocols such as AODV and DSR do not
authenticate source IP or MAC addresses, a malicious impersonates a legitimate
node can launch many attacks by spoofing a routing packet. As a result, the ma-
licious node can receive packets intended to the impersonated node or it can even
completely isolate that impersonated node from the network. Some of these attacks
are presented below.
2.5.3.2.1 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
A malicious node reads and possibly modifies the routing packets between two par-
ties in this attack [26]. An attacker can impersonate the receiver with respect to the
sender, and the sender with respect to the receiver, without having either of them
realize that they have been attacked.
2.5.3.2.2 Sybil Attack
A malicious node in the Sybil attack [27] pretends to have multiple identities. An
attacker can behave as if it were a larger number of nodes either by impersonating
other nodes or simply by claiming false identities. All Sybil identities can participate
simultaneously in the network or they may be cycled through.
2.5.3.3 Fabrication-based Attacks
Fabrication attacks are used to drain off the limited resources of nodes or the network
connectivity by sending false routing packets. For example, flooding a specific node
with unnecessary routing packets, fabricating route error RERRs to the other nodes
so as to inform them that a route is no longer available, or attempting to create
routes to nodes that do not exist which overwhelms the routing tables of neighbours,
preventing them from creating of new routes. These attacks can result in a DoS
attack. Some of these attacks are presented below.
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2.5.3.3.1 Routing Table Poisoning Attack
A malicious node creates fictitious, or modifies genuine, routing packets before for-
warding them to authorized nodes in the network to launch this attack [28]. This
inflates the routing tables of victim nodes with a number of false entries and may
result in congestion in portions of the network, or even make some parts of the
network inaccessible.
2.5.3.3.2 Flooding Attack
A malicious node in a flooding attack [29] floods its neighbours with a high number
of false requests RREQ to non-existent nodes. It aims to prevent its neighbours from
creating new genuine routes by overwhelming their routing tables or by effectively
using the bandwidth and processing resources of the nodes along the route.
2.5.3.3.3 Rushing Attack
A malicious node in a rushing attack [30] tampers the incoming RREQ packets by
modifying the node list to include itself, and fast forwarding the modified RREQ
packet to the next node. Since most of the reactive routing protocols forward only
one RREQ packet, often the route request forwarded by the malicious nodes reaches
the destination before all its copies from the other nodes which leads to inclusion of
this malicious node in the created route between the source and the destination.
2.5.3.3.4 Blackhole Attack
A malicious node in a blackhole attack [31] advertises that it has an optimum route
for a destination. This malicious node sends a modified packet or generates fake
routing information to neighbour nodes causing other nodes to route data packets
through this malicious one. Then, the malicious node discards any or all of the
network traffic being routed through it. This attack can cause a DoS if the malicious
node becomes dominant in multiple routes between sources and destinations.
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2.5.3.3.5 Grayhole Attack
A malicious node in a grayhole attack [32] drops all data packets but it processes and
forwards normally all control messages routed through it. So, the malicious node in
reactive routing protocols replies with a genuine RREP clarifying that it has a route
to a destination and later after asking by the source to route the data, it drops these
data. This selective dropping makes grayhole attacks much more difficult to detect
than blackhole attacks.
2.5.3.3.6 Wormhole Attack
A wormhole attack [33] involves the cooperation between two malicious nodes using a
high-speed channel, such as a fast LAN connection, as a tunnel known as a wormhole.
Wormhole attack is a severe threat to MANET routing protocols because it is hard
to detect and the two colluding nodes can potentially distort the topology in which
two distant nodes consider themselves neighbours and send data using the tunnel
[34].
2.5.3.3.7 Selfish Attack
A malicious node in a selfish attack [1] saves its resources, such as battery, by not
cooperating in the network operations. The selfish node drops all data and control
packets even if these packets are sent to it which affects the network performance.
It complies with routing protocol when it requires to send data to a destination.
2.6 Securing MANET Routing Protocols
MANETs secured routing protocols mainly use various cryptographic algorithms to
achieve secured routing information. Before we discuss some of the available secured
routing mechanisms, we briefly present the cryptographic algorithms in the following
section.
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2.6.1 Cryptographic Algorithms
A cryptographic algorithm is a sequence of processes used to encipher and decipher
packets [35]. Encryption and decryption allows communications between two parties
while preventing unauthorized third parties from understanding their communica-
tions. Often cryptographic algorithms are necessary to secure networks, particularly
when communicating through an untrusted network such as the Internet or an open
medium network such as a MANET. A source encrypts plaintext into ciphertext
before sending this ciphertext through the network, while a destination decrypts
this ciphertext to restore the plaintext. Cryptographic algorithms can be classi-
fied as symmetric key encryption, asymmetric key encryption, cryptographic hash
functions and digital signatures.
2.6.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric key algorithms [36] encrypt and decrypt data using a single key, which
is normally called a secret key, as shown in Figure 2.2 [37]. This shared key must
remain secret to be effective. Sending a secret key as a plain text through a medium
before using it increases the possibility of an attacker to record this key for later
use. Secure key management and distribution is a challenge in large networks as
it involves a large number of keys’ authentications and secure distribution of them.
Exchanging secret keys is difficult, especially in wireless networks, since each two
communication parties usually exchange keys on the same medium that they are
using encryption to protect from. Cryptographic key exchange protocols such as
the Diffie-Hellman protocol introduce a solution for this key distribution problem
by allowing key agreement without revealing the key on the network [35]. Triple
Data Encryption Standard (3DES) [38], Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [39],
RC4 and RC5 [40] are the most commonly used symmetric key algorithms. To secure
data using symmetric key encryption, the current advice is that the key length should
not be less than 90 bits [41].
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Figure 2.2: Symmetric Key Cryptography Model [37]
2.6.1.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
Asymmetric key algorithms, known also as public key algorithms, use two keys as
shown in Figure 2.3 [37]. These keys are mathematically related although knowledge
of one key does not introduce an opportunity to easily determine the other key [35].
A node has two keys, the public key is the key that can be freely distributed to
other nodes and used by these nodes to encrypt data for this node. The other
key is the private key that is only known by this node and is used to decrypt the
data for itself. Public keys are usually delivered to nodes with certificates that are
validated by trusted third parties. Public key cryptography is rarely used in direct
data encryption because it is slow for large messages [1]. Generally, public key
encryption is used to agree on a secret key for a symmetric algorithm, and then all
further encryption is done using this secret key. Therefore, public key encryption
algorithms are primarily used in key exchange protocols and when non-repudiation
is required. Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [42] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) [43] are the most popular public key encryption algorithms. RSA, Diffie-
Hellman, and El Gamal techniques require more bits for the keys for equivalent
security compared to typical symmetric keys; a 1024-bit key in these systems is
supposed to be roughly equivalent to an 80-bit symmetric key [41]. Today, RSA
users generally use keys that are at least 2048 bits long [44].
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Figure 2.3: Asymmetric Key Cryptography Model [37]
2.6.1.3 Cryptographic hash functions
Cryptographic hash functions are essentially cryptographic checksum algorithms
with special properties that produce a message digest known as Message Authenti-
cation Code (MAC) [45]. It is an algorithm which creates a standard length digital
representation of a message which is usually much smaller than the message and
unique to it. A change to the message will produce a different hash result even
when the same hash function is used. A cryptographic hash is a one-way function
meaning that given the hash value it is computationally infeasible to reconstruct the
original message. Usually, a message digest of a message is generated by a sender
as a function of a secret key and a hash function and then it is appended to the
message. Once receiving a message, a recipient regenerates the message digest of the
received message and compares it to the appended digest in the message to ensure
the integrity of the message. Message Digest (MD5) [46] and Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA) [47] are the most popular one-way cryptographic hash functions.
2.6.1.4 Digital signatures
MAC does not suit many applications because they require agreeing on a shared
secret. A digital signature introduces a solution that depends on public key cryp-
tography. A source node signs a message with its private key, then anyone can use
the source’s public key to verify that the source is who has signed the message. The
RSA digital signature [42] and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [48] are the
most popular digital signature algorithms. Digital signature algorithms are very
slow as they are designed based on public key algorithms. To overcome this draw-
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back, the algorithm generally is applied to a message digest instead of the entire
message. An application using digital signatures is the public key certificate created
by trusted third party.
2.6.2 Secured Routing Mechanisms
The majority of MANET routing protocols have been designed without security
considerations. As mentioned earlier, their design assumes that nodes are trusted
and they cooperate without maliciously disrupting the protocol operation. However,
existence of malicious nodes cannot be ignored in a large scale and dynamic net-
work such as a MANET. Non-securing MANET routing protocol exposes nodes to
several different types of attacks. MANET secured routing protocols can be mainly
categorized in two major categories:
Prevention: Prevention mechanism is designed to prevent a malicious node from
initiating a misbehaviour action. Its design is based on modifying a routing proto-
col by including the cryptographic algorithms. It usually appends encrypted routing
packet information as an extension to the basic routing protocol’s packet to authenti-
cate the confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation of routing information. These
proposals usually use symmetric, asymmetric or hash algorithms.
Detection and Reaction: Detection and Reaction mechanisms attempt to dis-
cover malicious nodes or misbehaviour actions in the network to maintain the proper
routing protocol operation. In addition to various types of attacks, there are a large
number of routing protocol misbehaviours that have to be discovered. A selfish node
may misbehave by agreeing to forward packets and then refrain from doing so to
save its resources. A malicious node launches a DoS attack by dropping packets. So,
Detection and Reaction mechanisms have to detect and react to such misbehaviours.
2.6.2.1 Prevention Mechanisms
These mechanisms use cryptographic algorithms to prevent various attacks. One
of the challenges for these solutions, if using an asymmetric key or a digital signa-
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ture, is the management and distribution of the keys as a MANET does not have a
centralized trusted third party. Another challenge for these solutions, if using sym-
metric key, is the large number of secret keys that have to be exchanged between
nodes. Mathematically, a network of n nodes requires n(n+1)/2 pairs of secret
keys in the network. Another challenge is that these keys are usually transmitted
through the wireless medium which introduces an opportunity for a malicious node
to intercept one and use it later to launch an attack. Hash algorithms are used to
ensure the integrity of the message. One of the most important disadvantages of
the prevention mechanisms is that they cannot ensure complete cooperation among
nodes in the network.
2.6.2.1.1 Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN)
Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN) [49] is a secured reactive rout-
ing protocol that implements cryptographic certificates to achieve end-to-end au-
thenticated routing information. It assumes pre-establishment of key management
and distribution and requires that a node has to have a preliminary certification
signed by a trusted certification authority before joining the network.
A source initiates a route discovery by broadcasting a Route Discovery Packet
(RDP) that is digitally signed by its private key. RDP includes the certificate of the
source node, a nonce, a timestamp and the address of the destination node. A nonce
and timestamp are used to prevent replay attacks and to ensure loop-free routes. A
neighbour of the source has to verify the integrity of the received packet by verifying
the signature of the source before appending its own signature encapsulated over
the signed packet. All subsequent intermediate nodes remove the signature of their
predecessor, verify it before appending their signature to the packet. The destination
verifies the signature of both its predecessor and the source before sending a Reply
packet (REP). Similarly, each node along the path from the destination to the source
has to verify the signature of its predecessor, sign and append its own certificate
before forwarding the REP to the next hop. A source verifies the signature of both
its predecessor and the destination received in the REP and trust the returned path
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from destination. Route maintenance can be achieved via an error message that is
generated and forwarded to the source node if there is a broken link.
ARAN provides effective protection from modification, impersonation, and fab-
rication attacks as a result of its strong authentication, message integrity, and non-
repudiation features. On the other hand, ARAN has a high computational cost for
using heavy asymmetric cryptographic operations and large routing packets. Selfish
attacks cannot be discovered by ARAN.
2.6.2.1.2 Security-Aware ad-hoc Routing (SAR)
Security-Aware ad-hoc Routing (SAR) [50] is an extension of the AODV routing
protocol that implements symmetric cryptography to provide security to a MANET
routing protocol. Different trust levels are implemented using shared symmetric keys
between nodes along a path. Nodes that have a same trust level should have the
same shared secret key. A node has to encrypt a routing packet using a shared secret
key before sending it. Once receiving this routing packet, a node has to decrypt it
using the shared secret key before rebroadcasting it. So, only nodes with the same
trust level can read and forward a packet. A source has to select the desired security
level to route the data. A packet received by a destination has to travel through
nodes having the same trust level as the source node. A RREP is sent from an
intermediate node or the destination node to the source node through the same
shared secret key. If there is more than one route sharing the same secret key, the
shortest route is selected for data forwarding. SAR provides effective protection of
routing messages from modification, impersonation, and fabrication attacks. The
disadvantage of SAR is that it involves significant encryption overhead since source,
intermediate and destination nodes have to perform both encryption and decryption
operations.
2.6.2.1.3 Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [51] is a secured reactive routing protocol designed
based on the assumption that each pair of nodes share a secret key. The protocol uses
symmetric and hash algorithms to authenticate the IP header, routing information
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and the shared key. A source node sends a RREQ packet that includes the hashed
value of the request, which is calculated based on the agreed secret key between
them, to a destination. The destination generates the hashed value of the request and
compares the output with the one received from the source. Matching ensures the
authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the RREQ message. The destination
replies with a RREP packet that includes the path information from the source to
destination and appends the hash value of the reply using their agreed secret key.
The source node, upon receiving the RREP packet, generates the hash value of the
reply and compares it to the received one to ensure the identity of the destination and
the integrity of the reply. If they match, the source starts sending the data encrypted
using their secret key. SRP achieves a low computational cost and overhead and
successfully protects against IP spoofing because the IP address is one of the values
hashed.
2.6.2.1.4 Secure Efficient Ad hoc Networks (SEAD)
Secure Efficient Ad hoc Networks (SEAD) [52] is a secured proactive routing protocol
designed based on the DSDV protocol. The protocol implements symmetric and
hash algorithms to protect the modification of routing information such as metric,
sequence number and source node. SEAD uses a hash for ensuring the integrity of
the information encapsulated in the routing updates. Authentication of the source
is achieved by providing a signature of the hash value using a pre-established shared
secret key between the nodes to authenticate the routing update message. Creating
loop-free routes can be achieved by using destination sequence numbers to protect
against reply attacks. The protocol provides strong protection against malicious
nodes attempting to tamper the destination sequence number. However, SEAD
does not protect against an attacker tampering the next hop or the destination field
of a routing update packet as they are not hashed.
2.6.2.1.5 ARIADNE
ARIADNE [53] is a secure reactive routing protocol that implements symmetric
and hash algorithms and its design is based on DSR to provide authentication of
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routing messages. ARIADNE assumes that an agreed shared secret between each
pair of nodes is established before starting its normal operation. A source node
sends a RREQ containing its address, a destination address, timestamp, and hashed
value for this information. An intermediate node verifies the hash value before
appending its address to the node list and replaces the old hash value with a new
one that includes its address. The destination node verifies each hop of the route by
comparing the received hash value with the generated hash value of the DSR packet
and then replies with RREP. The source repeats the process to authenticate the
reply from the destination. ARIADNE provides good defence against modification,
fabrication, and spoofing as a result of routing message verification feature.
2.6.2.1.6 Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol
(SAODV)
Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (SAODV) [54] is a
secured reactive routing protocol that implements asymmetric and hash algorithms
and its design is based on AODV. SAODV provides an end-to-end authentication
and hop-to-hop verification of the routing messages. SAODV uses digital signature
to authenticate a routing message and a hash function to authenticate the hop count
field within RREQ and RREP messages as it is the only mutable field.
A source sending a RREQ creates a hash value for the hop count and signs
the request with its private key. An intermediate node verifies both the hop count
and the digital signature of the RREQ by the public key of the source. Successful
verification ensures the identity and integrity of the request and the node then
can establish the reverse route entry to the source in its routing table. Then the
intermediate node increments the hop count value of the RREQ and computes the
new hash value that includes the new hop count before appending it to the RREQ
and broadcast. The destination verifies both the hop count and the digital signature
of the RREQ to ensure the identity and integrity of the request and replies with
a RREP that is signed with its private key. Similarly, intermediate nodes and the
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source verify the RREP similarly to authenticate the identity and the hop count of
the destination.
2.6.2.1.7 Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP)
Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP) [55] is a secure proactive protocol that
implements asymmetric and hash algorithms to secure the route discovery and the
distribution of link state information. Periodic Hello messages are used in the neigh-
bour discovery phase and are signed by the private key of the sender. A node re-
ceiving a link update messages verifies the attached signature using the public key
of the sender. The hop count field in the update message is protected using a hash
function.
2.6.2.2 Detection and Reaction Mechanisms
Detection and Reaction mechanisms discover malicious nodes and take a proper
action to maintain the proper operation of the routing protocol. Byzantine algo-
rithm, CORE, CONFIDANT, and Watchdog and Pathrater are examples of these
algorithms.
2.6.2.2.1 Byzantine Algorithm
The Byzantine algorithm [56] is used to protect the network from byzantine failures
which include the modification of packets, dropping packets and attacks caused
by selfish or malicious nodes. The Byzantine algorithm consists of three different
phases which are route discovery, fault detection and link weight management. The
route discovery phase is very similar to reactive protocols in which a source node
broadcasts a RREQ packet containing its address, destination address, a sequence
number, and also includes a list of detected malicious links and their weights signed
with its private key for authentication to its neighbours. An intermediate node that
does not have a route to the destination verifies the signature of the source before
rebroadcasting it to other nodes. The destination node verifies the signature and
creates a route reply message RREP towards the source that contains the source,
34
Chapter 2: Literature Review
the destination, a respond sequence number and a combined link weight list (for
both the source and the destination).
The fault detection phase ensures that an intermediate node sends an acknowl-
edgement to the source node for every received packet. If the number of unacknowl-
edged packets exceeds some threshold value, the route is registered as faulty. The
link weight management phase calculates the weight of the links. If a link is iden-
tified as faulty by the fault detection phase, its corresponding link weight value is
doubled which affects on the following route discovery phases as a link with a lower
weight value is considered as better link in the route discovery phase .
2.6.2.2.2 CORE
CORE [25] is a protocol that monitors the cooperative behaviour of nodes. It uses
a reputation table and Watchdog mechanism to identify the misbehaving nodes.
The reputation table maintains a table of intermediate nodes and their associated
reputations. The Watchdog calculates the reputation value based on a reputation
function. Whenever an intermediate node refuses to cooperate with a source node,
the CORE scheme will decrease the reputation of this intermediate node which
can lead to the elimination of this intermediate node from the network when its
reputation falls below a threshold.
2.6.2.2.3 CONFIDANT
The Cooperation of Nodes Fairness In Dynamic Ad hoc Networks (CONFIDANT)
[57] protocol is used to identify non-cooperative nodes. This protocol consists of a
monitor, a trust manager, a reputation system and a path manager. The monitor
is responsible for monitoring passive acknowledgements for each packet it forwards.
The trust manager is responsible for sending and receiving alarm messages. Alarm
messages are exchanged between nodes that are predefined as friends about misbe-
having nodes.
The reputation system maintains a table of nodes and their associated ratings.
Ratings are modified according to a rate function that assigns a substantially smaller
weight to alarm messages reported from friends regarding a misbehaving node and
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a greater weight for direct observations. The path manager manages path addition,
deletion, and update according to the feedback it received from the reputation sys-
tem. If a rating falls under a certain threshold the path manager removes the path
containing an identified malicious node.
2.6.2.2.4 Watchdog and Pathrater
The Watchdog and Pathrater [58] protocol is used to discover malicious nodes by
monitoring the behaviour of next node in a path. A node transmitting a packet to
its next node in a path eavesdrops on the medium to ensure that this next node
retransmits the packet without altering it. Watchdog increases the failure rating of
a node if it notices a malicious behaviour such as DoS or modification of the packet.
This failure rating is used by Pathrater to determine a reliable path from a source
to a destination.
2.6.2.3 Secured Routing Mechanisms Drawbacks
Prevention mechanisms are designed based on the usage of cryptographic algorithms
which do not suit the limited resources of MANET nodes. In addition, these solu-
tions succeed in discovering some attacks and fail in others especially the flooding
attacks such as SAODV as shown later in Chapter 4. On the other hand, detec-
tion and reaction mechanisms are used to discover malicious nodes or misbehaviour
actions in the network to maintain the proper routing protocol operation. These
solutions cannot guarantee the true classification of nodes because the cooperative
nature of the MANETs which leads to false exclusion of innocent nodes and/or good
classification of malicious nodes as shown later in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
The drawbacks of both types of mechanisms are the key to study and inves-
tigate the impacts of different types of attacks on the MANET reactive routing
protocols. The impact of flooding, blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks on the
MANET reactive routing protocol are presented in Chapter 4. As it will be clear,
the blackhole and flooding attacks have dramatic negative impact while grayhole
and selfish attacks have little negative impact on the performance of MANET rout-
ing protocols. This study and analysis clarifies that the current solutions for both
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flooding and blackhole attacks as shown in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively
have many drawbacks that prevent them from being implemented. These drawbacks
introduce the motivation to design and implement new mechanisms that can resist
both attacks.
2.7 Summary
MANETs introduce more challenges in designing routing protocols than wired net-
works. MANET routing protocols can be classified into proactive, reactive, hybrid
and multipath routing protocols. Proactive MANET protocols are designed based
on a node maintaining one or more tables containing routing information to other
nodes in the network and has to frequently update these tables to maintain a lat-
est view of the network topology. Reactive MANET protocols are initiated by a
source and the routes are created whenever a source node requires to send data to
a destination node. Hybrid routing protocols use proactive protocols in areas that
have low node mobility while use reactive protocols in areas that have high node
mobility. Multipath routing is designed to improve the reliability by establishing
multiple paths between a source and destination.
MANET routing protocols has not a clear line of defence to either active or
passive attacks as they are designed based on the assumption that nodes cooperate
without malicious disruption of the routing protocol. Security solutions of wired
networks cannot be applied directly to MANETs because of an absence of a central-
ized authority, and limited resources that impose another difficulty to implement
cryptography and key management algorithms. MANETs secured routing protocols
can be mainly categorized into prevention mechanisms, and detection and reaction
mechanisms. Prevention mechanism use cryptographic algorithms to prevent a ma-
licious node to initiate a misbehaviour action. Detection and Reaction mechanism
attempts to discover malicious nodes or misbehaviour actions in the network to
maintain the proper routing protocol operation.
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3.1 Introduction
MANET routing protocols are designed based on the assumption that all nodes
cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation of the routing protocol. Re-
active MANET protocols are initiated by a source whenever it needs to send data
to a destination node. Selecting well-known reactive routing protocols that repre-
sent different approaches such as single path, multipath and secured from the wide
span of these protocols requires a detailed study of these protocols. AODV, DSR,
AOMDV and SAODV routing protocols are selected to study their behaviours under
various attacks.
MANET routing protocols should be able to secure themselves against various
attacks. Active attacks are classified based on modification, impersonation or fabri-
cation of the routing packets. Selecting multiple attacks that represent fabrications
or modifications of routing packets, partial or full misbehaving requires as well a
deep study of various attacks. Flooding, blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks are
selected to represent the wide range of malicious behaviours and analyse the effect
of them on network performance. NS-2 is the most widely used network simulation
tool for network research. It is classified as an object-orientated discrete event
simulator. NS-2 has been selected as a simulation tool to study the performance of
different protocols in the presence of various attacks.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the details
about the chosen MANET routing protocols. In Section 3.3, selected MANET
routing attacks are presented. Section 3.4 discusses the simulation environment and
modifications to the simulator. In Section 3.5, a summary is presented.
3.2 Routing Protocols
As we mentioned in Chapter 2, routing protocols can be classified mainly into proac-
tive and reactive protocols. Proactive routing protocols are designed to maintain a
routing table that includes routing information to all other nodes in the network.
On the other hand, Reactive routing protocols are designed that routes are created
whenever a source requires to send data to a destination. While proactive protocols
suit small networks that have low node mobility, they suffer a lot in high dynamic
networks. Reactive MANET protocols are designed to suit networks that have high
node mobility which makes it a fertile area for research. So, our focus in the following
chapters is directed to reactive routing protocols to analyse their behaviours.
3.2.1 Selection Criteria
Reactive MANET protocols are initiated by a source. Routes are created whenever
a source node requires to send data to a destination node. The source node initiates
a route discovery procedure by transmitting route requests throughout the network.
The destination node or an intermediate node that has a route to the destination
has to respond with a list of intermediate nodes between the source and the desti-
nation. An established route is maintained as long as it is required through a route
maintenance procedure.
Our choice of AODV and DSR is based on their simplicity and popularity as
reactive routing protocols for MANET. On the other hand, while AOMDV rep-
resents multipath routing protocols, SAODV represents secured routing protocols
in MANET. AODV [12] is one of the extensively studied reactive protocols which
were jointly developed on July 2003 in Nokia Research Centre, University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Barbara and University of Cincinnati. DSR [11] is one of the earliest
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and most well-known MANET reactive protocols. AOMDV is an extension to the
AODV routing protocol designed to provide efficient recovery from route failures
and efficient fault tolerance using multipath. SAODV [54] is an enhancement over
AODV routing protocol that utilizes security features.
3.2.2 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
DSR [11] is one of the most well-known MANET reactive protocols. The protocol is
an on-demand source routing protocol which implies that the data packets contain
a list of nodes representing the route to be followed and the routes are created
whenever a source node requires to send data to a destination node. DSR supports
caching multiple routes to a single destination which enables a node to use any of
these routes for data forwarding.
The protocol consists of two mechanisms which are route discovery and route
maintenance. A source node wishing to send data has to consult its route cache
for an available route to a destination. If a route to the destination is available, it
includes the routing path inside the data packet before sending it. Otherwise, the
source node initiates a route discovery operation by broadcasting a route request
RREQ packet. An intermediate node that receives a RREQ checks its route cache
for an available route to the destination sending a route reply RREP packet to the
source if the route is available. If the node does not have a route for the requested
destination, it appends its own address to the RREQ packet before rebroadcasting
the RREQ packet to its neighbours. The destination node generates a RREP packet
that includes the list of addresses received in the RREQ, unicasts it back along this
path to the source and stores this route in its route cache for later use.
Route maintenance in DSR can be achieved through the confirmations that nodes
generate when they can verify that the next node successfully received a packet.
These confirmations can be link-layer acknowledgements, passive acknowledgements
or network-layer acknowledgements specified by the DSR protocol. A node on a
route is responsible for confirming that a packet has been received by a next node in
the route and retransmitting the packet if necessary. If no confirmation is received
40
Chapter 3: Methodology
after a limited number of retransmission attempts for the packet, the link from
this node to the next hop is considered to be broken, and the route maintenance
mechanism sends a route error RERR packet to the source node identifying this
broken link. The source node removes all the routes that include the failing link
from its cache and uses an alternate route that it may already have or may re-invoke
route discovery to discover a new route to this destination.
3.2.3 Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
AODV [12] is a reactive routing protocol. It uses destination sequence numbers to
ensure the freshness of routes and to guarantee loop-free routes. A node that receives
a routing packet updates its routing table, with the routing information included in
this routing packet, if it has a destination sequence number smaller than the one
received (i.e. old route) or it has the same sequence number with a higher hop count
(i.e. longer route). Non-active routes expire after a timeout and have to be removed
from the routing table of a node. Routing information for a route is stored only in
the source, the destination, and intermediate nodes along this active route which
decreases the memory overhead and minimizes the use of network resources.
A source node requires to send data to a destination node has to first check
its routing table for an available route to this destination. If it does not have a
valid route, it initiates a route discovery process by broadcasting a route request
(RREQ) packet to its neighbours using a new sequence number. An intermediate
node that receives a RREQ discards it if it is either the source of the request or it
has already rebroadcast the same RREQ earlier. Then, the intermediate node sets
up a reverse route towards the source and updates its routing table unless it has a
fresher one (i.e. higher destination sequence number) and increments the hop count
before rebroadcasting the RREQ packet to its neighbours if it has not a fresh route
to this destination. During the process of forwarding the RREQ, an intermediate
node records in its routing table the address of the neighbour from which the first
copy of the broadcast packet is received as a next hop towards the source, thereby
establishing a reverse path.
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The destination or an intermediate node with a route to the destination in its
routing table unicasts a RREP packet back to the neighbour from which it received
the first RREQ, which relays the RREP backward via the reverse path to the source
node. An intermediate node sets up a forward route to the destination. This pro-
cedure enables all intermediate nodes of a discovered path to have routes to both
the source and the destination. When the source node receives the RREP packet,
it starts sending data packets to the destination node through the neighbour node
that first responded with the RREP.
Routes maintenance can be achieved by HELLO messages that are broadcast
periodically to neighbour nodes and a route error (RERR) packet that reports a
link failure. When a source node moves, it has to reinitiate the route discovery
protocol to find a new route to the destination if the next hop towards the destination
becomes unreachable. On the other hand, when an intermediate node along the
route moves, its upstream neighbour will notice route breakage due to the movement
and broadcast a RERR to only its neighbours. An active neighbour in the route
rebroadcasts the RERR packet to their upstream neighbours until the RERR is
received by the source node. The source node may then choose to reinitiate the
route discovery for that destination if a route is still desired.
3.2.4 Ad hoc On-demand Multipath Distance Vector Routing
(AOMDV)
AOMDV [18], is an extension to AODV routing protocol that is designed to create
multiple loop-free and link-disjoint paths. AOMDV computes the multiple paths
during the route discovery phase that consists of a rule to create and maintain
multiple paths and a distributed protocol to calculate the link-disjoint paths. Paths
between a source and a destination are considered as disjoint paths if all intermediate
nodes along the paths are different. AOMDV uses one of the alternative paths to
forward packets if a path to this destination is broken.
A route request and a route reply packet received by a node has to be using
different routes from the source to the destination. Using duplicate route request
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RREQ copies, AOMDV creates loop-free reverse paths to the source at both in-
termediate and destination nodes. The destination generates multiple route replies
RREP which have to be sent along multiple loop-free reverse paths that have been
already created during the route request phase to create multiple loop-free forward
paths to the destination. To select the best route to the destination and guarantee
loop-free paths, advertised_hop_count is used which is the maximum acceptable
hop count for any path at a node. Only paths with a hop count less than the
advertised value is accepted while the remaining paths are discarded.
As AOMDV is an extension to AODV, it consequently shares some of its features
such as using destination sequence numbers to ensure loop-free paths. In terms of
route maintenance, the only difference between AODV and AOMDV is that while
a node sends a route error RERR to the source when a link is broken in AODV, it
sends this error if it has not an alternative path to the destination in AOMDV.
3.2.5 Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing
Protocol (SAODV)
This [54] is an enhancement of AODV routing protocol to fulfil security feature such
as integrity and authentication. SAODV provides an end-to-end authentication and
hop-to-hop verification of the routing messages. The protocol assumes that a node
has certified public keys of other nodes in the network and a certified private key for
itself. SAODV uses asymmetric cryptography to authenticate all non-mutable fields
of routing messages and a hash algorithm to authenticate the hop count (the only
mutable) field. The protocol suggests appending an extension message that includes
a hash value of the hop count and a digital signature of the packet using the private
key of the sender. A node can verify a signature of a sender using the sender’s public
key to ensure the identity of the sender and verify hash value of the hop count using
the hash function that is included in the packet to ensure the integrity of the packet.
A node fails to verify hash value or digital signature discards the received routing
packet.
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As the protocol design is based on AODV, it uses the same route discovery
and route maintenance procedure. A source node sends a RREQ to a destination
includes a hashed value of the hop count and a signature of the RREQ by its private
key. An intermediate node that receives a RREQ has to verify the hash value of hop
count and the digital signature. If it succeeded in verifying both of them, it stores
a reverse route entry to the source in its routing table, increments the hop count
value in RREQ packet, generates a new hash value and rebroadcasts the RREQ
again to its neighbour. The destination that succeeded in verifications has to reply
by sending RREP that includes a hashed value of the hop count and a signature
of the RREP by its private key. Similarly, the source and intermediate nodes have
to verify both the hash of the hop count and the signature of the RREP before
adding the forward route to their routing tables. This procedure ensures that both
the source and the destination can identify its communication partner and avoid
impersonation attacks.
The above scenario implies that it is impossible for intermediate nodes to reply to
RREQs even if they have a route to the destination because the RREP message must
be signed by the destination’s private key which is known only to the destination. To
imitate AODV that permits to other nodes that have a fresh route to the destination
to send a RREP, SAODV suggests a delegation feature that allows intermediate
nodes to reply to RREQ messages. This delegation is based on a double signature
in which a node sends a RREQ message can include a second signature that is
computed on a fictitious RREP message towards itself. Intermediate nodes stores
this second signature in their routing table to be used if later a node asks for a route
to the owner of the double signature. Then, the intermediate node generates the
RREP message includes the double signature and signs this message with its own
private key.
Routes maintenance can be achieved by RERR messages which report a link fail-
ure. SAODV suggests that RERR messages have to be fully signed using the private
key of its sender as these messages have a large amount of mutable information. A
node that receives this RERR has to verify the signature to ensure the identity of
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the sender. Since the destination sequence numbers in RERR are not signed by the
corresponding node, a node should never update any destination sequence number
of its routing table based on a RERR message.
Although SAODV does not require additional routing messages, SAODV mes-
sages are significantly bigger, mostly because of the digital signatures. Moreover,
SAODV requires heavyweight asymmetric cryptographic calculations as result of
generation and verification of the digital signature at each node which gets worse
when the double signature mechanism is used as it implies the generation or verifi-
cation of two signatures for a single message.
3.3 Routing Attacks
MANET routing protocols are exposed to active attacks and passive attacks. Passive
attacks do not disrupt the operation of the routing protocol, but try to discover
valuable information by eavesdropping data exchanged in network without altering
it. On the other hand, active attacks occur when a malicious node actively intercepts
the data and attempts to modify, delete, add or redirect this data to disrupt the
operation of the protocol.
3.3.1 Selection Criteria
Routing protocols should be able to secure themselves against active attacks. Ac-
tive attacks are classified based on modification, impersonation or fabrication to the
routing packets. Our choice of flooding attack to represent the fabrication attacks
in which a malicious node initiates the attack by generating a fake routing message.
The malicious node constructs RREQ packets to overwhelm the network to launch
a denial of service. A malicious node may also impersonate another node to con-
vince its neighbours that it forwards a RREQ that is received from another node.
Blackhole attack represents fabrication attacks in which a malicious node launches
the attack by responding to a genuine routing message by a fake RREP packet that
will lead to the direction of the traffic towards a node which will later drops all these
data causing denial of service. Thus, the flooding attack represents a malicious node
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action while the blackhole attack represents its reaction. Selfish attack represents a
full misbehaviour of a malicious node and the loss of cooperation on which MANET
design is based, in which the malicious node drops all the data and routing packets
routed through it. Grayhole attack represents partial misbehaviour of a malicious
node in complying with the protocol operation in which the malicious node drops the
data packets while it follows the normal protocol operation for the routing packets.
3.3.2 Flooding Attack
In a flooding attack [29], a malicious node floods the network with a large number of
RREQs to non-existent destinations in the network. Since these destinations do not
exist in the network, a RREP packet cannot be generated by a node in the network.
When a large number of fake RREQ packets are broadcast into the network, new
routes can no longer be added and the network is unable to transmit data packets.
This leads to congestion in the network and overflow of the routing table of nodes
so that the nodes cannot receive new RREQ packet, resulting in a DoS attack.
Moreover, unnecessary forwarding of these fake RREQ packets has serious effects in
MANET [59] as a result of limited computational and power resources of nodes.
3.3.3 Blackhole Attack
In a blackhole attack [60], a malicious node absorbs the network traffic and drops
all packets. Once a malicious node receives a RREQ packet from a node, it does
not query its routing table about a route to the destination. Rather, it immediately
sends a false RREP with a high sequence number and a minimum hop count to
spoof its neighbours that it has the best route to the destination. Thus, the reply
from the malicious node will be received by the source node before all other replies
and a route that includes this malicious node is selected to send the data packets.
Later, when data packets are routed through the blackhole node, it drops the packets
rather than forwarding them to the destination node. This attack can cause DoS
if the malicious node becomes dominant in the majority of routes between sources
and destinations.
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3.3.4 Grayhole Attack
In a grayhole attack [21], a malicious node behaves normally as a truthful node by
replying with true RREP packets to the nodes that sent RREQ packets. It queries
its routing table about an available route to the destination and replies with a RREP
if available which fully complying with the protocol operation. If later data is routed
through this malicious node, it starts dropping these data packets to launch a (DoS)
denial of service attack. So, the malicious node forwards routing packets and drops
data packets, which makes grayhole attacks much more difficult to detect.
3.3.5 Selfish Attack
In a selfish attack [1], a malicious node saves its resources; such as battery, by not
cooperating in the network operations. A selfish node affects the network perfor-
mance as it does not correctly process routing or data packets based on the routing
protocol. The selfish node drops all data and control packets even if these packets
are sent to it to save its resources. When a selfish node needs to send data to a des-
tination, it starts following the normal routing protocol operation. After it finishes
sending its data, the node returns to its silent mode and the selfish behaviour.
3.4 System Modelling
Implementing a real experiment on a testbed is costly, expensive, and time consum-
ing. Therefore, using the system modelling is essential to better understand the
behaviour of the protocol and evaluate the new idea before it can be implemented
in the testbed and finally implemented in a real life experiment [61]. Moreover,
most of the proposed algorithms and protocols in MANETs are designed to sup-
port hundreds of nodes which introduces the difficulty of implementing and testing
their performances on testbed without examining their feasibility and results using
modelling techniques.
System modelling uses a simple representation of an actual system to achieve pre-
dictions about how a system will behave without implementing it. Various param-
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eters and often some simplification assumptions can be applied to study a system’s
behaviour. Modelling can be classified into two approaches; analytical approach and
simulation approach [62]. The analytical modelling approach is used to describe the
system mathematically and apply numerical methods to provide a general view of
the system. As analytical results derive mainly from mathematical proofs, they are
true as long as the conditions, parameters and assumptions are valid. Analytical
modelling is less costly, more efficient and generally provides the best insight into
the effects of various parameters and their interactions [63]. So, analytical modelling
techniques, such as stochastic Petri nets and process algebra, have been used for the
performance analysis of communication systems. However, the number of analytical
studies of MANET is small [64]. This limitation of analytical modelling in MANET
is achieved as a result of difficulty of incorporating the random mobility of nodes
to these analyses which is the reason that most of these analytical studies suppose
that the nodes are stationary. As it has already discussed in Chapter 2, nodes mo-
bility is one of the major characteristic of the network that cannot be ignored which
introduces the difficulty of using analytical modelling [65] to study the performance
of this network.
When the system is rather large and complex, a mathematical formulation may
not be feasible and easy to implement. Simulation introduces the solution for these
environments. Simulation usually requires fewer simplification assumptions as al-
most all the details of the system specifications can be incorporated in a simulation
model. On the other hand, simulation results are usually considered not as strong
as the analytical results. Simulators are widely accepted as an efficient tool for
studying the complex environment of networks in general. Also, it has proven to
be a valuable tool to analyse system performance and examine the proposed model
under different scenarios and conditions prior to the actual physical design of the
system.
There is a wide variety of network simulation tools either commercial network
simulators such as QualNet [66], OPNET [67] and MATLAB [68] or open-source
network simulators such as Network Simulator (Version 2) NS-2 [69], OMNeT++
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[70] and GloMoSim [71]. Each network simulator has its own strengths and weak-
nesses. The choice of the most appropriate one depends upon the following factors;
the simulation platform, type of the simulation tool, and the user interfaces of the
simulation tool [72].
Network simulation tools are examples of time-dependent simulation. This sim-
ulation approach maintains a simulation clock to keep track of simulation time and
proceeds chronologically within events in the simulation. Time-dependent simula-
tion can be classified into time-driven and event-driven simulation [62]. Time-driven
simulation executes events at every fixed time interval of time units. On the other
hand, an event-driven simulation executes events at any arbitrary time and does
not proceed according to fixed time interval. It retrieves and removes an event with
the smallest timestamp from the event list, executes it, and advances the simulation
clock to the timestamp associated with the next event.
3.4.1 Selection Criteria
Network Simulator (Version 2) NS-2 [69] is the most widely used network simulation
tool for networks researches. NS-2 is dominating most of the research in MANET
and approximately 45% of published simulation-based MANET papers use NS-2 as
a simulation tool [62]. It is an example of an event-driven simulation tool. NS-2
supports simulation of wired and wireless network functions and protocols. Due to its
flexibility and modular nature, NS-2 has gained great popularity in the networking
research community [62]. So, we select NS-2 as a simulation tool to analyse the
behaviour of various MANET routing protocols in the presence of different attacks.
3.4.2 NS-2 Simulator
Network Simulator (Version 2) [69], widely known as NS-2, is an object-orientated
discrete event simulator that was introduced by the VINT project at University of
California in Berkeley in 1995. Later, NS2 was upgraded by the Monarch project at
Carnegie Mellon University with support for node mobility. It is the most widely
used open-source network simulator in the research field. It supports simulation
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of wired and wireless network services and protocols and has the ability to study
behaviours of both existing and new protocols.
One of the most important features of NS-2 is its ability to easily produce high
number of randomly created scenarios for both traffic and movement patterns. NS2
has all the essential features like abstraction, visualisation, emulation, and traffic
and scenario generation. NS-2 adopts a layered approach and supports a rich set of
MANET routing protocols such as AODV, AOMDV, DSR, DSDV, as well as many
others.
NS-2 consists of two programming languages, the first is C++ which defines
the internal mechanism of the simulation and the second is Object-oriented Tool
Command Language (OTcl) which is used to create and configure a network and acts
as a user interface[62]. OTcl is an interpreted programming language which means
changes in an OTcl file can be executed without compilation. NS2 is constructed
to combine the advantages of these two languages as C++ is fast to run which
makes it suitable for running the simulation. On the other hand, OTcl is fast to
consider changes which makes it suitable for configuring the network. So, simulation
components, their behaviour and the topologies are described by C++ code while
OTcl scripts model the overall simulation behaviour and are used for binding.
3.4.3 Supporting Mobility in NS-2
The mobility model describes the mobile nodes movement patterns, looking at
changes in their location, velocity and acceleration over time. Mobility pattern
is an important factor that determines the protocol performance in different param-
eters. Mobility models [73] can be classified into three types; random walk, random
waypoint and random direction mobility models. The random waypoint mobility
model is the most commonly used mobility model for MANET research simulations
and it is the one we have selected in our simulations [74].
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3.4.4 Randomness in Scenarios Generation
NS2 supports deterministic and random mobility. Deterministic mobility is used in
small networks and introduces an opportunity to control the movement of mobile
nodes during simulation. Controlling the movement of nodes in a large network
is hard to be achieved as long as the number of nodes increases in the network.
On the other hand, although random mobility provides a good judgement on the
behaviour of the network as it has wide range of tests, it does not provide the
ability of reviewing or controlling the movement of mobile nodes in the network.
NS2 provides an independent utility called setdest generated by CMU which creates
movement-related OTcl statements using the random waypoint algorithm. These
statements represent a fully random controllable movement of nodes and can be
considered as deterministic mobility as it is available before simulation and can be
included later in the simulation as a Tcl script. This utility is located in the directory
ns/indep-utils/cmu-scen-gen/setdest.
NS2 also provides another independent utility called cbrgen.tcl that is written in
Tcl to create traffic-related OTcl statements. This utility is a NS script and has to
be included as well to the simulation script before starting the simulation. Despite
the name, this utility can create both TCP and CBR traffic. This utility is located
in the directory ns/indep-utils/cmu-scen-gen/cbrgen.tcl. The disadvantage of this
available utility is that the connections between nodes are not fully randomised.
The destination for a connection to node n is either node n+1 for nodes that have
ID smaller than 50 and n+2 for nodes ID smaller than 75. So, we introduce a
new modification to the existing utility that chooses a random destination for a
connection to a source. For simulation purposes, the starting time of data sending
for a connection is set randomly between 0 and 30 seconds. Figure 3.1 shows a
flowchart of our modified utility while the detailed Tcl code is available in Appendix
A.
We introduce a new independent utility called nodes.tcl that is written in Tcl
as well to create node-related OTcl statements. This utility also is a NS script and
has to be included to the simulation script before starting the simulation. This
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Figure 3.1: Modified Connection Generator
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utility accepts from the user the number of nodes, the number of malicious nodes,
the attack type, if the attack starting time has to be set randomly chosen or set to
the starting time of simulation and optionally a seed value. The utility produces
a Tcl script that randomly selects malicious nodes and the time they start their
misbehaviour depends on the values predetermined by the user. Figure 3.2 shows
a flowchart of our new nodes.tcl utility while the detailed Tcl code is available in
Appendix B.
3.4.5 Adding Security to NS-2
NS-2 does not support security and cryptographic algorithms. So, we include one
of the most popular libraries that implements security algorithms called OpenSSL.
OpenSSL is a popular and effective open source toolkit implementing the Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS), the most widely used
protocols for secure network communications [75]. It is consists of two tools, SSL
toolkit and a cryptography library. The SSL library provides an implementation
of both the SSL and TLS protocols which can be used to secure applications that
need to communicate over a network. SSL is currently the most widely deployed
security protocol that is able to secure any protocol that works over TCP. The
cryptography library provides the most popular algorithms for symmetric key and
public key cryptography such as 3DES [38], AES [39] and RSA [42], as well as,
hash algorithms, and message digests. It provides as well manipulating common
certificate formats and managing and distributing key protocols. It includes also
general-purpose helper libraries for pseudorandom number generator, manipulation
of arbitrary precision numbers and buffers manipulations. OpenSSL is a cross-
platform toolkit that works on both Unix and Windows and although its core library
is written in C programming language, it can be used from C, C++ and other
languages such as Python, Perl, and PHP.
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Figure 3.2: Malicious Node Scenario Generator
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3.4.6 SAODV Implementation
Although NS-2 has many protocol implementations, it does not have an implemen-
tation for SAODV protocol. So, we introduce our own implementation that gives
very similar results to those reported by the protocol author [76]. SAODV module
is implemented by modifying the original AODV source code to include the security
features such as hashing the hop count value of both RREQ and RREP packets
and provide digital signature of these packets and RERR as well. These additional
fields are appended to the RREQ, RREP and RERR packets of AODV protocol
as a message extension. The size of the additional fields for RREQ, RREP, and
RERR packets are 448 bytes, 448 bytes, and 404 bytes, respectively. RREQ and
RREP include signature (64 bytes), top hash (16 bytes), hash (16 bytes) certificate
(339 bytes) and other header information (13 bytes). RERR includes the signa-
ture (64 bytes) certificate (339 bytes) and other header information (1 byte). We
include OpenSSL encryption library that includes a large number of different dig-
ital signatures and hashing algorithms to NS-2. We use Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA-1) for generating and verifying the hash values of the hop count while we use
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) for signing and verifying the digital signatures of the
routing packets.
Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) [47] is the most widely used SHA hash func-
tions which is implemented in many widely used applications and protocols such
as SSL, TLS, Secure Shell (SSH), and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec). SHA-
1 produces a 160-bit long hash value as a message digest. In 2005, cryptanalysts
found that attacks on SHA-1 achieve a result that the algorithm might not be secure
enough which inspires most of the organisations to announce that they stop accept-
ing SHA-1 certificates in SSL by 2017. SHA-2 family consists of six hash functions
that have 224, 256, 384 or 512 bits long hash values which are used in SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256 functions respectively.
Although SHA-2 has some similarity with SHA-1 algorithm, these attacks have not
been successfully extended to SHA-2. In 2015, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has announced that SHA-3 has become a hashing standard. For
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simplicity and achieve a fast simulation response, we use SHA-1 hash function to
authenticate the hop count value for both the RREQ and RREP packets to ensure
the integrity of the packet.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [42] is public-key cryptography algorithm that is
widely used for securing data over an insecure network such as the Internet. The
security of RSA relies on the computational difficulty of factoring large integers.
Although RSA keys are typically 1024-bits or 2048-bits long, it is expected that
1024-bits keys could be broken in the near future which directs governments and
industries to approve 2048-bits long as the minimum key length. Again for simplicity
and achieve a fast simulation response, we use 512-bits key for RSA digital signature
in our simulation to authenticate the identity of the sender of the routing packet.
As it will be clarified in Chapter 4, SAODV has a high resistance to blackhole
attack while its performance suffers a lot under flooding attack. So, we incorporate
the flooding resistance solution to SAODV such as other MANET protocols to justify
the effect of the suggested algorithms on its performance as it will be shown in
Chapter 5. On the other hand, blackhole resisting mechanisms are not incorporated
to SAODV as the original protocol is fully immune to this attack but it is used as
a different solution to compare with as it will be shown in Chapter 6.
3.4.7 Simulation Approaches
The NS-2 simulator [69] is used to simulate the behaviour of various protocols in the
presence of different attacks. Experiments have already been done on bwlf cluster
of servers that consists of 32 machines. We use this large number of machines as
the experiments have a very high number of scenarios. So, we distribute these
scenarios between different machines to save the time of simulation and to overcome
the storage size limitation that is caused by huge file size of each scenario as we
will see in the section of simulation limitations. A machine in the bwlf cluster has
8 Intel processors 2.0 GHZ, 4 MB cache size, 12 GB RAM, and 1 TB hard disk
size. NS-2 simulator is running under Linux CentOS 6.7 operating system. NS-2 is
56
Chapter 3: Methodology
working independent of the machine specifications as we are not focus on the time
it takes to execute a scenario.
All experiments in the subsequent chapters are tested using simulation and the
behaviour of these protocols with and without these new mechanisms are compared.
Simulation results are obtained from 3 different movement scenarios, 3 different
traffic scenarios and 3 different node-type (malicious or non-malicious) scenarios
which mean that each metric value is the mean of the 27 runs. The node-type
scenario is created randomly which implies that the addresses of malicious nodes and
the starting time of the malicious behaviour are completely random. For simulation
purposes, the starting time of the malicious node behaviour sets randomly between
0 and 50 seconds while the starting time of data sending for a connection regardless
of the node-type sets randomly between 0 and 30 seconds. In all cases, the 90%
confidence interval was small compared with the values being reported.
While our experiments are examined for both UDP and TCP traffic, the thesis is
focused on the results of the TCP traffic only. While we examined our experiments
for different numbers of nodes (25, 50, 75 and 100), only the case of 100 node
networks is reported in the thesis which ensures a high density of nodes and gives
malicious nodes a high number of neighbours. Node mobility was modelled with the
random waypoint method. We examined our experiments on different node speeds
(0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 m/s) and different simulation areas (500 m2 and 1000
m2) to ensure the effect of nodes’ density on the results. For the consistency of the
thesis, we reported only the larger area. As we will see in Chapter 4, the highest
negative impact of malicious nodes usually appears on static networks and this effect
decreases as node mobility increases [77], so most of the reported results in the thesis
focus on the case of static networks.
All experiments in the subsequent chapters use the general simulation parameters
that are shown in Table 3.1. Parameters used in Chapter 4 are slightly different from
these are used in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in simulation time and the number of
connections in a scenario. In Chapter 4, as we will study the performance of MANET
protocols under the different attacks, we choose a relatively small simulation time
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Table 3.1: General Simulation Parameters
Simulation Area 1000 m2
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 10
Node Speed 0 - 30 m/s
Pause Time 10 s
Traffic Type TCP
of 180 seconds. On the other hand, we choose a large simulation time, 600 seconds,
in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 to examine the ability of the suggested algorithms
to discover the vast majority of malicious nodes especially for scenarios with a large
number of malicious nodes. In addition, the number of connections per scenario is
70 in Chapter 4 while they are 150 in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This large
number of connections ensures that every node is involved in communication with
at least one other partner during the simulation time to examine the ability of the
suggested algorithms to work under the high density of connections.
3.4.8 Attacker Model
Attacker model for different types of attacks are different based on the misbehaviour
action. We will examine the four attacks in Chapter 4 by simple attacker models. In
Chapter 4, it will be clear that both flooding and blackhole attacks have dramatic
negative effects on the performance of different MANET routing protocols. So,
we will introduce intelligent attacker models in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 to
examine the strength of the suggested algorithms to resist flooding and blackhole
attacks respectively.
The selfish attack model assumes that a selfish node follows the normal protocol
behaviour only if it requires to send data. Otherwise, it drops the received packet
whether it is data or routing packet and whether it is for itself or it should be
forwarded to another node.
The grayhole attack model assumes that a grayhole node follows the normal
protocol behaviour in reacting to a RREQ. If the node is used later to forward data,
it drops data although it has a fresh route to the destination and it has already
agreed to cooperate by previously sending a true RREP.
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While the flooding attack model is simple in Chapter 4, a more intelligent at-
tacker is assumed in Chapter 5 to examine the strength of the suggested algorithms.
A malicious node periodically broadcasts a fake RREQ every 0.5 second in Chapter 4
while it randomly sets the interval between each two successive RREQ in Chapter 5.
The simple attacker model sets the hop count of the RREQ to 1 and the TTL value
to NETWORK_DIAMETER which is the highest value to ensure that widespread
of the RREQ to the maximum possible number of nodes in the network. On the
other hand, the more intelligent attacker randomly sets the generated hop count
between 2 and 4. The value 2 ensures that a malicious node spoofs its neighbours
that it forwards a RREQ received from another node, while the value 4 ensures
that this RREQ travels at least (NETWORK_DIAMETER - 4) hops to flood the
network.
The blackhole attack model also is simple in Chapter 4 while it assumes an
intelligent attacker in Chapter 6 to examine the strength of the suggested algorithms.
In Chapter 4, it assumes that once a blackhole node receives a RREQ, it unicasts a
fake RREP with a hop count to 2 to spoof other nodes about best route; i.e. 1 hop
count only from the RREQ destination. In Chapter 6, the attacker constructs a fake
RREP that includes a randomly generated hop count between 2 and 4 to spoof other
nodes about best route; i.e. 1 to 3 hop counts only from the RREQ source. Both
attacker models assign the destination sequence number value of this fake RREP as
equal to the received one in the RREQ plus a randomly generated number between
10 and 30 to spoof other nodes about the freshness of this RREP. A malicious node
initiating a blackhole attack generates a fake RREP for each RREQ it receives to
incorporate itself in all routes, therefore all packets are sent to a point where they
are not forwarded anywhere which is a form of a DoS attack. Later, when a source
node uses this malicious node to forward data, it drops the received data.
3.4.9 Simulation Limitations
Our experiments have been conducted on a wide range of environments such as mul-
tiple simulation areas, simulation times, number of nodes in the networks, number of
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malicious nodes in the networks, starting time of misbehaving for malicious nodes,
traffic type, and number of connections in a scenario and starting time of transmis-
sion for a connection. Although this wide variety of parameters introduces a trust
in the results, this work has a number of limitations that has to be considered in
the future work. The main limitations are as follows:
1. Evaluating the existing protocols and our new mechanisms have been
achieved for networks that have at most 100 nodes. So, we did not examine
our work in larger networks. This is because the inflation of the capacity of
trace file that is produced by a scenario as a result of malicious nodes be-
haviour. This inflation is proportional to the number of malicious nodes in
the network. As an example, a network that contains 100 nodes produces an
approximately 1.20 GBytes trace file if the network has no malicious nodes
while this trace file is inflated to an approximately 4.25 GBytes if the number
of malicious nodes increases to 10 especially for high mobility networks. As
we mentioned earlier, these simulation results are obtained from 3 different
movement scenarios, 3 different traffic scenarios and 3 different node-type
(malicious or non-malicious) scenarios which mean that each metric value is
the mean of the 27 runs to achieve a confidence interval. This means that
analysing behaviour of network for each malicious count requires 27 times
the size of a scenario. Testing networks that contain 200 nodes generates
a file size of an approximately 7.30 GBytes which introduces a difficulty to
test larger networks. In addition, the time to execute a scenario is propor-
tional to the number of malicious nodes in the network. Sometimes, it takes
more than 30 minutes to execute a scenario which adds another difficulty to
evaluate the larger networks.
2. Although our mechanism to resist the blackhole attacks succeeded in dis-
covering and excluding only genuine malicious nodes, we did not achieve
the same success in resisting flooding attacks. Flooding Attack Resisting
Mechanism (FARM) succeeded in detecting an excluding more than 80% of
malicious neighbours in the simulation time with a highly trusted ratio ex-
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ceeds than 90% if the algorithm is incorporated to AODV, DSR or SAODV.
On the other hand, FARM achieves a smaller success in AOMDV with a
trusted ratio approximately 40%.
3.4.10 Evaluation Metrics
There are several metrics used to evaluate a network performance. However for the
purposes of this research, we focus on the following metrics to examine the perfor-
mance of various protocols in the presence of different attacks.
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The ratio of data packets that are successfully
delivered to destinations compared to the number of data packets that have been
sent out by sources.
Throughput: The number of data bits delivered to the application layer of desti-
nation nodes in unit time measured in bps.
End-to-End Delay (EED): The average time taken for data packets to be trans-
mitted across the network from sources to destinations.
Routing Overhead: The number of routing packets for route discovery and route
maintenance needed to deliver the data packets from sources to destinations. When
we compare two or more different protocols, we use the size of the routing packets
measured in KBytes to consider the differences between the routing packet sizes of
theses protocols
Normalized Routing Load (NRL): The ratio of the number of transmitted rout-
ing packets to the number of received data packets.
Route Discovery Latency (RDL): The average of the delays between sending
RREQs from a source and receiving the first corresponding RREP.
True Exclusion Ratio: The ratio of successful exclusion of genuine malicious
nodes to the total number of exclusions.
Total Exclusions: The total number of neighbour exclusions during the simulation
time.
Malicious Discovery Ratio: The ratio of malicious nodes discovered as time
progresses to the total number of malicious nodes that should be discovered.
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3.5 Summary
MANET routing protocols are designed based on the assumption that all nodes
cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation of the routing protocol. Re-
active MANET protocols are initiated by a source whenever it requires to send
data to a destination node. AODV, DSR, AOMDV, and SAODV routing proto-
cols are selected to study their behaviours under various attacks. Both AODV and
DSR are well-known reactive routing protocols in MANET while AOMDV repre-
sents multipath routing protocols and SAODV represents secured routing protocols
in MANET. Active attacks are classified based on modification, impersonation or
fabrication to the routing packets. Flooding, blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks
are selected to represent the wide range of malicious behaviours and analyse the
effect of them on a network performance. Flooding and blackhole attacks represent
the fabrication attacks that can launch a denial of service. Selfish attack represents
the loss of cooperation that MANET design is based. Grayhole attack represents
partial misbehaviour of a malicious node in complying with the protocol operation.
NS-2 is the most widely used network simulation tool for networks researches. NS-2
has been selected to study the performance of different protocols in the presence of
various attacks.
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Routing Protocols under Attacks
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we use NS-2 to study the performance of AODV, DSR, AOMDV
and SAODV routing protocols in the presence of flooding, blackhole, grayhole and
selfish attacks. Results from these simulations have been published in [77], [78], [76]
and [79].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, a simulation
approach is presented. In Section 4.3, the impact of some attacks on AODV is
discussed. In Section 4.4, DSR performance under these attacks is introduced. In
Section 4.5, the impact of these attacks on AOMDV is discussed. In Section 4.6,
SAODV performance in the presence of these attacks is introduced. In Section 4.7,
the performance comparison of these protocols is discussed. In Section 4.8, summary
is presented.
4.2 Simulation Approach
NS-2 simulator [69] is used to simulate flooding, blackhole, grayhole and selfish
attacks. The simulation is used to analyse the performance of AODV, DSR, AOMDV
and SAODV routing protocols under these attacks. The parameters used are shown
in Table 4.1. While we examined these protocols on both UDP and TCP traffic,
the chapter is focused on the results of the proposed mechanism on the TCP traffic
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only. We examine these protocols for different number of nodes (25, 50, 75 and 100)
and different node speeds (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 m/s) although we present the
results for (0, 10, 20 and 30 m/s) for clarity. Similarly, only the case of 100 node
networks is reported, corresponding to a high density of nodes. This gives malicious
nodes a high number of neighbours.
Our flooding attack model assumes that a malicious node periodically broadcasts
a fake RREQ every 0.5 second. The malicious node randomly chooses a destina-
tion address between 200 and 300 with a randomly generated destination sequence
number. It sets the hop count of the RREQ to 1 and the TTL value to NET-
WORK_DIAMETER which is the highest value to ensure that widespread of the
RREQ to the maximum possible number of nodes in the network.
Our blackhole attack model assumes that once a blackhole node receives a RREQ,
it unicasts a fake RREP without reference to its routing table. It sets the hop count
to 2 to spoof other nodes about best route; i.e. 1 hop count only from the RREQ
destination. The attacker assigns the destination sequence number value of this
fake RREP as equal to the received one in the RREQ plus a randomly generated
number between 10 and 30 to spoof other nodes about the freshness of this RREP. A
malicious node initiating a blackhole attack generates a fake RREP for each RREQ
it receives to incorporate itself in all routes, therefore all packets are sent to a point
where they are not forwarded anywhere which is a form of a DoS attack. Later,
when a source node uses this malicious node to forward data, it drops the received
data.
Our grayhole attack model assumes that a grayhole node follows the normal
protocol behaviour in reacting to a RREQ. If the node is used later to forward data,
it drops data although it has a fresh route to the destination and it has already
agreed to cooperate by previously sending a true RREP.
Our selfish attack model assumes that a selfish node follows the normal protocol
behaviour only if it requires to send data. Otherwise, it drops the received packet
whether it is data or routing packet and whether it is for itself or it should be
forwarded to another node.
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Table 4.1: Reactive Protocols under Attacks Simulation Parameters
Simulation Time 180 s
Simulation Area 1000 m2
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Connections 70
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 10
Node Speed 0 - 30 m/s
Pause Time 10 s
Traffic Type TCP
Generally, regardless of the number of malicious nodes that joins the network,
static networks achieve better performance than mobile networks.
4.3 AODV under Attacks
AODV has a huge degradation of its performance under both flooding and blackhole
attacks. On the other hand, selfish and grayhole attacks have a small negative impact
on their performance. Details of the simulations are presented in the following
sections.
4.3.1 AODV under Flooding Attack
The results show that the flooding attack has a severe impact on AODV perfor-
mance. The effect of flooding attack on the packet delivery ratio is shown in Figure
4.1. Results show that the flooding attack has a negative impact on the PDR of
AODV. This negative impact is higher in high node mobility networks than in static
networks.
Figure 4.2 shows the effect of flooding attack on the network throughput.
Throughput of AODV decreases dramatically as the number of malicious nodes
increases. The network throughput is more highly affected in static networks than
in high node mobility networks.
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Figure 4.1: AODV Packet Delivery Ratio under Flooding
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Figure 4.2: AODV Network Throughput under Flooding
The effect of flooding attack on the end-end-delay is shown in Figure 4.3. The
result shows that the delay increases as the number of malicious nodes increases
regardless of node mobility.
Figure 4.4 shows the effect of flooding attack on the routing overhead. Routing
overhead increases as the number of malicious nodes increases regardless of the speed
of the nodes.
4.3.2 AODV under Blackhole Attack
A blackhole attack has a large impact on the AODV performance. The effect of
the blackhole attack on the packet delivery ratio is shown in Figure 4.5. The PDR
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Figure 4.3: AODV End-End-Delay under Flooding
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Figure 4.4: AODV Routing Overhead under Flooding
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Figure 4.5: AODV Packet Delivery Ratio under Blackhole
of AODV decreases dramatically as the number of malicious nodes increases. This
performance degradation is more pronounced in higher nodes speed.
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Figure 4.6 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the network throughput. The
throughput of AODV decreases dramatically as the number of malicious nodes
increases. The network throughput is more highly affected in static networks than
in networks with high node mobility.
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Figure 4.6: AODV Network Throughput under Blackhole
The effect of blackhole attack on the end-end-delay is shown in Figure 4.7. An
expected logical result has to be increasing the EED as the number of malicious
nodes increases and this delay should be at least equal to the delay of the network
in the absence of malicious nodes. However, the results show that the delay of
AODV is reduced as the number of malicious nodes increases regardless of the node
mobility. This result is slightly paradoxical as the attack improves the delay. This
is a misleading result because the delay is only measured on packets that reach
their destinations and since the blackhole nodes drop all the received data, the
number of packets that will be considered in calculating the delay decreases as the
number of malicious nodes increases. The routes that avoid blackhole nodes suffer
less competition, and hence reduced delay.
Figure 4.8 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the routing overhead. The
routing overhead of AODV decreases dramatically as a result of malicious nodes
especially for the first three malicious nodes regardless of the node mobility. These
results also are slightly confusing as the blackhole attack improves the routing over-
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Figure 4.7: AODV End-End-Delay under Blackhole
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Figure 4.8: AODV Routing Overhead under Blackhole
head. This is because the blackhole nodes stop rebroadcasting the RREQ which
decreases the total number of RREQ packets, one of factors used to measure the
routing overhead.
4.3.3 AODV under Grayhole Attack
The results show that the grayhole attack has no significant effect on the AODV
performance. The effect of grayhole attack on the packet delivery ratio is shown
in Figure 4.9. While the PDR of AODV is constant regardless of the number of
malicious nodes, the PDR is slightly better in static networks than in high node
mobility networks.
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Figure 4.9: AODV Packet Delivery Ratio under Grayhole
Figure 4.10 shows the effect of grayhole attack on the routing overhead. The
routing overhead of AODV decreases slightly as the number of malicious nodes
increases regardless of the node mobility. This result is also paradoxical as the
grayhole attack improves the routing overhead. The reason, as discussed before
in the blackhole attack, is that the grayhole nodes stop rebroadcasting the RREQ
which decreases the routing overhead.
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Figure 4.10: AODV Routing Overhead under Grayhole
4.3.4 AODV under Selfish Attack
The results show that the selfish attack has no significant effect on the AODV
performance. As the grayhole node drops all data packets and the selfish node
drops all data and routing packets, the grayhole attack simulation produces very
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similar results to the selfish attack. This is because the metrics are calculated based
on the received data packets which are very similar for both attacks. So, we do not
include the results of the selfish attack on AODV.
4.4 DSR under Attacks
DSR has a dramatic collapse of its performance under flooding attack and a smaller
negative impact under blackhole attack. On the other hand, selfish and grayhole
attacks have no significant impact on its performance. Details of the simulations
are presented in the following sections.
4.4.1 DSR under Flooding Attack
The results show that the flooding attack has a severe impact on the DSR perfor-
mance. Simulation shows that the flooding attack has very similar effect on both
AODV and DSR. Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show the effect of flooding attack on
the network throughput and overhead respectively which clarifies the performance
similarities of both protocols.
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Figure 4.11: DSR Network Throughput under Flooding
4.4.2 DSR under Blackhole Attack
The results show that the blackhole attack has a small impact on the DSR
performance. The effect of blackhole attack on the packet delivery ratio is shown
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Figure 4.12: DSR Routing Overhead under Flooding
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Figure 4.13: DSR Packet Delivery Ratio under Blackhole
in Figure 4.13. The PDR of DSR is nearly constant for static nodes and the
performance degradation increases as the nodes’ speed increases.
The effect of blackhole attack on the end-end-delay is shown in Figure 4.14.
While the average delay is approximately constant for mobile nodes, when the net-
work is static the delay for DSR is reduced as the number of malicious nodes in-
creases. The reason of this paradoxical result of statics nodes has been discussed
before in AODV as the number of data packets that is considered in calculating the
delay decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases.
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Figure 4.14: DSR End-End-Delay under Blackhole
Figure 4.15 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the routing overhead. While
the average routing overhead of DSR is constant for static network, it increases
slightly as a result of malicious nodes.
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Figure 4.15: DSR Routing Overhead under Blackhole
4.4.3 DSR under Selfish Attack
The results show that the selfish attack has no significant effect on the DSR perfor-
mance. Packet delivery ratio and network throughput are nearly constant regardless
of node mobility and the number of malicious nodes. The effect of selfish attack on
delay is shown in Figure 4.16. The average delay of DSR is constant for high speed
nodes while it decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases for static and
low speed nodes.
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Figure 4.16: DSR End-End-Delay under Selfish
Figure 4.17 shows the effect of selfish attack on the routing overhead. The routing
overhead decreases slightly as a result of malicious nodes regardless of node mobility.
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Figure 4.17: DSR Routing Overhead under Selfish
4.4.4 DSR under Grayhole Attack
As mentioned earlier, the grayhole and the selfish attacks achieve very similar results.
This is because, as we discussed previously, the metrics are calculated based on the
received data packets which are same for both attacks. The major difference between
the performance of DSR under the two attacks is that while the routing overhead of
selfish attack slightly decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases, its value
is nearly constant for grayhole attack. This is because the selfish nodes drop the
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routing packets in addition to the data packets that are dropped by the grayhole
nodes. So, we do not include the results of the grayhole attack on DSR.
4.5 AOMDV under Attacks
AOMDV has a small degradation on its performance under various attacks. Details
of the simulations are presented in the following sections.
4.5.1 AOMDV under Flooding Attack
The results show that the flooding attack has a severe impact on the AOMDV
performance especially for static networks. Figure 4.18 shows the effect of flooding
attack on the network throughput. Throughput of AOMDV decreases dramatically
as the number of malicious nodes increases for static nodes. The higher the nodes
speed the lower the effect of the flooding attack on the network throughput.
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Figure 4.18: AOMDV Network Throughput under Flooding
Figure 4.19 shows the effect of flooding attack on the routing overhead. The re-
sult shows that this attack has a dramatic impact on the routing overhead especially
for static nodes. This effect decreases as the node mobility increases.
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Figure 4.19: AOMDV Routing Overhead under Flooding
4.5.2 AOMDV under Blackhole Attack
The results show that the blackhole attack has a small impact on the AOMDV
performance. Figure 4.20 shows that the blackhole attack has a little degradation
on the network throughput regardless of the nodes speed.
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Figure 4.20: AOMDV Network Throughput under Blackhole
The effect of blackhole attack on the end-end-delay is shown in Figure 4.21.
While the average delay of AOMDV is approximately constant for mobile networks,
its value decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases for the reason that
has been mentioned earlier in AODV.
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Figure 4.21: AOMDV End-End-Delay under Blackhole
Figure 4.22 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the routing overhead. The
routing overhead of AOMDV increases dramatically as a result of malicious nodes
especially for mobile networks. The results show that this increase is small for static
networks.
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Figure 4.22: AOMDV Routing Overhead under Blackhole
4.5.3 AOMDV under Grayhole Attack
The results show that the grayhole attack has no significant effect on the AOMDV
performance. Figure 4.23 shows the effect of grayhole attack on the routing overhead.
The routing overhead of AOMDV decreases slightly as the number of malicious nodes
increases. The reason has been discussed earlier in AODV.
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Figure 4.23: AOMDV Routing Overhead under Grayhole
4.5.4 AOMDV under Selfish Attack
As mentioned in both AODV and DSR, the grayhole and the selfish attacks achieve
very similar results. The results show that the selfish attack has no significant effect
on the AOMDV performance. So, we do not include the results of the selfish attack
on AOMDV.
4.6 SAODV under Attacks
While SAODV has a dramatic collapse on its performance under flooding attack,
it has a high resistance to blackhole, selfish and grayhole attacks. SAODV does
not forward the routing packets without ensuring authenticity and integrity which
explains its success in resisting blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks. SAODV
cannot resist the flooding attack because a malicious node impersonates a non-
existent node which could not be discovered by other non-malicious nodes. Details
of the simulations are presented in the following sections.
4.6.1 SAODV under Flooding Attack
The results show that the flooding attack has a severe impact on the SAODV perfor-
mance. The effect of flooding attack on the packet delivery ratio is shown in Figure
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4.24. The flooding attack has a highly negative impact on the PDR of SAODV.
This negative impact is independent of the node mobility.
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Figure 4.24: SAODV Packet Delivery Ratio under Flooding
Figure 4.25 shows the effect of flooding attack on the network throughput.
Throughput of SAODV decreases dramatically as the number of malicious nodes
increases. The reduction in the throughput is most dramatic in static networks.
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Figure 4.25: SAODV Network Throughput under Flooding
The effect of flooding attack on the EED is shown in Figure 4.26. The result
shows that the delay increases as the number of malicious nodes increases regardless
of node mobility. Static networks have a higher impact on the delay than mobile
networks.
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Figure 4.26: SAODV End-End-Delay under Flooding
Figure 4.27 shows the effect of flooding attack on the routing overhead. The rout-
ing overhead increases as the number of malicious nodes increases regardless of the
speed of the nodes. The effect is smaller in mobile networks than in static networks.
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Figure 4.27: SAODV Routing Overhead under Flooding
SAODV is highly resistant to all other attacks. Verifying the signature of a rout-
ing packet using the sender’s public key before rebroadcasting is a highly effective
way to discard malicious nodes packets. Results of various attacks show that the
network performance is independent of the number of malicious nodes joining the
network. Figure 4.28 and Figure 4.29 show the effect of blackhole attack on the
network throughput and the routing overhead respectively as an example to its high
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resistance to different attacks. Figure 4.28 shows that the throughput of SAODV
does not change significantly in the presence of malicious nodes.
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Figure 4.28: SAODV Network Throughput under Blackhole
Similarly, Figure 4.29 shows that the average routing overhead is not affected by
the number of malicious nodes joining the network.
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Figure 4.29: SAODV Routing Overhead under Blackhole
4.7 Performance Comparison
In the previous sections, we have studied various protocols individually under dif-
ferent attacks. From the above discussions, we conclude that the highest negative
impact of malicious nodes usually appears on static networks and this effect de-
creases as node mobility increases [77]. In this section, we compare the performance
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of various protocols in static networks in the presence of different attacks to deter-
mine the discrepancies between them. As the routing packet sizes are different from
a protocol to another, we consider the routing overhead as the size of the routing
packets measured in KBytes.
4.7.1 Flooding Attack
Figure 4.30 shows the network throughput of the examined protocols under the
flooding attack. The flooding attack has a high negative impact on both AODV and
SAODV while DSR and AOMDV suffer less from the attack. SAODV has the most
dramatic degradation of its performance under the flooding attack. While AOMDV
achieves the best performance, the DSR achieves the worst network throughput in
the presence of the flooding attack.
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Figure 4.30: Network Throughput under Flooding
Routing overhead of the examined protocols under the flooding attack is shown
in Figure 4.31. The routing overhead of both SAODV and DSR is inflated as the
number of malicious nodes increases, the routing overhead of AODV inflates with
a smaller ratio and the effect on AOMDV is ever smaller. While AOMDV achieves
the best overhead, the SAODV achieves the worst value under the flooding attack.
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Figure 4.31: Routing Overhead under Flooding
4.7.2 Blackhole Attack
Figure 4.32 shows the network throughput of the examined protocols under the
blackhole attack. The figure shows that AODV is the only protocol that has huge
degradation on its throughput as a result of the blackhole attack. While AOMDV
achieves the best throughput, DSR is the worst performing protocol especially when
the number of malicious nodes is small.
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Figure 4.32: Network Throughput under Blackhole
Routing overhead of the examined protocols under the blackhole attack is shown
in Figure 4.33. While both AOMDV and SAODV achieve an approximately con-
stant overhead, the overhead of the AODV and DSR decreases as a result of this
attack. This confusing result has been mentioned earlier in AODV analysis. While
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AOMDV achieves the lowest overhead, SAODV’s overhead is the largest, almost
independently of the number of malicious nodes.
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Figure 4.33: Routing Overhead under Blackhole
4.7.3 Selfish Attack
Figure 4.34 shows the network throughput of the examined protocols under the
selfish attack. The selfish attack has no significant impact on the throughput of
various protocols. While AOMDV achieves the best throughput, the DSR achieves
the worst value.
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Figure 4.34: Network Throughput under Selfish
Routing overhead of the examined protocols under the selfish attack is shown
in Figure 4.35. The figure shows that while both AODV and AOMDV achieve an
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approximately constant overhead, the overhead of both SAODV and DSR decreases
as a result of this attack. This paradoxical result has been discussed earlier in
Section 4.3 and its reason is that the selfish node drops the received routing packets
which decreases the overhead. While AOMDV achieves the best overhead, SAODV
achieves the worst value under selfish attack.
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Figure 4.35: Routing Overhead under Selfish
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we analysed the performance of AODV, DSR, AOMDV and SAODV
routing protocols under the blackhole, grayhole, selfish and flooding attacks. We
concluded that the blackhole and flooding attacks have dramatic impact on the
network performance. The blackhole introduces a fake RREP which affects the
network performance and the flooding attack introduces a fake RREQ which affects
the network performance as well. As most of the performance metrics depend on
the number of received data packets, little change is observed in these metrics under
grayhole and selfish attacks because the malicious nodes drop data packets in these
attacks. We conclude also that the highest negative impact of malicious nodes in all
these different attacks usually appears on static networks and this effect decreases
as node mobility increases.
AOMDV is the most resistant protocol to different attacks. While SAODV
succeeded in resisting blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks, it suffers performance
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degradation under the flooding attack. SAODV does not forward the routing packets
without ensuring authenticity and integrity which explains its success in resisting
blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks. SAODV cannot resist the flooding attack
because a malicious node impersonating a non-existent node which could not be
discovered by other non-malicious nodes. On the other hand, while SAODV achieves
a moderate performance compared to the other protocols, its routing overhead is
higher because of the cost of its security features.
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Resisting Flooding Attacks
5.1 Introduction
Reactive MANET routing protocols are vulnerable to a dramatic collapse of net-
work performance under flooding attack. This affects even the secured protocols as
discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter introduces two new mechanisms Anti-Flooding
(AF) and Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM) to resist flooding attacks.
These algorithms can be incorporated into any reactive routing protocol. While AF
mechanism uses some thresholds and timers to classify nodes as malicious, FARM
mechanism uses the concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) in which detecting
a malicious intruder is accomplished by complying with the normal protocol be-
haviour and luring the malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its malicious
behaviour. Both solutions do not require expensive cryptography or authentica-
tion mechanisms or modifications to the packet formats. Using NS2 simulation, we
compare the performance of networks under flooding attacks with and without our
mechanisms, showing that they significantly reduce the effect of a flooding attack.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the related
work. In Section 5.3, Anti-Flooding (AF) mechanism to detect the flooding at-
tack is presented. Section 5.4 introduces the Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism
(FARM) that modifies the AF mechanism. In Section 5.5, a simulation approach and
parameters are presented. In Section 5.6, simulation results are given. In Section
5.7, summary is presented.
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5.2 Related Work
A number of important algorithms have been introduced to improve MANET routing
security, but most of them cannot resist flooding attacks effectively. A malicious
node initiating a flooding attack generates a large number of RREQs to non-existent
nodes. These RREQ flood out through the MANET and because the destination
does not exist, are propagated by all nodes. A node has no way of detecting whether
the neighbour that sent the RREQ is malicious or not. All suggested solutions to
the flooding attack attempt to classify neighbours as normal or malicious nodes and
then suppress malicious ones.
Yi [80] proposed Flooding Attack Prevention (FAP) that defined a neighbour
suppression method which prioritizes the node based on the number of RREQ re-
ceived. A node gets higher priority if it sends fewer RREQ packets. When a ma-
licious node broadcasts large number of RREQ packets, the immediate neighbours
of the malicious node observe a high rate of RREQ and then they lower the cor-
responding priority according to the rate of incoming queries. Forwarding received
RREQ depends on the priority value of the sending neighbour. The disadvantage of
this algorithm is that it still disseminates flooding packets albeit at a reduced rate.
Peng [81] modified FAP by defining a fixed RREQ threshold. The algorithm
assumes that if the number of RREQ packets received from a neighbour exceeds the
threshold value, this neighbour is a malicious node and discards all future packets
from this malicious node. The disadvantage of this algorithm is obvious if the
threshold value is disseminated which introduces an opportunity to a malicious
node to subvert the mechanism by sending RREQs under this threshold. Another
disadvantage of this algorithm is that it treats a high mobility normal node as if it
is a malicious node.
Song [82] defines a Filter-Based (FB) solution that has two threshold val-
ues; RATE_LIMIT and BLACKLIST_LIMIT. A RREQ from a neighbour is pro-
cessed only if the number of previously received RREQ from this neighbour is less
than RATE_LIMIT. On the other hand, if the number is greater than BLACK-
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LIST_LIMIT, the RREQ is discarded and this neighbour is blacklisted and classi-
fied as malicious. If the number of previously received RREQ from this neighbour
is greater than RREQ_LIMIT and less than BLACKLIST_LIMIT, the RREQ is
queued for processing after a delay expires. A disadvantage of this approach is the
ability of the attacker to subvert the algorithm by disseminating thresholds levels
and the possibility of permanently suspending a blacklisted neighbour that is not
malicious.
Balakrishnan [83] proposed a solution that defines three threshold values; trans-
mission threshold, blacklist threshold and white listing threshold. A RREQ from
a neighbour is processed only if the received RREQ rate from this neighbour is
less than the transmission threshold; otherwise the node discards the RREQ. If the
received RREQ rate from this neighbour is greater than the blacklist threshold,
the RREQ is discarded and this neighbour is blacklisted. This algorithm avoids
permanently suspending of a blacklisted neighbour by introducing a white listing
threshold. A blacklisted neighbour can be returned to normal status if it behaves
correctly for a whitelisting time interval.
Venkataraman [84] introduced an algorithm that extends the DSR protocol based
on the trust function to mitigate the effects of flooding attack. This algorithm
classifies a node neighbours based on a trust value to three categories; friend, ac-
quaintance and stranger. Friend is a trusted node and stranger is a non-trusted
node while an acquaintance has the trust value that is greater than a stranger and
less than a friend. The algorithm defines a threshold value to each neighbour type.
A node decision will be taken based on the neighbour type that sends the RREQ
and threshold value of this neighbour type. As a general rule, if a node receives a
RREQ from a neighbour, it first checks its relationship class and based on this it
checks if this neighbour runs over the relationship class threshold value or not. The
node processes the RREQ if this neighbour still running under the relationship class
threshold otherwise it discards the RREQ and blacklists this neighbour. The dis-
advantage of this algorithm is that it cannot support high node mobility. Khartad
[85] introduces a modification to this algorithm to extend the algorithm for high
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node mobility. A significant disadvantage of this approach is that it depends on a
modification of DSR and cannot be adapted to other MANET protocols.
5.3 Anti-Flooding (AF) Mechanism
Anti-Flooding (AF) [86] mechanism is designed to mitigate the effect of the flooding
attack on the performance of a MANET routing protocol. The mechanism does not
use cryptographic techniques which conserves the power and computation resources.
Each node in the network has to monitor the performance of its neighbours to detect
if they are attempting to flood the network or not. Malicious nodes will be detected
reliably within a very few minutes. The only way for a malicious node to subvert
the mechanism is to transmit fake RREQ packets at such a low rate which do not
affect the network performance significantly.
The idea is to record for each neighbour the rate at which it transmits RREQs.
A node pursuing a flooding attack will be generating a high number of RREQs. If
the rate exceeds a threshold, then the neighbour is added to a black list of potential
malicious nodes. Once on the black list, RREQs from the black listed node are not
forwarded, but they are still recorded. A node can be removed from the black list if
its rate of RREQ generation later reduces below the threshold. If the rate continues
high, the offending node is queried - only a non-malicious node will respond. After
two queries, the neighbour will be suspended for a period, and if its rate is still high
after the period has been elapsed it will be declared as malicious. Table 5.1 shows
the values of parameters that were used in our simulations. A node implementing
the Anti-Flood mechanism behaves as follows:
Table 5.1: AF Mechanism Parameters
RREQ_THRESHOLD 10
RREQ_COUNT_1 7
RREQ_COUNT_2 3
RREQ_TIME_1 5 s
RREQ_TIME_2 2 s
RREP_WAIT_TIME 1 s
TRAFFIC_TIME 10 s
EXCLUDE_TIME 60 s
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Algorithm 5.1 AF Neighbour Classification
L: largest number of RREQs received from all neighbours
N : number of RREQ received from a neighbour
T : RREQ threshold
B : neighbour blacklist value (default assigned for normal node)
1: calculate L
2: for all neighbour in list do
3: if N ≥ T then
4: increment B of neighbour sent L
5: suspend other neighbours
6: else
7: decrement B if not default
8: end if
9: reset N
10: end for
Figure 5.1: AF Neighbour Classification
• Algorithm 5.1 shows that every TRAFFIC_TIME, the number of RREQs
received from each neighbour since the last classification update was examined.
• If the number of RREQs received from a neighbour exceeds the threshold
RREQ_THRESHOLD, the black_list value of this neighbour is set to 1. If
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multiple neighbours exceed the threshold, the black_list value of the neighbour
which has sent the largest number of RREQs is set to 1. Other neighbours
that exceeded the threshold are suspended for a short period. RREQs from
suspended nodes are ignored and not forwarded. Suspension of neighbours
except the one with the largest RREQ count allows the mechanism to avoid
double counting of RREQs and concentrate on classification of the worst of-
fender. RREQ_THRESHOLD value has been chosen by running AODV on a
large number of malicious-free scenarios and observing the largest number of
RREQs that can be received in TRAFFIC_TIME as shown in Figure 5.1.
• Algorithm 5.2 and Figure 5.2 show that RREQ packets are processed normally
when only received from neighbours with a black_list value of 0. If a RREQ is
received from a neighbour with a black_list value of 1, then the node examines
how many RREQs have been received in an interval of RREQ_TIME_1. If
that is less than RREQ_COUNT_1, the black_list value for that neighbour
is reset to 0. If the number exceeds RREQ_COUNT_1, the node tests the
authenticity of the neighbour by replying with a fake RREP packet to the
RREQ. If the neighbour is malicious, it does not send data to be routed
to the destination. If no data is received within RREP_WAIT_TIME, the
neighbour’s black_list value is set to 2. If the neighbour is not malicious, data
is received by the fake RREP originator, which can respond with a RERR so
that a new route can be found.
• If a RREQ is received from a neighbour with a black_list value of 2, it re-
examines the rate of RREQ received from that neighbour. If the number of
RREQ received from this neighbour is less than RREQ_COUNT_2 in an in-
terval of RREQ_TIME_2, it decrements the black_list value to 1. Otherwise
the node again sends a fake RREP to the RREQ sender to test its authenticity.
If the RREP_WAIT_TIME expires without receiving the data, the node sets
the black_list value of this neighbour to 3 and suspends this neighbour for a
long period equal to the next TRAFFIC_TIME + EXCLUDE_TIME. This
long suspension ensures that if the behaviour of this neighbour has been af-
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Algorithm 5.2 AF RREQ Processing
N : number of RREQs received from a neighbour
R: rate of RREQ (N during time period)
L: limit of RREQ rate (depend on B)
B : neighbour blacklist value (default assigned for normal node)
1: receive RREQ
2: if neighbour under suspension OR testing then
3: discard RREQ
4: else
5: increment N
6: if B = exclusion then
7: malicious misbehaviour
8: discard RREQ
9: else if B 6= default then
10: if R ≥ L then
11: send fake RREP
12: else
13: decrement B
14: end if
15: discard RREQ
16: else
17: normal RREQ processing
18: end if
19: end if
fected by a malicious node, then that malicious node will have been discovered
and excluded during this suspension.
• After the long-time suspension has expired, the node restarts the previous
process; it counts again the number of received RREQ from this neighbour and
if the number is less than the threshold RREQ_THRESHOLD, it decrements
the black_list value to 2. Otherwise it will increment the black_list value to
4.
• If a RREQ is received from a neighbour with a black_list value equal to 4, the
node re-monitors the rate of RREQ received from this neighbour. This gives
a final chance to the neighbour under suspicion to prove it is innocent and its
previous misbehaviour was a result of forwarding malicious’ RREQs. If the
number of RREQ received from this neighbour is less than RREQ_COUNT_1
in an interval of RREQ_TIME_1, it decrements the black_list value to 3.
Otherwise the node sends a fake RREP to the RREQ sender to test its au-
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Figure 5.2: AF RREQ Processing
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thenticity for the final time. If the RREP_WAIT_TIME expires without
receiving the data, the node sets the black_list value of this neighbour to 5,
classifies this neighbour as malicious node and removes this neighbour from
its routing table. All received RREQ from a neighbour that has a black_list
value of 5 will be dropped without processing as a result of its classification
as a malicious node.
Although AF mechanism succeeded in discovering malicious nodes within a small
time, it has a number of security gaps. Disseminating threshold levels such
as RREQ_THRESHOLD, RREQ_COUNT_1 and RREQ_COUNT_2 introduces
the ability for an attacker to subvert the algorithm by working below these thresh-
olds. In addition, as RREQs are forwarded through innocent nodes without check-
ing the trustiness of their senders, the algorithm cannot guarantee that the excluded
nodes are genuine malicious nodes which increases the number of innocent excluded
nodes. The simulation results in the next section clarify that the true exclusion ratio
of this algorithm is too small which was the motivation to develop this algorithm
by introducing the Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM).
5.4 Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM)
Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM) [87] is designed to mitigate the ef-
fect of the flooding attack on the performance of a MANET routing protocol by
fast detection of malicious neighbours. FARM modifies AF mechanism to close the
security gaps and to overcome its drawbacks such as using fixed thresholds that can
be disseminated to malicious nodes and guarantee of genuine malicious nodes exclu-
sion. The mechanism uses the concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) [88] that
detects a malicious node by following the normal protocol behaviour and luring the
malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its malicious behaviour. The mechanism
does not use cryptographic techniques which conserves the power and computation
resources. Furthermore, the mechanism neither adds new routing packets nor mod-
ifies the existing ones.
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Each node monitors the behaviour of its neighbours to detect if any of them
appears to be attempting a flooding attack. When a node receives more RREQs
from a neighbour than a dynamic threshold, it suspects that neighbour and tests it
by sending a fake RREP to the next RREQ received from that neighbour. If that
neighbour is malicious, it will not have data to send. A non-malicious neighbour will
send data, to which the testing node can respond with a RERR packet. Malicious
nodes are detected and excluded within a short time and with high reliability com-
pared with existing algorithms. A malicious node cannot subvert the mechanism
as there are no fixed thresholds and all variables are randomly set. The algorithm
introduces two different variables; trust level and confidence level. The trust level is
a node’s trust in the network and its assessment of the instantaneous attack threat.
Once a node joins a network, it sets its trust level to Normal mode and updates
this trust level to either Trust or Threat according to if there is a threat in the
network or not. The RREQ threshold is dynamically changed based on the trust
level and setting the value is randomly chosen based on the boundaries of these trust
levels.
Normal
Threat Trust
No data reception to
fake RREP
2 successive
TRAFFIC_TIME
without threat
2 successive
TRAFFIC_TIME
without threat
Figure 5.3: FARM Node Trust Level
Figure 5.3 shows the operation of trust levels as a finite state machine. The
node assigns a confidence level to each of its neighbours. A confidence level for
a neighbour is dynamically changed according to the neighbour behaviour to the
testing node fake RREP which consequently changing the testing node trust level.
Table 5.2 shows the values of parameters that were used in our simulations. A
node implementing the Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM) behaves as
follows:
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Table 5.2: FARM Mechanism Parameters
RREP_WAIT_TIME 1 s
VALIDATE_TIME 2 s
TRAFFIC_TIME 3 s
UPGRADE_LIMIT 2
NEIGHBOUR_LIMIT 2
HOP_LIMIT 5
MAX_CONFIDENCE 11
MIN_THREAT 2
MAX_THREAT 4
MIN_NORMAL 4
MAX_NORMAL 6
MIN_TRUST 6
MAX_TRUST 8
• A node initialises its trust level to Normal and randomly sets RREQ
threshold between MIN_NORMAL and MAX_NORMAL. Once a node
sends a fake RREP to test a neighbour and does not receive data within
RREP_WAIT_TIME, it changes its trust level to Threat and randomly sets
its threshold between MIN_THREAT and MAX_THREAT.
• The node upgrades it trust level from Threat to Normal or from Normal
to Trust if it does not examine any neighbour during UPGRADE_LIMIT
successive TRAFFIC_TIME. A node that set its trust level to Trust
sets its RREQ threshold between MIN_TRUST and MAX_TRUST. The
MIN_NORMAL and MAX_NORMAL limits, and their equivalents for
Threat and Trust levels, are chosen to give a greater range of testing of
a neighbour. These three ranges introduce more difficulty for a malicious node
looking to subvert our proposed mechanism as it knows neither the trust level
nor the random threshold chosen for this level by the victim node as shown in
Algorithm 5.3.
• A node initialises the black_list value of all its neighbours to 0 and updates
this value based on the neighbour behaviour. RREQ packets are processed
normally when received from neighbours with a black_list value of 0. When
a node receives a RREQ, it stores two values for each neighbour; the number
of RREQs received and the total number of hops received in these RREQs.
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Algorithm 5.3 FARM Neighbour Classification
L: largest number of RREQs received from all neighbours
N : number of RREQs received from a neighbour
H : average hop count of RREQs received from a neighbour
T : RREQ dynamic threshold (depend on Trust level)
B : neighbour blacklist value (default assigned for normal node)
C : confidence value of a neighbour
M : maximum confidence
1: calculate L
2: for all neighbour in list do
3: calculate H
4: if N ≥ T then
5: increment B of neighbour sent L
6: else
7: if b 6= default AND H< I then
8: increment C
9: if C=M then
10: reset C
11: decrement B
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: reset N
16: reset H
17: end for
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Figure 5.4: FARM Neighbour Classification
• Figure 5.4 show that each TRAFFIC_TIME, A node computes the average
hop count for the received RREQs and examines the neighbour that sends
the largest number of RREQs during this period. If the largest number
of RREQs exceeds the RREQ threshold, which is randomly selected and
dynamically changed based on its trust level, and the average hop of all
RREQs received from this neighbour is less than HOP_LIMIT, the node sets
the black_list value of that neighbour to 1 and sets the time to examine
this neighbour to VALIDATE_TIME. If the number of RREQs is less than
RREQ threshold, the node increases this neighbour confidence level value until
MAX_CONFIDENCE after which the node decreases the black_list value of
this neighbour.
• Once a node suspects a neighbour (i.e. black_list = 1), it drops RREQs
received from this neighbour that have number of hops greater than NEIGH-
BOUR_LIMIT which decreases a malicious node’s opportunity to flood the
network by getting closer to the flooding source. If the node receives a RREQ
during VALIDATE_TIME, it sends a fake RREP to this neighbour and stores
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Algorithm 5.4 FARM RREQ Processing
N : number of RREQs received from a neighbour
H : hop count of RREQ
L: hop count limit (small to filter RREQs)
B : neighbour blacklist value (default assigned for normal node)
T : RREQ dynamic threshold (depend on Trust level)
1: receive RREQ
2: increment N
3: Add H
4: if B = exclusion then
5: malicious misbehaviour
6: discard RREQ
7: else if B 6= default AND H ≥ L then
8: if neighbour under testing then
9: switch to Threat mode
10: randomly set T
11: increment B
12: else
13: send fake RREP
14: store fake Src & Dst addresses
15: end if
16: discard RREQ
17: else
18: normal RREQ processing
19: end if
the source and destination addresses of this RREQ in a trustiness table for
later examination. The node also sets an expiry time for this entry to avoid
the table inflation.
• Algorithm 5.4 clarifies that if the node later receives data from that suspected
neighbour, it is assumed that this neighbour is not a malicious node and
resets this neighbour’s black_list value. If it does not receive data within
RREP_WAIT_TIME; it sets the black_list value of this neighbour to 2.
• The algorithm is repeated three times to ensure that the non-reception of
data after examining a neighbour is not a result of link failure or network
congestion. If the black_list value of a neighbour reaches 6, the node classifies
that neighbour as a malicious node and removes it from its routing table and
drops any upcoming RREQs received from this neighbour without processing
as shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: FARM RREQ Processing
FARM algorithm includes strong features that do not allow malicious nodes to
subvert it. The algorithm has no fixed thresholds; that could be disseminated to
malicious nodes and allow these malicious nodes to work under these thresholds.
Instead of this, the algorithm sets RREQ threshold randomly depending on the
trust level of a node. The adjacent threshold limits of the three level of trustiness
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introduce a difficulty for a malicious node to subvert the algorithm. As shown from
Table 5.2, the RREQ threshold is randomly set between 2 and 8 which is a big range
that makes it difficult for a malicious node to estimate the threshold value.
In addition, FARM takes into account network problems such as link failure
and congestion by giving a neighbour 2 consecutive chances to prove its normal
behaviour. After the third consecutive misbehaviour by receiving a RREQ and did
not receive data later in response to the fake RREP, a node will be sure that this
neighbour attempts to flood the network. Moreover, this represents as well a warning
for a malicious node that its bad behaviour has been discovered asking it to give
up on this. Our proposed algorithm does not care about all nodes in the MANET;
each node cares only about its neighbours (1 hop only from it). If a node sends a
fake RREP to a neighbour and it does not later receive data from this neighbour
regarding to this RREP; it will be sure that this neighbour is a malicious or a
colluding node and it should be excluded after multiple examination. If each node
succeeded in excluding its malicious neighbours, this would guarantee malicious-free
routes. To ensure that the excluded node is a malicious node, our algorithm ignores
RREQs from a neighbour with a non-zero black_list value and the number of hops
in the RREQ greater than NEIGHBOUR_LIMIT.
Moreover, a node can temporarily increment the black_list value of an innocent
neighbour as a result of forwarding malicious RREQs. Later, when this innocent
neighbour succeeded in discovering and excluding the malicious node, a change
of the behaviour of this innocent neighbour is observed by the node. We sug-
gest that a node has to increment this innocent neighbour confidence level until
MAX_CONFIDENCE after that it decrements its black_list value to avoid a per-
manent effect of malicious node on other innocent nodes.
As we will see later in simulations, FARM algorithm succeeded in detecting
and excluding most of malicious neighbours in a short time. A malicious node is
detected whenever it does not send data after it is examined by a fake RREP. FARM
algorithm does not assume that the attacker has to continue its malicious behaviour;
but it guarantees that whenever a malicious node starts its bad behaviour, it will
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be discovered within a short time. So, a malicious node has two choices; either
to continue its bad behaviour by sending RREQs and expose itself for detection
and exclusion or it sends RREQs under the lowest threshold MIN_THREAT (i.e.
1 RREQ) every TRAFFIC_TIME which is a very low rate even compared to the
normal RREQ rate to be safe from detection which leads to the same result of
preventing the flooding attack.
5.5 Simulation Approach
NS-2 simulator [69] is used to simulate flooding attack. The simulation is used
to analyse the performance of the networks under the flooding attacks with and
without our new two mechanisms AF and FARM. The parameters used are shown
in Table 5.3. While we examined our proposed mechanisms on both UDP and
TCP traffic and the mechanisms succeeded in detecting flooding neighbours and
enhancing the network performance for both traffic, the chapter is focused on the
results of the proposed mechanisms on the TCP traffic only. We examined our
proposed mechanisms for different number of nodes (25, 50, 75 and 100) and different
node speeds (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 m/s). Similarly, only the case of 100
node networks is reported, corresponding to a high density of nodes. This gives
malicious nodes a high number of neighbours. We tested our algorithms on different
simulation areas (500 m2 and 1000 m2) to ensure the effect of nodes’ density on our
algorithm. Although, we report the higher area in this chapter for the consistency
of the thesis, results for the smaller area simulation are presented in [86]. We choose
a large simulation time to ensure that the vast majority of malicious nodes have
been detected especially for scenarios with a large number of malicious nodes. The
highest negative impact of malicious nodes usually appears on static networks and
this effect decreases as node mobility increases [77], so we report here the case of
static networks.
Our flooding attack model assumes that a malicious node periodically generates a
RREQ packet from a non-existent source to a non-existent destination each random
interval between MIN_FLOOD and MAX_FLOOD. The attacker constructs a fake
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Table 5.3: Resisting Flooding Attacks Simulation Parameters
Simulation Time 600 s
Simulation Area 1000 m2
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Connections 150
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 10
Node Speed 0 - 30 m/s
Pause Time 10 s
Traffic Type TCP
MIN_FLOOD 0.25 s
MAX_FLOOD 0.50 s
RREQ that includes a randomly generated hop count between 2 and 4. The value
2 ensures that a malicious node spoofs its neighbours that it forwards a RREQ
received from another node, while the value 4 ensures that this RREQ travels at
least (NETWORK_DIAMETER - 4) hops to flood the network. On the other hand,
the generated fake RREP which is used to test the trustiness of a neighbour is unicast
to this neighbour with a number of hops randomly chosen between 2 and 4 to spoof
this neighbour that it has the best route (i.e. 1 to 3 hop counts only from the RREQ
source). The RREP originator is also chosen randomly and the destination sequence
number value of this RREP is set to the received corresponding one in the RREQ
plus a randomly generated number between 10 and 30 to spoof this neighbour about
the freshness of this RREP.
5.6 Simulation Results
AF and FARM algorithms achieve different levels of success in excluding flooding
nodes. As the AF mechanism achieves a smaller success than the FARM mechanism,
we include only the FARM effect on the network performance in this chapter. FARM
succeeded in detecting and excluding more than 80% of malicious neighbours in
the simulation time with a highly trusted ratio that exceeds 90% in AODV, DSR
and SAODV. Although FARM achieves a smaller success in AOMDV, it can be
adapted by modifying the trust levels boundary values. Trust levels boundaries are
chosen based on calculating the average number of RREQs disseminated through
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the network each TRAFFIC_TIME if the network does not have malicious nodes.
The boundaries stated in Table 5.2 are used for AODV, DSR and SAODV protocols.
On the other hand, as the rate of RREQs traversing the network in a period for
AOMDV are usually more than double the values of the other protocols, we use
the same boundary values stated in Table 5.2 for AOMDV while we reduce the
TRAFFIC_TIME to half of its value in other protocols (i.e. TRAFFIC_TIME =
1.5 sec). Details of the simulations are presented in the following sections.
5.6.1 Resisting Flooding Attacks in AODV
In this section, we evaluate the performance of AODV under flooding attacks with
and without our two mechanisms and compare with the results of the Filter-Based
(FB) [82] algorithm. Our simulation results show that FARM-AODV achieves a
higher exclusion ratio of genuine malicious nodes than other algorithms.
Figure 5.6 shows that FARM-AODV ensures that if a neighbour is excluded, in
98% of cases this neighbour is a malicious node. On the other hand, FB-AODV and
AF-AODV have very low true exclusion ratio.
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Figure 5.6: AODV True Exclusion Ratio
The effect illustrated by the true exclusion ratio is more noticeable if we combine
it with the total number of neighbours excluded during the simulation which is shown
in Figure 5.7. The figure shows the effect of dramatic true exclusion ratio of both FB-
AODV and AF-AODV on excluding high number of victim nodes. The total number
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of neighbours that is wrongly excluded during the simulation is too high for both
FB-AODV and AF-AODV. Although FARM-AODV excludes the lowest number of
neighbours, it guarantees that the vast majority of these excluded neighbours are
genuine malicious nodes.
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Figure 5.7: AODV Total Exclusions
Our simulation shows that regardless of the number of nodes and the number
of malicious nodes in the network, a node will detect a malicious neighbour within
a short time. Figure 5.8 shows the proportion of malicious nodes that have been
detected as time progresses. For clarity, we only show the results for 1, 4, 7
and 10 malicious nodes. As the simulation time increases, FARM succeeded in
detecting and excluding malicious nodes up to 75% of malicious neighbours within
600 seconds. The mechanism succeeded in excluding high ratio of the flooding
neighbours after 120 seconds from the beginning of the simulation because most
of the genuine RREQs and RREPs are sent during this period. The mechanism
continues to exclude more malicious neighbours after that at a low rate as a result
of small number of RREQs.
The effect of FARM algorithm on the AODV packet delivery ratio is shown in
Figure 5.9. While the flooding attack shows a slight degradation on the PDR of
AODV especially for large number of malicious nodes, FARM-AODV achieves an
approximately constant PDR regardless of the number of malicious nodes.
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Figure 5.8: FARM-AODV Malicious Discovery Ratio
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Figure 5.9: FARM Impact on AODV Packet Delivery Ratio
Figure 5.10 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the AODV network through-
put. From the previous discussions in Chapter 4 and from this figure, we notice that
the flooding attack has a severe negative impact on the network throughput. FARM
improves AODV network throughput by approximately 3% for each malicious node
and the enhancement becomes huge for large number of malicious nodes. While
the throughput of AODV dramatically decreases as the number of malicious nodes
increases, FARM-AODV achieves a slow rate degradation of throughput as a result
of continuous detection and exclusion of malicious neighbours.
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Figure 5.10: FARM Impact on AODV Network Throughput
The effect of FARM algorithm on the AODV delay is shown in Figure 5.11.
While the delay increases as the number of malicious nodes increases in AODV,
FARM-AODV achieves better average delay.
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Figure 5.11: FARM Impact on AODV End-to-End Delay
Figure 5.12 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the AODV normalized rout-
ing load. The result shows that while the normalized routing load of AODV increases
as the number of malicious nodes increases especially for large number of malicious
nodes, it has a less significant change for FARM-AODV.
Figure 5.13 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the AODV routing overhead.
FARM succeeded in reducing overhead of AODV by approximately 3% for each
malicious node.
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Figure 5.12: FARM Impact on AODV Normalized Routing Load
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Figure 5.13: FARM Impact on AODV Routing Overhead
Figure 5.14 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the AODV routing discovery
latency. The result shows that while RDL of AODV increases dramatically as the
number of malicious nodes increases, FARM achieves a huge improvement in RDL
especially for large number of malicious node.
5.6.2 Resisting Flooding Attacks in DSR
In this section, we compare the performance of DSR under flooding attacks with and
without our two mechanisms. Our simulation results show that FARM mechanism
achieves a higher exclusion ratio of genuine malicious nodes than AF mechanism.
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Figure 5.14: FARM Impact on AODV Route Discovery Latency
Figure 5.15 shows that our algorithm ensures that if a neighbour is excluded, in
95% of cases this neighbour is a malicious node which is slightly smaller than AODV
ratio as shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.15: DSR True Exclusion Ratio
The effect illustrated by true exclusion ratio is more remarkable if we combine it
with the total number of neighbours excluded during the simulation which is shown
in Figure 5.16. While FARM has a smaller number of exclusions than AF, the vast
majority of them are malicious nodes. Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.16 show that FARM
achieves as well higher number of exclusions in DSR than AODV.
Figure 5.17 shows the proportion of malicious nodes that have been detected
as time progresses. The figure shows that as the simulation time increases the
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Figure 5.16: DSR Total Exclusions
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Figure 5.17: FARM-DSR Malicious Discovery Ratio
mechanism succeeded in detecting and excluding malicious nodes up to 95% of
malicious neighbours within 600 seconds which is higher than its ratio in AODV as
shown in Figure 5.8.
As a result of excluding most of the malicious neighbours, FARM achieves
approximately constant performance in all metrics regardless of the number of
malicious nodes joining the network. This improvement has a positive impact in
the absence of malicious nodes as well. This is because a node does not forward
all received RREQs and it drops RREQs received from suspected nodes which
decreases the overhead and frees the medium to deliver other data. The following
figures present some of these enhancements. The effect of FARM algorithm on
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the DSR packet delivery ratio is shown in Figure 5.18. While the flooding attack
has a dramatic negative impact on the PDR of DSR, FARM-DSR achieves an
approximately constant PDF regardless of the number of malicious nodes.
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Figure 5.18: FARM Impact on DSR Packet Delivery Ratio
Figure 5.19 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the DSR network throughput.
FARM-DSR achieves a constant throughput compared to original DSR which has
dramatic degradation as the number of malicious nodes increases.
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Figure 5.19: FARM Impact on DSR Network Throughput
The effect of FARM algorithm on the DSR end-end-delay is shown in Figure
5.20. While the delay increases as the number of malicious nodes increases in DSR,
FARM-DSR achieves approximately constant delay.
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Figure 5.20: FARM Impact on DSR End-to-End Delay
Figure 5.21 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the DSR routing overhead.
The result shows that FARM-DSR achieves a constant overhead compared to the
original DSR. One of the most interesting results is the enhancement of overhead
even in the absence of malicious nodes. This is, as mentioned earlier, because of the
selective droppings feature of RREQs by a node.
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Figure 5.21: FARM Impact on DSR Routing Overhead
5.6.3 Resisting Flooding Attacks in SAODV
In this section, we compare the performance of SAODV under flooding attacks
with and without our two mechanisms. Our simulation results show that FARM
mechanism achieves a higher exclusion ratio of genuine malicious nodes than AF
mechanism. Figure 5.22 shows that FARM ensures that if a neighbour is excluded,
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in 90% of cases this neighbour is a malicious node especially for large number of
malicious nodes. This is slightly less than its value for both AODV and DSR if we
compare this figure to Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.15.
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Figure 5.22: SAODV True Exclusion Ratio
As mentioned earlier, the effect illustrated by true exclusion ratio is more re-
markable if we combine it with the total number of neighbours excluded during the
simulation which is shown in Figure 5.23. The figure shows that while FARM has
a smaller number of exclusions than AF, the vast majority of them are malicious
nodes. FARM achieves a smaller number of exclusions in SAODV than either AODV
or DSR.
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Figure 5.23: SAODV Total Exclusions
Figure 5.24 shows the proportion of malicious nodes that have been detected
as time progresses. The figure shows that as the simulation time increases the
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mechanism succeeded in detecting and excluding malicious nodes up to 80% of
malicious neighbours within 600 seconds which is higher ratio than AODV and less
than DSR.
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Figure 5.24: FARM-SAODV Malicious Discovery Ratio
FARM achieves approximately a small difference in all performance metrics re-
gardless of the number of malicious nodes. The following figures prove the validity
of this advantage. Figure 5.25 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the SAODV
network throughput. While the throughput of FARM-SAODV slightly decreases
compared to the original SAODV, the variations of its values regardless of the num-
ber of malicious nodes is smaller than SAODV which has a remarkable change.
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Figure 5.25: FARM Impact on SAODV Network Throughput
Figure 5.26 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the SAODV routing overhead.
FARM-SAODV achieves a better routing overhead and the variations of its values
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regardless of the number of malicious nodes are smaller than SAODV which has a
bigger change.
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Figure 5.26: FARM Impact on SAODV Routing Overhead
5.6.4 Resisting Flooding Attacks in AOMDV
In this section, we compare the performance of AOMDV under flooding attacks
with and without our two mechanisms. Our simulation results show that while
FARM mechanism achieves a small exclusion ratio of genuine malicious nodes, its
true exclusion ratio is better than AF mechanism. FARM excludes smaller number
of nodes with a higher ratio of exclusion.
Figure 5.27 shows that FARM ensures that if a neighbour is excluded, in 75% of
cases this neighbour is a malicious node. Although this is a small trustiness value, it
can be increased by modifying the boundaries values of the trust levels. This smaller
ratio compared to all the other protocols is achieved because the number of RREQs
traversing the network in a period for AOMDV is usually more than double the
number for the other protocols. Finding minimum/maximum trust level boundary
values will produce higher exclusion ratio.
As discussed earlier, the effect illustrated by the true exclusion ratio is more
remarkable if we combine it with the total number of neighbours excluded during
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Figure 5.27: AOMDV True Exclusion Ratio
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Figure 5.28: AOMDV Total Exclusions
the simulation which is shown in Figure 5.28. The figure shows that FARM has a
smaller number of exclusions than AF.
Figure 5.29 shows the proportion of malicious nodes that have been detected
as time progresses. The figure shows that as the simulation time increases the
mechanism succeeded in detecting and excluding malicious nodes up to more than
80% of malicious neighbours within 600 seconds and this ratio is high for a large
number of malicious nodes.
As a result of low exclusion ratio, FARM achieves a smaller improvement in the
network performance than the original AOMDV and this improvement is more re-
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Figure 5.29: FARM-AOMDV Malicious Discovery Ratio
markable especially with a large number of malicious nodes. The following figures
present some of these improvements. Figure 5.30 shows the effect of FARM algo-
rithm on the AOMDV network throughput. While the throughput of AOMDV with
and without FARM decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases, FARM
achieves an improvement up to 13% of the original AOMDV when the number of
malicious nodes is 10.
 650
 700
 750
 800
 850
 900
 950
 1000
 1050
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
T
h
r o
u
g
h
p
u
t  
[ K
b
p
s
]
Malicious Nodes
AOMDV
FARM-AOMDV
Figure 5.30: FARM Impact on AOMDV Network Throughput
Figure 5.31 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the AOMDV end-end-delay.
The result shows that FARM-AOMDV achieves a better delay than the original
AOMDV which increases dramatically as the number of malicious nodes increases.
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Figure 5.31: FARM Impact on AOMDV End-to-End Delay
Figure 5.32 shows the effect of FARM algorithm on the AOMDV routing over-
head. While the overhead of AOMDV with and without FARM increases as the
number of malicious nodes increases, FARM achieves an improvement up to 12% of
the original AOMDV when the number of malicious nodes is 10.
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Figure 5.32: FARM Impact on AOMDV Routing Overhead
5.7 Summary
A flooding attack has a dramatic impact on the MANET routing protocols perfor-
mance even for secured protocols such as SAODV. We proposed two new mecha-
nisms Anti-Flooding (AF) and Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM) to
resist flooding attacks that can be incorporated into any reactive routing protocol.
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While AF mechanism uses some thresholds and timers to classify nodes as malicious,
FARM mechanism uses the concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) in which de-
tecting a malicious intruder is accomplished by complying with the normal protocol
behaviour and luring the malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its malicious
behaviour. FARM mechanism is designed to close the security gaps and overcome
the drawbacks of AF mechanism such as fixed thresholds that enable malicious nodes
to subvert it. It succeeded in detecting and excluding a high ratio of flooding nodes
in a short time. Neither solution requires expensive cryptography or authentication
mechanisms or modifications to the packet formats.
Using NS2 simulation, we compare the performance of networks under flooding
attacks with and without our mechanisms, showing that it significantly reduces
the effect of a flooding attack. Both AF and FARM algorithms achieve success
in excluding flooding nodes with different ratios. When incorporated into AODV,
DSR or SAODV, FARM succeeded in detecting and excluding more than 80% of
malicious neighbours in the simulation time with a highly trusted ratio exceeds than
90%. Used with AOMDV, FARM was less successful but it could be improved by
modifying the trust level boundary values.
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Resisting Blackhole Attacks
6.1 Introduction
Reactive MANET routing protocols are vulnerable to a dramatic collapse of net-
work performance in the presence of blackhole attack. The chapter introduces two
new mechanisms Anti-Blackhole (AB) and Blackhole Resisting Mechanism (BRM)
to resist such attacks that can be incorporated into any reactive routing protocol.
Both AB and BRM mechanisms use the concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) in
which detecting a malicious intruder is accomplished by complying with the normal
protocol behaviour and luring the malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its
malicious behaviour. Neither solution requires expensive cryptography or authenti-
cation mechanisms or modifications to the packet formats. Using NS2 simulation,
we compare the performance of networks under blackhole attacks with and with-
out our mechanisms, showing that it significantly reduces the effect of a blackhole
attack.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the related
work. In Section 6.3, the Anti-Blackhole (AB) mechanism to detect the black-
hole attack is presented. Section 6.4 introduces the Blackhole Resisting Mechanism
(BRM) that modifies the AB mechanism. In Section 6.5, a simulation approach and
parameters are presented. In Section 6.6, simulation results are given. Section 6.7
summarizes the findings.
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6.2 Related Work
Since on-demand routing protocols have been introduced, many significant algo-
rithms have been proposed to secure MANETs against blackhole attacks. Some of
these solutions are designed based on using cryptographic techniques to secure the
routing packets. Although these solutions introduce high immunity to the black-
hole attack, network nodes suffer from the high computations required which does
not suit the characteristics of MANET. Other solutions suggest modification to the
routing protocols by adding some packets, modifying the existing packets or chang-
ing the procedure of these protocols. While a small number of these solutions are
introduced as a mechanism that can be incorporated to any routing protocols, the
majority of these solutions are designed for a specific routing protocol to detect and
defend against this type of attack.
Such solutions focus their suggested mechanisms on two characteristics of the
RREP received from a blackhole node; the first is that this reply is usually received
before any other replies as a result of blackhole node sending this fake reply without
checking its route table. The second is that this fake RREP usually contains a much
higher sequence number relative to the RREQ because the blackhole node tries to
convince its neighbours it has a fresh route to the destination node. Suggested solu-
tions classify the attack as single blackhole attack or cooperative blackhole attack.
In a cooperative attack, multiple malicious nodes attempt to subvert the routing
protocol. Some solutions detect single attacks and give acceptable protection. Oth-
ers attempt to detect cooperative attacks. All these solutions make assumptions
about blackhole behaviour and cannot guarantee that the excluded nodes are gen-
uine blackhole nodes. Forwarding a RREP received from a blackhole can result in a
node being wrongly classified as malicious. In this section we introduce some of the
existing algorithms used to avoid the blackhole attack.
SAODV [54] is an enhancement of the AODV routing protocol. The protocol
operates mainly by appending an extension message to each AODV message. The
extension messages include a digital signature of the routing packet using the private
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key of the original sender of the routing message and a hash value of the hop count.
SAODV uses asymmetric cryptography to authenticate all non-mutable fields of
routing messages as well as hash chain to authenticate the hop count (the only
mutable) field. Since all fields except the hop count of routing messages are non-
mutable they can be authenticated by verifying the signature using the public key
of the message originator. So, when a routing message is received by a node, the
node verifies the signature of the received packet. If the signature is verified, the
node computes the hash value of the hop count, if the routing message is RREQ or
RREP, and compares it with the corresponding value in the SAODV extension. If
they match, the routing message is valid and will be forwarded with an incremented
hop count and a new hash value. If the destination receives the RREQ, it verifies the
RREQ signature and the hop count hash value before replying by a RREP signed
by the its private key. Similarly, the source and intermediate nodes have to verify
the RREP to authenticate the identity of the sender. As RERR messages have a
large amount of mutable information, SAODV suggests that all RERRs should be
signed by the sender’s private key.
S. Lee [89] proposed a solution that modified the AODV routing protocol by
introducing two new packets; the route confirmation request (CREQ) and route
confirmation reply (CREP). An intermediate node has to send a CREQ to its next-
hop node toward the destination node in addition to a RREP to the source node.
Upon receiving a CREQ, the next-hop node looks up its cache for a route to the
destination. If it has a route, it sends the CREP to the source. After receiving the
CREP, the source node can confirm the validity of the path by comparing the path
in RREP and the one in CREP. If both agree, the source node judges that the route
is appropriate. One drawback of this method is that it cannot avoid the cooperative
blackhole attack if two consecutive nodes work together as the first node asked its
next hop node to send CREP to the source.
M. Al-Shurman [31] developed a solution that requires additional computational
overhead. A node maintains the sequence number for the last packet sent to the
other nodes in one table and the sequence number for the last packet received from
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the other nodes in a second table. Either an intermediate node or the destination
node stores the sequence number of last packet received from the RREQ. Source node
extracts the last packet sequence number when it receives RREP and compares it to
the most recent value saved in its table. If matching occurs, the transmission takes
place otherwise this forwarding node is considered as malicious node and an alarm
message is sent to the other nodes to block this malicious node.
S. Kurosawa [90] introduced a mechanism that monitors the characteristic change
of a node within a given time. A node monitors the characteristics of another
node by observing the number of sent RREQs and the number of received RREPs
and the mean destination sequence numbers of RREQs and RREPs. A node is
recognized as blackhole node if its characteristics are changed over the monitoring
period. Threshold value is compared to the difference between the monitored RREQ
and RREP sequence numbers and nodes that have high difference between these two
numbers are isolated from the network. Determining optimal threshold is the major
drawback of this algorithm which can lead to the isolation of an innocent node as if
it is a blackhole.
L. Tamilselvan [91] proposed a solution that is designed upon a Fidelity Table in
which each participating node is assigned with a fidelity level that determines the
node reliability. A default fidelity level is assigned to each node and this level is
updated based on the behaviour of the node. When a source node receives RREP,
it waits until receiving further route replies from its neighbouring nodes and then
selects a neighbour node with a highest fidelity level to forward data to the desti-
nation node. A destination node acknowledges receiving the data by sending ACK.
Updating the fidelity level of node relies on trusted participation of the node in the
network. The source node increments or decrements the fidelity level of the forward-
ing node upon receiving or missing the ACK respectively. A node is eliminated from
the network if its fidelity level reaches zero and the node marked as malicious. This
technique is used to identify cooperative blackhole attacks for a safe route discovery.
The main drawback of this solution is the high end-to-end delay, especially when
the malicious node is far away from the source node.
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P. Raj [92] developed an algorithm that adds an additional check for a node
to accept RREP. The node tests if the RREP sequence number is higher than
a threshold value. If the RREP sequence number is higher, the sending node is
considered to be malicious and that node is added to the black list and this RREP is
discarded. As soon as the node detects a malicious node, it sends an ALARM packet
to inform its neighbours about this malicious and ignores all RREPs received from
it. A node dynamically updates its threshold value each interval time as the average
of the difference between the sequence numbers received in the RREP packets and
their corresponding values in its routing table. The solution is designed mainly for
single blackhole attack and does not detect cooperative blackhole attacks. Updating
threshold value and forwarding ALARM packets increases the routing overhead. The
wrong calculation of the threshold value may exclude an innocent node as if it is a
blackhole.
N. Mistry [93] introduced a solution that depends on analysing all received
RREPs. As source node receives the first RREP, it waits MOS_WAIT_TIME
seconds to receive multiple RREPs. During this time, the source node saves all the
received RREPs in a table. Thereafter, the source node analyses the stored RREPs
from the table, and rejects any having a very high destination sequence number and
marks the node as malicious. The remaining entries in the table are arranged ac-
cording to their destination sequence number and the node with the highest number
is selected. This technique also records the identity of suspected malicious nodes to
discard any upcoming control packets received and/or forwarded from/to that node
and a routing entry for that node will not be maintained. The algorithm introduces
high end-to-end delay as nodes have to wait for multiple RREPs.
X. Li [94] proposed a Packet Forwarding Ratio (PFR) trust model. A trust value
of a node depends on the PFR value which is the ratio of data packets forwarded
to the data packets received. This trust value is incremented or decremented upon
forwarding or dropping data packets respectively. Trust values ranges between 0 to
1; with 0 signifies malicious node and 1 signifies absolute trust. A node with low
trust value is not allowed to forward data packets.
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R. Vaghela [95] proposed a solution in which the source node forwards data
packets to destination node through the first RREP. The source node stores other
replies in Collect Route Reply Table (CRRT) which includes the sequence number
and packet arrival time at CRRT table. Furthermore, the source checks CRRT for a
common next hop node in the RREPs. If common next hop nodes found, it considers
those paths to be safe.
T. Mahmoud [96] developed a detection technique called Intrusion Avoidance
System (IASAODV). The proposed algorithm suggests that the source node has to
wait a time before sending data, in order to receive multiple RREP messages. During
this period, the source node stores the sequence number and the arrival time of all
received RREP in a table. When the timer expires, then the proposed algorithm
checks the number of RREP messages in the table. This algorithm assumes that
only the destination node is the trusted node and receiving more than one RREP
packet clarifies that one of these packets is created by the trusted destination node
and the other messages are created by blackhole nodes.
N. Choudhary [97] introduced a solution that based on sensing the wireless chan-
nel. A node assigns a max_trust value to all its neighbouring nodes. The node ex-
cludes a neighbour whose trust value decreases less than min_trust from engaging
in communication. When a node forwards a data packet, it sets a timer with it and
listens to the wireless channel in promiscuous mode to ensure that this packet is
forwarded by a next hop neighbour. When the timer expires without hearing the
retransmission of this packet, the node reduces the trust value for its next hop node.
Trust value information is updated and disseminated to other neighbouring nodes.
If the trust value of a node decreases below min_trust value, it will be isolated by
all the nodes in the network.
6.3 Anti-Blackhole (AB) Mechanism
AB is designed to mitigate the effect of the blackhole attack on the performance
of MANET on-demand routing protocol. The mechanism uses the concept of Self-
Protocol Trustiness (SPT) [88] in which detecting a malicious intruder is accom-
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plished by complying with the normal protocol behaviour and luring the malicious
node to give an implicit avowal of its malicious behaviour. The mechanism does not
use cryptographic techniques which conserves the power and computation resources.
The algorithm has no assumption about the malicious node behaviour which makes
it robust and reliable. Furthermore, the mechanism neither adds new routing pack-
ets nor modifies the existing ones. Each node in the network has to monitor the
behaviours of its neighbours to detect if any misbehaves as a blackhole node. Mali-
cious nodes will be detected reliably within a short time. The algorithm guarantees
100% exclusion of only blackhole nodes and does not exclude innocent nodes that
may forward a RREP. The only way for a malicious node to subvert the mechanism
is to reply to a very small number of RREQ packets and therefore it cannot launch
the blackhole attack or affect the network performance.
The idea is to record the rate of RREP packets received from a neighbour and use
this rate to clarify if it will suspect on one or more of its neighbours or not. If the rate
exceeds a threshold, the trustiness of this neighbour node is examined by sending
a fake RREQ from a non-existent source node to a non-existent destination node.
Only a malicious node will respond to this fake RREQ. If a node receives a RREP
to its fake RREQ from a neighbour, the node becomes sure that this neighbour is
a blackhole node, classifies it as malicious, and adds it to a black list of potential
malicious nodes. Once on the black list, it will be removed from the routing table
and any RREP from this black listed node are discarded, but they are still recorded.
A node implementing the Anti-Blackhole mechanism behaves as follows:
• Every TRAFFIC_TIME, each node monitors the number of RREPs received
from each neighbour since the last classification update was examined as shown
in Algorithm 6.1 and Figure 6.1.
• RREP packets are processed normally when received from neighbours with a
black_list value of 0.
• If the number of RREPs received from a neighbour exceeds the thresh-
old RREP_THRESHOLD, this neighbour’s black_list value is set to 1
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Algorithm 6.1 AB Neighbour Classification
N : number of RREP received from a neighbour
T : RREP threshold
B : neighbour blacklist value (default assigned for normal node)
1: for all neighbour in list do
2: if B 6= default AND N > T then
3: increment B
4: end if
5: reset N
6: end for
Figure 6.1: AB Neighbour Classification
which means that this neighbour is under suspicion. Choice of the
RREP_THRESHOLD is made by running AODV hundreds number of sce-
narios in the absence of malicious nodes and observing the average number of
RREPs that can be received during TRAFFIC_TIME. This choice of a low
value of RREP_THRESHOLD leads to suspecting in many normal nodes but
the node can differentiate later between a blackhole node and a normal node
depending on their response.
• Each node counts the number of neighbours nodes that exceed this threshold
during TRAFFIC_TIME.
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• If the black_list value of neighbour is 1, the node tests the trustiness of its
neighbour by sending a fake RREQ from a random non-existent source node to
a random non-existent destination node. The node stores this fake source and
destination to a trustiness table for later examination. The node also sets an
expiry time for this entry to avoid table inflation. The node schedules a timer
until RREP_VALIDATE seconds which is the testing duration to receive a
RREP for this fake RREQ. To control the number of tests, the node sends
fake RREQs as long as the number of these fake requests is less than the
black listed nodes divided by RREP_LIMIT. This ratio decreases the routing
overhead results from sending unrequired fake RREQs.
• To avoid flooding the network with fake RREQs which increases the routing
overhead, the node sets the TTL value of this request to a small number. If
TTL is set to 1, this implies that this fake RREQ will be received only by
the neighbours of the node and all normal neighbours will drop this RREQ
without forwarding it as the TTL value reaches zero and they have not any
route to this fake destination while the blackhole node only replies to this fake
RREQ.
• Algorithm 6.2 and Figure 6.2 show that if a RREP is received from a neighbour
for this fake RREQ and both fake source and destination addresses are found in
the trustiness table and the number of hops identifies that RREP originator is
the neighbour (i.e. number of hops is 2), the node identifies that the originator
is a blackhole node by incrementing its black_list value to 2, removes it from
the routing table and drops any upcoming RREPs received from this neighbour
without processing.
• If a RREP is received from a neighbour for the fake RREQ and both fake
source and destination addresses are found in the trustiness table but the
number of hops is greater than 2 which implies that this neighbour is for-
warding a RREP originated from a blackhole node, the node drops this RREP.
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Algorithm 6.2 AB RREP Processing
N : number of RREPs received from a neighbour
B : neighbour blacklist value (default assigned for normal node)
1: receive RREP
2: increment N
3: if B = exclusion then
4: malicious misbehaviour
5: discard RREP
6: else if B 6= default AND reply for fake RREQ then
7: reset N
8: increment B
9: discard RREP
10: else
11: normal RREP processing
12: end if
Figure 6.2: AB RREP Processing
• To avoid permanent blacklisting of an innocent node, the node resets the
black_list value to 0 if a RREP_VALIDATE timer expires without receiving
a reply to the fake RREQ.
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Our proposed mechanism (AB) clarifies that each node is responsible for mon-
itoring its neighbours and detecting and excluding blackhole ones. So, our mecha-
nism does not differentiate between single and cooperative blackhole attack. This
is because if the node at each terminal of a chain of cooperative blackhole nodes is
detected by its neighbours, the chain becomes useless and cannot affect the network.
Table 6.1 shows the values of parameters that were used in our simulations.
Table 6.1: AB Mechanism Parameters
RREP_THRESHOLD 2
RREP_LIMIT 3
RREP_VALIDATE 5 s
TRAFFIC_TIME 20 s
A malicious node can subvert the mechanism by sending only 2 RREPs at most
to a neighbour every 20 seconds and therefore it cannot launch the blackhole attack
or affect the network performance.
AODV controls flooding of RREQs by enforcing a source node that has not
fresh route to a destination to use an expanding ring search technique as an op-
timization. In an expanding ring search, the source node initially sets the TTL
value to TTL_START in the RREQ packet and if it does not receive a RREP
it increments the TTL value by TTL_INCREMENT until the TTL value reaches
TTL_THRESHOLD, beyond which it sets the TTL value to NET_DIAMETER
is used for each flood. Although AODV suggests a value 1 for TTL_START [98],
the NS-2 simulator version of AODV uses the value 5. So, setting the TTL value
in the fake RREQ to 1 is compatible with the original AODV and has not a big
difference with the simulator version. A malicious node that decided not to reply
to all RREPs with TTL value of 1 to avoid detection will also not reply to gen-
uine RREQs which limits the effectiveness of the blackhole attack. In addition, as
a result of dropping RREP with hop count greater than 2 to the fake RREQ, the
mechanism forces blackhole neighbours to use a hop count value 2 in all their fake
RREPs which exposes it to detection if the RREQ is fake or sets their hop count
greater than 2 to avoid detection and gives up claiming that they have best routes
to destinations which exposes its reply to be dropped if the RREQ is fake.
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Although AB mechanism succeeded in discovering malicious nodes within a small
time with a ratio of 100% true exclusion of genuine malicious nodes, it has an obvious
security gap. Disseminating the only threshold level used RREP_THRESHOLD in-
troduces the ability for an attacker to subvert the algorithm by working below this
threshold. Introducing a mechanism that overcome this drawback was the motiva-
tion to develop this algorithm by introducing the Blackhole Resisting Mechanism
(BRM).
6.4 Blackhole Resisting Mechanism (BRM)
Blackhole Resisting Mechanism (BRM) [88] is designed to mitigate the effect of
the blackhole attack on the performance of MANET reactive routing protocols by
fast detection of blackhole neighbours. BRM modifies AB mechanism to close
the security gaps and overcome its drawbacks such as using a fixed threshold
RREP_THRESHOLD that can be disseminated to malicious nodes. The mech-
anism uses the concept of SPT which detects a malicious node by complying with
the normal protocol behaviour and luring the malicious node to give an implicit
avowal of its malicious behaviour. The mechanism does not use cryptographic tech-
niques which conserves the power and computation resources. The algorithm makes
no assumptions about blackhole behaviour which makes it robust and reliable. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism neither adds new routing packets nor modifies the existing
ones. We introduce a small modification to the original routing protocol by storing
the last three per hop times for a RREP received for a destination. The per-hop time
is calculated as the latency between sending a RREQ and receiving its corresponding
RREP divided by the hop count value included in the RREP.
Each node in the network has to monitor the performance of its neighbours to
detect if any misbehaves as a blackhole node. Malicious nodes will be detected
reliably within a short time. The algorithm guarantees 100% exclusion of only
blackhole nodes and does not exclude any innocent node that may forward a RREP.
A malicious node cannot subvert the mechanism as there are no thresholds and all
variables are randomly set.
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Figure 6.3: BRM Node Trust Level
The idea is to periodically send a fake RREQ from a non-existent source node
to a non-existent destination node. Only a malicious node will respond to this fake
RREQ. If a node receives a RREP to its fake RREQ from a neighbour, the node
ensures that this neighbour is a blackhole node, declares it as malicious and adds it
to a black list of potential malicious nodes. Once on the black list, it will be removed
from the routing table. All RREPs from black listed nodes are not forwarded, but
they are still recorded. The interval between two successive fake RREQs of a node
is determined based on its neighbours’ behaviours. The algorithm introduces two
different variables; trust level and confidence level. The trust level is a node’s trust
in the network and its assessment of the instantaneous attack threat. Once a node
participating in a network, it sets its trust level to Normal mode and it updates
this trust level to either Trust or Threat upon reception of replies to its fake
RREQs. Figure 6.3 shows the finite state machine diagram of the trust level modes
of operations. The node assigns a confidence level to each neighbour. A confidence
level for a neighbour is dynamically changed according to the neighbour behaviour
to the testing node fake RREQ which consequently changes the testing node trust
level. It is initialized to MAX_CONFIDENCE for a neighbour and decremented
upon misbehaviour of this neighbour. A node implementing the Blackhole Resisting
Mechanism behaves as follows:
• Algorithm 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show that a node periodically sends a fake
RREQ from a random non-existent source node to a random non-existent
destination node. The node stores these fake source and destination addresses
in a trustiness table for later examination. The node also sets an expiry time
for this entry to avoid the table inflation.
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Algorithm 6.3 BRM Fake RREQ Scheduling
S : small interval time (Threat)
M : medium interval time (Normal)
L: large interval time (Trust)
T : next fake RREQ time
U : mode upgrade time (used if no RREP for fake RREQ)
C : confidence value of a neighbour
V : testing time to receive RREP for fake RREQ
1: send fake RREQ
2: if mode = Trust then
3: T = randomly set from S
4: else if mode = Threat then
5: T = randomly set from L
6: else
7: T = randomly set from M
8: end if
9: schedule T
10: schedule U
11: C = T + V
Figure 6.4: BRM Fake RREQ Scheduling
• A node usually sets its trust level to Normal and sends fake RREQs with
a moderate rate at random time intervals between MIN_NORMAL and
MAX_NORMAL. Once a node receives a reply for one of its fake RREQs,
it changes its trust level to Threat and sends fake RREQs with a higher rate
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at random time intervals between MIN_THREAT and MAX_THREAT. The
node upgrades it trust level from Threat to Normal or from Normal to
Trust if it sends two successive fake RREQs without receiving a reply during
RREP_VALIDATE period. A node that set its trust level to Trust sends
fake RREQs with a low rate at random time intervals between MIN_TRUST
and MAX_TRUST. These three intervals introduce much more difficulty for
a malicious node looking to subvert our proposed mechanism by tracing fake
RREQs rate and differentiating it among genuine RREQs. To avoid over-
whelming the network with unrequired routing overhead, our algorithm guar-
antees that at most one fake RREQ is sent by a node during MIN_TRUST
seconds if there are no malicious nodes in the network which does not introduce
a high routing overhead.
• To solve the trade-off between flooding the network with fake RREQs which
increases the routing overhead and detection of validity of the RREQ by a
malicious node, we suggest that the TTL value of this fake RREQ is set to a
random number between MIN_TTL and MAX_TTL. We suggest values of 1
and 4 for these limits. Using a TTL of 1 ensures that any malicious neighbour
will receive the fake RREQ. A limit of 4 ensures that this fake RREQ does
not propagate too far in the MANET and hence overhead is limited. This
limit also spoofs a malicious neighbour that the node which sent the RREQ
to it is a forwarding node and it did not originate it for testing the malicious
trustiness.
• Algorithm 6.4 shows that if a RREP is received from a neighbour for this
fake RREQ and both fake source and destination addresses are found in the
trustiness table and either the source address of this reply or the number of
hops identifies that RREP originator is the neighbour (i.e. number of hops
is 2), the node identifies that the originator is a blackhole node by setting
its black_list value to 1, removes it from its routing table, and drops any
upcoming RREPs received from this neighbour without processing. This check
forces any malicious node attempting to launch a blackhole attack to claim
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Algorithm 6.4 BRM RREP Processing
N : number of RREPs received from a neighbour
H : average latency of RREPs
L: latency of a RREP
B : neighbour blacklist value (default assigned for normal node)
C : confidence value of a neighbour
M : minimum confidence (neighbour is colluded node)
T : Time of next fake RREQ (depend on Trust level)
1: receive RREP
2: increment N
3: if B 6= default then
4: malicious misbehaviour
5: discard RREP
6: else if reply for fake RREQ then
7: if neighbour is RREP originator OR C =M then
8: switch to Threat mode
9: randomly set T
10: increment B
11: else if C > M then
12: calculate L
13: if L then < H
14: decrement C
15: end if
16: end if
17: discard RREP
18: else
19: normal RREP processing
20: end if
that it only forwards this RREP by setting the hop count value greater than
2. This guarantees that any malicious neighbour will stop claiming it has best
route to a destination by setting its reply hop count to 2.
• Figure 6.5 shows that if a RREP is received from a neighbour for this fake
RREQ and both fake source and destination addresses are found in the trusti-
ness table and the source address of this reply is not identical to the forwarding
neighbour and the number of hops is greater than 2. This implies that this
neighbour may be an innocent node that is used to forward this RREP or a
malicious node that tries to subvert our algorithm. The node drops this RREP
and computes the latency between sending the corresponding RREQ and this
RREP and then divided this value by the hop count received in this RREP to
calculate the per hop time for the received RREP. Then, the node compares
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this value to the average hop time of all routes included in the routing table
taking into account that each route has three previously stored per hop time
values. If the per hop time of the received RREP is less than the average per
hop time of all stored routes in the routing table, the node decrements this
neighbour confidence level for each received RREP to a fake RREQ. The node
clarifies that this neighbour attempting to use the blackhole characteristic of
replying without checking its routing table which is a reason for receiving the
RREP faster than those from other normal nodes.
Figure 6.5: BRM RREP Processing
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• If a neighbour confidence level becomes zero, a node identifies that this neigh-
bour is a blackhole node or a colluding node. If this neighbour is not a mali-
cious, it might be a colluding node as it should detect its malicious neighbour
that uses it as victim node to forward RREPs. Decrementing a confidence
level for a neighbour ensures that a node gives plenty of time for it to discover
its malicious neighbours. So, a node sets the neighbour’s black_list value to
1, removes it from its routing table and drops any upcoming RREPs received
from this neighbour without processing.
Our proposed mechanism (BRM) clarifies that each node is responsible for moni-
toring its neighbours and detecting and excluding blackhole ones. So, our mechanism
does not differentiate between single and cooperative blackhole attacks. This is be-
cause if the node at each end of a chain of cooperative blackhole nodes is detected
by its neighbours, the chain becomes useless and cannot affect the network. Table
6.2 shows the values of parameters that were used in our simulations.
Table 6.2: BRM Mechanism Parameters
MAX_CONFIDENCE 3
MIN_TTL 1
MAX_TTL 4
RREP_VALIDATE 5 s
MIN_THREAT 5 s
MAX_THREAT 30 s
MIN_NORMAL 30 s
MAX_NORMAL 90 s
MIN_TRUST 90 s
MAX_TRUST 150 s
A malicious node that decided not to reply to all RREQs with TTL value between
1 and 4 to avoid detection will not reply to genuine RREQs and for sure all its fake
replies to RREQ with higher TTL values are useless as a normal RREP will often
be received by a source before its fake RREP. In addition, as a result of excluding
nodes that replies by their own address or impersonating with hop counts value of 2,
the mechanism forces malicious nodes to stop replying with their true identities and
stop claiming that they have best routes. Moreover, calculating the per hop time of
RREP with hop count greater than 2; the mechanism enforces blackhole neighbours
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to delay their RREP which give RREQ sources an opportunity to receive replies
from genuine nodes before the blackhole neighbour RREP. So, a malicious node
follows our proposed mechanism either takes the risk to misbehave by sending fake
RREP which increases the possibility of discovering it by its neighbour or stops
misbehaving.
The BRM algorithm includes strong features that do not allow malicious nodes to
subvert it. BRM has no thresholds, such as RREP rate, that may be disseminated to
malicious nodes and introduce a way for these malicious nodes to work under these
thresholds. Instead of this, the algorithm sends fake RREQs periodically at a rate
depending on the trust level. The adjacent sending interval times of the three level of
trustiness in addition to the normal RREQ of the original routing protocol introduces
a difficulty for a malicious node to differentiate between genuine and fake RREQs.
As shown from Table 6.2, a node sends fake RREQ randomly between 5 seconds and
150 seconds which is a long interval that makes the process of tracing fake RREQs
complex. In addition, BRM introduces two limits MIN_TTL and MAX_TTL in
which the TTL value has to be chosen randomly to introduce much more difficulty
for a malicious node to estimate if the RREQ is genuine or one for testing. Moreover,
BRM classifies its reaction to a reply for a fake RREQ based on the hop count value
received in this RREP into two levels. The first if the hop count value is 2 which
implies implicit recognition from a malicious neighbour. The second if the hop count
value is greater than 2 which means that the forwarding neighbour may be a victim
to a malicious node. The node decrements this neighbour confidence level until it
reaches zero; when the node will be considered as a malicious neighbour. So, the
worst scenario permitted by BRM algorithm is that a node accepts a limited number
of RREPs (i.e. MAX_CONFIDENCE) to its fake RREQs from a neighbour; after
which the node is certain that this neighbour is a malicious node.
As we will see later in simulations, BRM algorithm succeeded in detecting the
majority of malicious neighbours in a short time. Detection of a malicious node is
done whenever it replies to a fake RREQ, and because the generations of this fake
RREQ is done randomly within a range (5 - 150 seconds), just few minutes are more
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than enough to exclude malicious nodes from the network. BRM algorithm does not
assume the attacker has to continue its malicious behaviour, but it guarantees that
whenever a malicious node starts it bad behaviour, it will discovered immediately
and this can be done within at most 150 seconds from beginning of its bad behaviour.
So, a malicious node has two choices if it cannot differentiate between genuine and
fake RREQs; either to reply to some or all RREQs and expose itself for detection
and exclusion or to not reply to any RREQ to be safe from detection which leads
to the same result of preventing blackhole attack. Our proposed algorithm does not
care about all nodes in the MANET; each node only cares about its neighbours (1
hop only from it). If a node sends a fake RREQ and later receives a reply for it from
one of its neighbour; it will be sure that this neighbour is a malicious or a colluded
node and as a result the neighbour should be excluded. If each node succeeded in
excluding its malicious neighbours; this for sure guarantees malicious-free routes.
6.5 Simulation Approach
NS-2 simulator [69] is used to simulate blackhole attack. The simulation is used
to analyse the performance of the networks under the blackhole attacks with and
without our new two mechanisms AB and BRM. The parameters used are shown
in Table 6.3. While we examined our proposed mechanisms on both UDP and
TCP traffic and the mechanisms succeeded in detecting blackhole neighbours and
enhancing the network performance for both traffic, the chapter is focused on the
results of the proposed mechanisms on the TCP traffic only. We examined our
proposed mechanisms for different number of nodes (25, 50, 75 and 100) and different
node speeds (0, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 m/s). The highest negative impact of malicious
nodes usually appears on static networks and this effect decreases as node mobility
increases [77], so we report here the case of static networks. Similarly, only the case
of 100 node networks is reported, corresponding to a high density of nodes. This
gives malicious nodes a high number of neighbours. We choose a large simulation
time to ensure that most of the malicious nodes have been detected especially for
scenarios with a large number of malicious nodes.
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Table 6.3: Resisting Blackhole Attacks Simulation Parameters
Simulation Time 600 s
Simulation Area 1000 m2
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Connections 150
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 10
Node Speed 0 - 30 m/s
Pause Time 10 s
Traffic Type TCP
Our blackhole attack model assumes that once a malicious node receives a RREQ
packet from a node, it immediately constructs a fake RREP that includes a randomly
generated hop count between 2 and 4 to spoof other nodes about best route; i.e. 1
to 3 hop counts only from the RREQ source. The attacker assigns the destination
sequence number value of this fake RREP as equal to the received one in the RREQ
plus randomly generated number between 10 and 30 to spoof other nodes about
the freshness of this RREP. Then, the attacker unicasts this fake RREP toward
the RREQ source. A malicious node initiating a blackhole attack generates a fake
RREP for each RREQ it receives to incorporate itself in all routes, therefore all
packets are sent to a point where they are not forwarded anywhere which is a form
of a DoS attack.
On the other hand, a testing node periodically sends a fake RREQ. Our model
to generate this fake request assumes that the node randomly generates the source,
the destination and their sequence numbers. It generates also TTL value for this
request to control the distance that is traversed in the network and this value is
randomly set between 1 and 4.
6.6 Simulation Results
AB and BRM algorithms achieve 100% success in excluding only blackhole neigh-
bours without falsely excluding innocent nodes during simulations. AB algorithm
is faster than BRM in detecting malicious neighbours and succeeded to discover
more than 90% of malicious neighbours in few minutes. Although AB mechanism is
faster than BRM in detecting blackhole neighbours, both mechanisms achieve very
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similar results of the performances of the protocols. So, we compare their success
ratio in excluding malicious nodes and then include only BRM effect on the network
performance in this chapter. Details of the simulations are presented in the follow-
ing sections. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, SAODV has a high resistance to
blackhole attack. So, we do not incorporate our algorithms to it, instead we use its
performance to compare with the corresponding non-secured protocol, i.e. AODV,
in the presence and absence of our algorithm BRM.
As we mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, we use two parameters for measuring
the exclusion efficiency of our algorithms. The first parameter is the total number
of neighbour exclusions during the simulation time. The second parameter is the
malicious discovery ratio which represents the ratio of malicious nodes discovered as
time progresses to the total number of malicious nodes that should be discovered. In
evaluating blackhole resisting mechanisms, we did not use the true exclusion ratio
which represents the ratio of successful exclusion of genuine malicious nodes to the
total number of exclusions as our algorithms achieves 100% success in excluding the
malicious nodes only.
From the discussions presented earlier in Chapter 4, the blackhole attack has
severe collapse on AODV and small negative impacts on DSR and AOMDV. Results
show that BRM introduces huge improvements on AODV performance while it has
slightly smaller degradation on both DSR and AOMDV. This clarifies that the
degradation of the performance of our mechanism on DSR and AOMDV has no
significant impact.
6.6.1 Resisting Blackhole Attacks in AODV
In this section, we evaluate the performance of AODV under blackhole attacks
with and without our two mechanisms and compare with the results of SAODV.
Our simulation shows that regardless of the number of nodes and the number of
malicious nodes in the network, a node will detect a malicious neighbour within
a short time. Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 show the proportion of malicious nodes
that have been detected as time progresses for both AB and BRM algorithms
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respectively. For clarity, we only show the results for 1, 4, 7 and 10 malicious
nodes. The figures show that as the simulation time increases both the mechanisms
succeeded in detecting and excluding malicious nodes. They also show that AB
mechanism is faster than BRM and succeeded in excluding the vast majority of the
blackhole neighbours in very short time. AB succeeded in excluding the majority
blackhole neighbours after 120 seconds from the beginning of the simulation because
most of the genuine RREQs and RREPs are sent during this period. Then the
mechanism continues to exclude more malicious neighbours after that at a low rate.
On the other hand, BRM has a continuous rate of detecting blackhole neighbours
as it has not a threshold.
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Figure 6.6: AB-AODV Malicious Discovery Ratio
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Figure 6.8 shows the total number of neighbours excluded during the simulation.
The figure shows that AB excludes a larger number of malicious neighbours than
BRM.
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Figure 6.8: AODV Total Exclusions
The effect of BRM algorithm on the AODV packet delivery ratio is shown in
Figure 6.9. While the blackhole attack has severe impact on the PDR of AODV
especially for large number of malicious nodes, BRM-AODV introduces an approx-
imately constant PDR regardless of the number of malicious nodes. On the other
hand, while SAODV has a constant PDR regardless of the number of malicious nodes
such as our algorithm; our algorithm achieves a better PDR value than SAODV.
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Figure 6.9: BRM Impact on AODV Packet Delivery Ratio
Figure 6.10 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on AODV network throughput.
Throughput of BRM-AODV is better than AODV by approximately 25% for each
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malicious node and the enhancement becomes huge for a high number of malicious
nodes. While the throughput of AODV dramatically decreases as the number
of malicious nodes increases, BRM-AODV slightly decreases for a high number
of malicious nodes. In addition, our algorithm introduces a better throughput
compared to SAODV of approximately 100%.
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Figure 6.10: BRM Impact on AODV Network Throughput
The effect of BRM algorithm on the AODV end-end-delay is shown in Figure
6.11. The delay of the original AODV protocol is reduced as the number of malicious
nodes increases which is slightly paradoxical as the attack improves the delay. As
discussed earlier in Chapter 4, this is because the delay is only measured on packets
that reach their destinations and since the blackhole nodes drop all received data
routed through them, the number of packets that will be considered in calculating
the delay decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases. As our proposed
mechanism succeeded in receiving more data packets than AODV, the number of
packets that will be considered in calculating the delay increases approaching the
level that is the delay of network in the absence of malicious nodes. While the num-
ber of malicious nodes has very little effect on the delay in SAODV, our algorithm
decreases it slightly further.
Figure 6.12 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on the AODV normalized routing
load. The result shows that while the normalized routing load of AODV increases
145
Chapter 6: Resisting Blackhole Attacks
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 450
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
E
n
d
- E
n
d
- D
e
l a
y
 [
m
s
]
Malicious Nodes
AODV
SAODV
BRM-AODV
Figure 6.11: BRM Impact on AODV End-to-End Delay
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Figure 6.12: BRM Impact on AODV Normalized Routing Load
as the number of malicious nodes increases especially for large number of malicious
nodes, it has not significantly changed for BRM-AODV. In addition, our algorithm
introduces a better NRL than SAODV by approximately 300%.
Figure 6.13 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on the AODV routing overhead.
The routing overhead of AODV decreases as a result of malicious nodes increases
which is slightly confusing as the blackhole attack improves the routing overhead.
This is because the blackhole nodes stop rebroadcasting the RREQ which decreases
the number of RREQ packets, one of the factors used to measure the routing over-
head as discussed before in Chapter 4. The routing overhead of BRM-AODV slowly
decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases and our algorithm has small
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differences compared to the routing overhead of the network in the absence of ma-
licious nodes as a result of continuous detection of blackhole nodes. On the other
hand, while routing overhead in SAODV is constant regardless of the number of
malicious nodes, our algorithm introduces a better routing overhead than SAODV.
Although the figure shows that the number of routing packets of our algorithm is
less than its value of SAODV by approximately 5%, this enhancement increases up
to approximately 400% if we consider the difference between AODV and SAODV
packet sizes.
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Figure 6.13: BRM Impact on AODV Routing Overhead
Figure 6.14 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on the AODV routing discovery
latency. The result shows that RDL of AODV decreases dramatically as the number
of malicious nodes increases which is slightly confusing as well that the blackhole
attack improves RDL. This is because the fast response of blackhole nodes to RREQ
which reduces the delay between sending a RREQ and receiving its corresponding
RREP. The result shows that the routing discovery latency of BRM-AODV slowly
decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases. In addition, our algorithm
introduces a better RDL than SAODV by approximately 60%.
6.6.2 Resisting Blackhole Attacks in DSR
In this section, we compare the performance of DSR under blackhole attacks with
and without our new mechanism. Figure 6.15 shows the proportion of malicious
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Figure 6.14: BRM Impact on AODV Route Discovery Latency
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Figure 6.15: DSR Malicious Discovery Ratio
nodes that have been detected as time progresses. As mentioned earlier, we only
show the results for 1, 4, 7 and 10 malicious nodes for clarity. The figure shows while
our algorithm achieves a smaller ratio when incorporated to DSR than AODV, it is
still succeeded in detecting and excluding malicious as the simulation time increases.
The effect of BRM algorithm on the DSR packet delivery ratio is shown in Figure
6.16. While BRM achieves slightly smaller PDR in absence of malicious nodes, it
has a constant PDR regardless of the number of malicious nodes. On the other
hand, the blackhole attack has a negative impact on the PDR of DSR especially for
a large number of malicious nodes.
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Figure 6.16: BRM Impact on DSR Packet Delivery Ratio
Figure 6.17 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on the DSR network throughput.
Throughput of BRM-DSR achieves a nearly constant throughput regardless of the
number of malicious nodes with a small degradation, approximately 15% on the
average, compared to the original DSR. The figure shows also that the blackhole
attack has a remarkable negative impact on the DSR throughput.
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Figure 6.17: BRM Impact on DSR Network Throughput
The effect of BRM algorithm on the DSR end-end-delay is shown in Figure 6.18.
The results show that the delay of DSR with and without our algorithm decreases as
the number of malicious nodes increases which is slightly paradoxical as the attack
improves the delay. This misleading result, which has been discussed earlier in
Chapter 4, is a result of dropping received data routed through blackhole nodes.
Incorporating our algorithm into DSR increases the delay of DSR by approximately
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20% particularly when there are no malicious nodes. This is because that a node
suspects to its neighbours and drops a high number of RREPs that exceeds its
dynamic threshold until it ensures that its neighbours are innocents.
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Figure 6.18: BRM Impact on DSR End-to-End Delay
Figure 6.19 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on the DSR routing overhead.
The result shows that the routing overhead of DSR increases slightly as a result of
malicious nodes increases. The result shows that the routing overhead of BRM-DSR
has a small degradation as the number of malicious nodes increases. This is because
as the number of malicious nodes increases, our algorithm increases the number of
nodes under suspicious and hence increases the number of RREPs received from
these suspicious nodes which decreases the number of RREQs forwarded by these
suspicious nodes that leads reducing the routing overhead of the network.
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Figure 6.19: BRM Impact on DSR Routing Overhead
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6.6.3 Resisting Blackhole Attacks in AOMDV
In this section, we compare the performance of AOMDV under blackhole attacks
with and without our new mechanism. Figure 6.20 shows the proportion of malicious
nodes that have been detected as time progresses. The figure shows while our
algorithm achieves a smaller ratio when incorporated in AOMDV than AODV, it is
still succeeded in detecting and excluding malicious as the simulation time increases.
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Figure 6.20: AOMDV Malicious Discovery Ratio
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Figure 6.21: BRM Impact on AOMDV Network Throughput
Figure 6.21 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on the AOMDV network
throughput. While the throughput of BRM-AOMDV has a negligible degradation
when there is malicious nodes, compared to AOMDV, the throughput of both
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protocols decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases. On the other hand,
BRM achieves a small improvement in the throughput in the absence of malicious
nodes.
The effect of BRM algorithm on the AOMDV end-end-delay is shown in Figure
6.22. While our algorithm increases the delay slightly compared to AOMDV
especially for large number of malicious nodes, it achieves a small enhancement in
the absence of malicious nodes. Delay of AOMDV with and without our mechanism
decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases because of dropping data as
discussed earlier in Chapter 4.
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Figure 6.22: BRM Impact on AOMDV End-to-End Delay
Figure 6.23 shows the effect of BRM algorithm on the AOMDV routing overhead.
The result shows that the routing overhead of AOMDV is approximately constant
regardless of the number of malicious nodes. On the other hand, incorporating our
algorithm into AOMDV has a dramatic effect on the overhead of AOMDV, cutting
it by approximately 6% for each malicious node. This is because as the number
of malicious nodes increases, the number of nodes under suspicious increases which
increases the number of fake RREQs. In addition, AOMDV supports multiple RREQ
copies which means that a RREQ is rebroadcast many times.
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Figure 6.23: BRM Impact on AOMDV Routing Overhead
6.7 Summary
Blackhole attack has a dramatic impact on the MANET routing protocols perfor-
mance. We proposed two new mechanisms Anti-Blackhole (AB) and Blackhole Re-
sisting Mechanism (BRM) to resist blackhole attacks that can be incorporated into
any reactive routing protocol. Both mechanisms use the concept of Self-Protocol
Trustiness (SPT) in which detecting a malicious intruder is accomplished by com-
plying with the normal protocol behaviour and luring the malicious node to give an
implicit avowal of its malicious behaviour. BRM mechanism is designed to close the
security gaps and overcome the drawbacks of AB mechanism that enable malicious
nodes to subvert it. It succeeded in detecting and excluding a high ratio of blackhole
nodes in a short time. It guarantees 100% exclusion of genuine blackhole nodes and
does not exclude any innocent nodes that may forward a RREP. Neither solution
requires expensive cryptography or authentication mechanisms or modifications to
the packet formats.
Using NS2 simulation, we compare the performance of various protocols under
blackhole attacks with and without our mechanisms, showing that it significantly
reduces the effect of a blackhole attack. Although AB mechanism is faster than BRM
at detecting blackhole neighbours, both mechanisms achieve very similar results
in performances of the protocols. As the blackhole attack has severe collapse on
AODV and small negative impacts on DSR and AOMDV. Results show that BRM
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introduces huge improvements on AODV performance while it has slightly smaller
degradation on both DSR and AOMDV which does not cause a significant negative
impact.
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Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
MANETs are more prone to security threats than other wired and wireless networks
because of their distributed system nature. Conventional MANET routing proto-
cols assume that all nodes cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation
of the protocol and do not provide defence against malicious attackers. Current
security solutions of the MANETs routing protocols can be mainly categorized into
prevention mechanisms and detection and reaction mechanisms. We analysed and
evaluated the performance of MANET reactive routing protocols in the presence of
various attacks and introduced new mechanisms that resist some of them.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of
the thesis contributions. In Section 3, research limitations are highlighted. Section
3 suggests a future work.
7.2 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, we have addressed the security problem of the MANETs reactive
routing protocols. Selecting well-known reactive routing protocols that represent
different approaches such as single path, multipath and secured from the wide span
of these protocols require a detailed study of these protocols. Similarly, selecting
multiple attacks that represent fabrications of routing packets, partial or full misbe-
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having require a deep study of various attacks. The summary of the contributions
that are presented in the thesis are as follows:
1. Analysing and evaluating the performance of MANET reactive routing pro-
tocols in the presence of various attacks. We demonstrated a result that
the blackhole and flooding attacks have dramatic impact on the network
performance. While the blackhole fabricates a fake reply, the flooding at-
tack fabricates request which affects the network performance. On the other
hand, grayhole and selfish attacks have a little negative impact on the per-
formance of MANET routing protocols. We also discovered that the highest
negative impact of malicious nodes in all these different attacks usually ap-
pears on static networks and this effect decreases as node mobility increases.
Another important result is that while SAODV succeeded in resisting black-
hole, grayhole and selfish attacks, it has performance degradation under
the flooding attack. SAODV does not forward the routing packets with-
out ensuring authenticity and integrity that explains its success in resisting
blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks. While SAODV achieves a moderate
performance compared to the other protocols, its routing overhead is higher
as a cost of its security features. SAODV cannot resist the flooding attack
because a malicious node impersonating a non-existent node which could
not be discovered by other non-malicious nodes. Finally, AOMDV achieves
the lower negative impact to different attacks than other routing protocols.
2. Introducing a new concept in securing multi-hop networks such as MANETs
called Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT). This concept detects a malicious in-
truder by complying with the normal protocol behaviour and luring the
malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its malicious behaviour.
3. Introducing an Anti-Flooding (AF) mechanism to resist flooding attacks
which can be incorporated into any reactive routing protocol. It does not
require expensive cryptography or authentication mechanisms, but relies on
locally applied timers and thresholds to classify nodes as malicious. No
modifications are made to the packet formats and hence it does not incur
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any additional overhead. The proposed mechanism succeeded in discovering
malicious nodes that attempt to flood the network regardless of the number
of malicious nodes.
4. Introducing the Flooding Attack Resisting Mechanism (FARM) to resist
flooding attacks. It has the main advantages of AF mechanism while it is
designed to close the security gaps and overcome the drawbacks of AF mech-
anism. FARM mechanism uses our new concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness
(SPT) to discover malicious intruders. It succeeded in detecting and ex-
cluding a high ratio of flooding nodes in a short time. FARM succeeded
in detecting and excluding more than 80% of malicious neighbours in the
simulation time with a highly trusted ratio exceeds than 90%.
5. Introducing the Anti-Blackhole (AB) mechanism to resist blackhole attacks
which can be incorporated into any reactive routing protocol. It is designed
based on our new concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) in addition to
some thresholds to discover a blackhole node. The algorithm neither adds
new routing packets nor modifies the existing ones and it does not require
expensive cryptography or authentication mechanisms. The algorithm guar-
antees 100% exclusion of only blackhole nodes and does not exclude any
victim node that may forward a reply packet.
6. Introducing the Blackhole Resisting Mechanism (BRM) to resist blackhole
attacks. It has the main advantages of AB mechanism while it is designed
to close the security gaps and overcome the drawbacks of AB mechanism
that enable malicious nodes to subvert it. It succeeded in detecting and
excluding a high ratio of blackhole nodes in a short time.
From the previous discussion, it is clear that current security solutions for
MANET reactive routing protocols can be classified as prevention mechanisms, and
detection and reaction mechanisms. The disadvantages of the prevention mecha-
nisms are their design dependency on the cryptographic algorithms which do not
suit the MANET characteristics and their failure to discover some attacks. In addi-
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tion, the detection and reaction mechanisms cannot guarantee the true classification
of nodes because the cooperative nature of the MANETs which leads to false ex-
clusion of innocent nodes and/or good classification of malicious nodes. Moreover,
many solutions of both types are designed to suit a specific MANET routing proto-
col, as these solutions depend on the routing packet format of this protocol, which
decreases the opportunity to use these solutions in other MANET routing protocols.
On the other hand, this thesis introduces a new concept of Self-Protocol Trusti-
ness (SPT) to discover malicious nodes with a very high trustiness ratio of a node
classification. This is because detecting a malicious intruder is based on an implied
avowal of its malicious behaviour. SPT is used an underlying concept in design-
ing different mechanisms to both flooding and blackhole attacks. From the above
results, it is clear that using the SPT concept in both AB and RBM mechanisms
ensures the fast discovery of malicious nodes within a very small time with 100%
true exclusion of only malicious nodes. Although FARM mechanism achieves a very
high true exclusion ratio exceeds than 90% compared to AF mechanism, and the
previous solutions that did not consider this ratio, this ratio can be adapted later
to achieve a complete success. The design and implementation of these mechanisms
did not incorporate the use of cryptographic algorithms to suit the limited resources
of the MANET nodes and did not depend on routing packet formats which increases
their ability to be implemented in different MANET reactive protocols.
7.3 Future Work
This section highlights areas for potential future research, based on the contributions
of this thesis. Many research ideas can be derived from our research work such as:
1. Extending the SPT concept to be applied in different wireless networks.
Implementation of these new suggested algorithms, the BRM and the FARM
algorithms, can be tested in other hop-by-hop networks and other wireless
networks that do not have centralized structure such as sensor networks
confirming their general applicability.
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2. Introducing similar algorithms that can resist other attacks on MANETs
using the SPT concept. SPT can be used as an underlying concept to design
algorithms that can resist the other dangerous attacks such as wormhole
attack.
3. Combining BRM and FARM algorithms to achieve a robust algorithm that
can resist blackhole and flooding attacks simultaneously. Incorporating these
algorithms in other various MANET proactive and reactive routing protocols
to ensure their applicability.
4. Examining these new algorithms in larger networks to confirm the success of
their design and to discover and address their advantages and disadvantages
in these networks. This is can be a key to enhance the FARM algorithm to
achieve success in discovering and excluding only genuine malicious nodes.
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Modified Traffic Generator
#
# This Tcl script generates a malicious node type scenario.
# It accepts five arguments:
# Type of connections (type)
# Number of nodes (nn)
# Number of connections (mc)
# CBR packet rate/sec (rate)
# Seed number (seed) [optional]
#
# The command format is:
#
# ns cbrgen.tcl -type cbr -seed 1 -nn 10 -mc 4 -rate 4.0
#
# The code generates nn number of ns nodes and mc number of connections.
# So, each node generation code in the format:
#
# set udp_(0) [new Agent/UDP]
# $ns_ attach-agent $node_(0) $udp_(0)
# set null_(0) [new Agent/MyNull]
# $ns_ attach-agent $node_(4) $null_(0)
# set cbr_(0) [new Application/Traffic/CBR]
# $cbr_(0) set packetSize_ 512
# $cbr_(0) set interval_ 0.25
# $cbr_(0) set random_ 1
# $cbr_(0) set maxpkts_ 10000
# $null_(0) drop-target [$node_(4) mobility-trace Drop "AGT"]
# $cbr_(0) attach-agent $udp_(0)
# $ns_ connect $udp_(0) $null_(0)
# $ns_ at 1.00000 "$cbr_(0) start"
#
# The code is created by Mohamed Abdelshafy
#
# Copyright (c) 2014 by the Heriot-Watt University
# All rights reserved.
#
# Connection Scenario construction code.
#
# $Header: .../ns-2/indep-utils/cbrgen.tcl,v 2.0 Mon 5/8/2014 12:40:00
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# ======================================================================
# Default Script Options
# ======================================================================
set opt(nn) 0 ;# Number of Nodes
set opt(seed) 0.0
set opt(mc) 0
set opt(pktsize) 512
set opt(rate) 0
set opt(interval) 0.0 ;# inverse of rate
set opt(type) ""
# ======================================================================
proc usage {} {
global argv0
puts "\nusage: $argv0 \[-type cbr|tcp\] \[-nn nodes\] \[-seed seed\]
\[-mc connections\] \[-rate rate\]\n"
}
proc getopt {argc argv} {
global opt
lappend optlist nn seed mc rate type
for {set i 0} {$i < $argc} {incr i} {
set arg [lindex $argv $i]
if {[string range $arg 0 0] != "-"} continue
set name [string range $arg 1 end]
set opt($name) [lindex $argv [expr $i+1]]
}
}
proc create-cbr-connection { src dst } {
global rng cbr_cnt opt
set stime [$rng uniform 0.0 30.0]
puts "#\n# $src connecting to $dst at time $stime\n#"
puts "set udp_($cbr_cnt) \[new Agent/UDP\]"
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node_($src) \$udp_($cbr_cnt)"
puts "set null_($cbr_cnt) \[new Agent/MyNull\]"
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node_($dst) \$null_($cbr_cnt)"
puts "set cbr_($cbr_cnt) \[new Application/Traffic/CBR\]"
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set packetSize_ $opt(pktsize)"
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set interval_ $opt(interval)"
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set random_ 1"
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) set maxpkts_ 10000"
puts "\$null_($cbr_cnt) drop-target \[\$node_($dst) mobility-trace Drop
\"AGT\"\]"
puts "\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) attach-agent \$udp_($cbr_cnt)"
puts "\$ns_ connect \$udp_($cbr_cnt) \$null_($cbr_cnt)"
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puts "\$ns_ at $stime \"\$cbr_($cbr_cnt) start\""
incr cbr_cnt
}
proc create-tcp-connection { src dst } {
global rng cbr_cnt opt
set stime [$rng uniform 0.0 30.0]
puts "#\n# $src connecting to $dst at time $stime\n#"
puts "set tcp_($cbr_cnt) \[new Agent/TCP\]"
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node_($src) \$tcp_($cbr_cnt)"
puts "set sink_($cbr_cnt) \[new Agent/MyTCPSink\]"
puts "\$ns_ attach-agent \$node_($dst) \$sink_($cbr_cnt)"
puts "set ftp_($cbr_cnt) \[new Application/FTP\]"
puts "\$tcp_($cbr_cnt) set window_ 32"
puts "\$tcp_($cbr_cnt) set packetSize_ $opt(pktsize)"
puts "\$sink_($cbr_cnt) drop-target \[\$node_($dst) mobility-trace Drop
\"AGT\"\]"
puts "\$ftp_($cbr_cnt) attach-agent \$tcp_($cbr_cnt)"
puts "\$ns_ connect \$tcp_($cbr_cnt) \$sink_($cbr_cnt)"
puts "\$ns_ at $stime \"\$ftp_($cbr_cnt) start\""
incr cbr_cnt
}
# ======================================================================
getopt $argc $argv
if { $opt(type) == "" } {
usage
exit
} elseif { $opt(type) == "cbr" } {
if { $opt(nn) == 0 || $opt(seed) == 0.0 || $opt(mc) == 0 || $opt(rate)
== 0 } {
usage
exit
}
set opt(interval) [expr 1 / $opt(rate)]
if { $opt(interval) <= 0.0 } {
puts "\ninvalid sending rate $opt(rate)\n"
exit
}
}
puts "#\n# nodes: $opt(nn), max conn: $opt(mc), send rate: $opt(interval),
seed: $opt(seed)\n#"
set max_node [expr $opt(nn) - 0.5]
set rng [new RNG]
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$rng seed $opt(seed)
set u [new RandomVariable/Uniform]
$u set min_ 0
$u set max_ $max_node
$u use-rng $rng
set cbr_cnt 0
set src_cnt 0
set srclist {}
while { $cbr_cnt < $opt(mc) } {
set src [expr round([$u value])]
set dst [expr round([$u value])]
set y [lsearch $srclist $src]
if { $dst == $src } {
set dst [expr $dst + 1]
}
if { $cbr_cnt < $opt(nn) } {
if { $y == -1 } {
incr src_cnt
lappend srclist $src
if { $opt(type) == "cbr" } {
create-cbr-connection $src $dst
} else {
create-tcp-connection $src $dst
}
}
} else {
if { $y == -1 } {
incr src_cnt
lappend srclist $src
}
if { $opt(type) == "cbr" } {
create-cbr-connection $src $dst
} else {
create-tcp-connection $src $dst
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}
}
}
puts "#\n#Total sources/connections: $src_cnt/$cbr_cnt\n#"
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Node-Type Generator
#
# This Tcl script generates a malicious node type scenario.
# It accepts three arguments:
# Total nuber of nodes (n)
# Number of malicious nodes (m)
# Attack type (a)
# Attack time (t)
# Seed number (seed) [optional]
#
# The command format is:
#
# ns nodes.tcl -n 10 -m 4 -a 3 -t 1 -seed 1
#
# The code generates n number of ns nodes generation code and
# randomly select if the node is malicious node or not.
# So, each node generation code in the format:
#
# set node_(0) [$ns_ node]
# $node_(0) random-motion 0
# $ns_ at 1.234567 "$node_(0) set malicious_ 1"
# $ns_ at 1.234567 "$node_(0) set attack_ 3"
#
#
# The code is created by Mohamed Abdelshafy
#
# Copyright (c) 2014 by the Heriot-Watt University
# All rights reserved.
#
#
# Node type construction code.
#
# $Header: .../ns-2/indep-utils/node.tcl,v 2.0 Mon 5/8/2014 12:40:00
# ======================================================================
# Default Script Options
# ======================================================================
set opt(n) 0 ;# Number of nodes
set opt(seed) 0.0
set opt(m) 0 ;# Number of malicious nodes
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set opt(a) 0 ;# Attack type
set opt(t) 0 ;# Attack Random time
# ======================================================================
proc usage {} {
global argv0
puts stderr "\nusage: $argv0 \[-n nodes\] \[-m malicious\] \[-a
attack\] \[-t time\] \[-seed seed\]\n"
}
proc getopt {argc argv} {
global opt
lappend optlist n m a t seed
for {set i 0} {$i < $argc} {incr i} {
set arg [lindex $argv $i]
if {[string range $arg 0 0] != "-"} continue
set name [string range $arg 1 end]
set opt($name) [lindex $argv [expr $i+1]]
}
}
proc create-normal-node { } {
global node_cnt
puts "#\n# creating node $node_cnt\n#"
puts "set node_($node_cnt) \[\$ns_ node\]"
puts "\$node_($node_cnt) random-motion 0"
puts "\$node_($node_cnt) set malicious_ 0"
}
proc create-malicious-node { } {
global node_cnt t x opt
puts "#\n# creating node $node_cnt\n#"
puts "set node_($node_cnt) \[\$ns_ node\]"
puts "\$node_($node_cnt) random-motion 0"
puts [format "\$ns_ at %.6f \"\$node_($node_cnt) set malicious_ %d\""
$t $x]
puts [format "\$ns_ at %.6f \"\$node_($node_cnt) set attack_ %d\"" $t
$opt(a)]
}
# ======================================================================
# Main Program
# ======================================================================
getopt $argc $argv
if { $opt(n) == 0 } {
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usage
exit
}
if { $opt(m) > $opt(n) } {
puts stderr "error: The number of malicious node should less than the
total number of nodes"
exit
}
puts "#\n# nodes: $opt(n), malicious: $opt(m), attack: $opt(a), random
time: $opt(t), seed: $opt(seed)\n#"
set nseed [expr $opt(seed) + 5]
set sseed [expr $opt(seed) * 3]
if {$opt(n) > 25} {
if {$opt(m) > 0} {
set minint [expr round($opt(n)/50)]
set maxint [expr round($opt(n)/$opt(m))]
} else {
set minint $opt(n)/10
set maxint $opt(n)
}
} else {
set minint 0
set maxint 0
}
set maliciousRNG [new RNG]
$maliciousRNG seed $opt(seed)
set malicious [new RandomVariable/Uniform]
$malicious set min_ 0
$malicious set max_ 1
$malicious use-rng $maliciousRNG
set intervalRNG [new RNG]
$intervalRNG seed $nseed
set interval [new RandomVariable/Uniform]
$interval set min_ $minint
$interval set max_ $maxint
$interval use-rng $intervalRNG
set startRNG [new RNG]
$startRNG seed $sseed
set start_time [new RandomVariable/Uniform]
$start_time set min_ 0
$start_time set max_ 50
$start_time use-rng $startRNG
set malicious_cnt 0 ;# number of random malicious
set rndcrt 0 ;# randmly created nodes
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for {set node_cnt 0} {$node_cnt < $opt(n)} {incr node_cnt} {
if {$opt(m) == 0} {
create-normal-node
} else {
set x [expr round([$malicious value])]
if {$x == 1} {
incr malicious_cnt
if {$malicious_cnt <= $opt(m)} {
if {$opt(t) == 1} {
set t [$start_time value]
}
incr rndcrt
create-malicious-node
set y [expr round([$interval value])]
for {set i 0} {$i < $y} {incr i} {
incr node_cnt
if {$node_cnt == $opt(n)} {
set node_cnt [expr $node_cnt - 1]
break
}
create-normal-node
}
} else {
if {$node_cnt < $opt(n)} {
create-normal-node
}
}
}
if {$x == 0} {
if {$node_cnt < $opt(n)} {
create-normal-node
}
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}
}
set t 0
}
puts "#\n#Total Malicious/Nodes: $rndcrt/$node_cnt\n#"
169
Bibliography
[1] Ad hoc networks. http://www.acorn.net.au/telecoms/adhocnetworks/
adhocnetworks.html [retrieved: April, 2016].
[2] Nelly Delgado. Web Service Security: Scenarios, Patterns, and Implementation
Guidance for Web Services Enhancements (WSE) 3.0. Microsoft, USA, 2005.
[3] Priyanka Goyal, Sahil Batra, and Ajit Singh. A literature review of security
attack in mobile ad-hoc networks. International Journal of Computer Applica-
tions, 9(12):11–15, November 2010.
[4] Monu Singh, Ajay Singh, Rajesh Tanwar, and Ritu Chauhan. Security at-
tacks in mobile adhoc networks. IJCA Proceedings on National Workshop-Cum-
Conference on Recent Trends in Mathematics and Computing 2011, RTMC(11),
May 2012.
[5] Azzedine Boukerche, Begumhan Turgut, Nevin Aydin, Mohammad Z. Ahmad,
Ladislau Bölöni, and Damla Turgut. Routing protocols in ad hoc networks: A
survey. Computer Networks, 55(13):3032–3080, 2011.
[6] Ashwani Kumar. Security attacks in MANET - a review. IJCA Proceedings
on National Workshop-Cum-Conference on Recent Trends in Mathematics and
Computing 2011, RTMC(11), May 2012.
[7] Kamaljit I. Lakhtaria and Kamaljit I. Lakhtaria. Technological Advancements
and Applications in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Research Trends. IGI Global,
Hershey, PA, USA, 1st edition, 2012.
170
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[8] Charles E. Perkins and Pravin Bhagwat. Highly dynamic destination-sequenced
distance-vector routing (DSDV) for mobile computers. SIGCOMM Comput.
Commun. Rev., 24(4):234–244, October 1994.
[9] Shree Murthy and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves. An efficient routing protocol for
wireless networks. Mob. Netw. Appl., 1(2):183–197, October 1996.
[10] Guangyu Pei, Mario Gerla, and Tsu-Wei Chen. Fisheye state routing in mo-
bile ad hoc networks. In ICDCS Workshop on Wireless Networks and Mobile
Computing, pages 71–78, 2000.
[11] P. Jacquet, P. Muhlethaler, T. Clausen, A. Laouiti, A. Qayyum, and L. Viennot.
Optimized link state routing protocol for ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of
IEEE International Multi Topic Conference (INMIC) Technology for the 21st
Century, pages 62–68, 2001.
[12] David B. Johnson and David A. Maltz. Dynamic source routing in ad hoc
wireless networks. Mobile Computing, 353:153–181.
[13] Charles E. Perkins and Elizabeth M. Royer. Ad-hoc on-demand distance vec-
tor routing. In Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing
Systems and Applications, pages 90–100, 1997.
[14] Chai-Keong Toh. Associativity-based routing for ad hoc mobile networks.
Wirel. Pers. Commun., 4(2):103–139, March 1997.
[15] Zygmunt J. Haas and Marc R. Pearlman. The performance of query control
schemes for the zone routing protocol. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., 9(4):427–438,
2001.
[16] Prasun Sinha Raghupathy, Prasun Sinha, Raghupathy Sivakumar, and Vaduvur
Bharghavan. CEDAR: a core-extraction distributed ad hoc routing algorithm.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 17:1454–1465, 1999.
[17] Shuo Wang, Qiao Li, Yule Jiang, and Huagang Xiong. Stable on-demand mul-
tipath routing for mobile ad hoc networks. In Computational Intelligence and
171
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Industrial Applications, 2009. PACIIA 2009. Asia-Pacific Conference on, vol-
ume 2, pages 318–321, Nov 2009.
[18] Mohammed Tarique, Kemal E. Tepe, Sasan Adibi, and Shervin Erfani. Survey
of multipath routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks. Journal of Network
and Computer Applications, 32(6):1125–1143, November 2009.
[19] Mahesh K. Marina and Samir R. Das. Ad hoc on-demand multipath dis-
tance vector routing. Wireless Communications and Mobile Ccomputing
(WCMC): Special Issue: Wireless Ad Hoc Networks: Technologies and Chal-
lenges, 6(7):969–988, November 2006.
[20] L. Reddeppa Reddy and S. V. Raghavan. Smort: Scalable multipath on-demand
routing for mobile ad hoc networks. Ad Hoc Netw., 5(2):162–188, March 2007.
[21] Rajib Das, Bipul Syam Purkayastha, and Prodipto Das. Security measures for
black hole attack in MANET: An approach. CoRR, abs/1206.3764, 2012.
[22] K.P. Manikandan, R.Satyaprasad, and K.Rajasekhararao. A Survey on At-
tacks and Defense Metrics of Routing Mechanism in Mobile Ad hoc Networks.
IJACSA - International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applica-
tions, 2(3):7–12, 2011.
[23] S. A. Razak, S. M. Furnell, N. L. Clarke, and P. J. Brooke. Friend-assisted
intrusion detection and response mechanisms for mobile ad hoc networks. Ad
Hoc Netw., 6(7):1151–1167, September 2008.
[24] Issa Khalil. Mitigation of Control and Data Traffic Attacks in Wireless. PhD
thesis, Purdue University, 05 2007.
[25] Marek Klonowski, Miroslaw Kutylowski, and Anna Lauks. Repelling detour
attack against onions with re-encryption. In Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS’08, pages
296–308, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
172
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[26] Pietro Michiardi and Refik Molva. Prevention of denial of service attacks and
selfishness in mobile ad hoc networks. In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Institut
Eurecom Research Report RR-02-063, 2002.
[27] Henk C. A. van Tilborg and Sushil Jajodia, editors. Encyclopedia of Cryptog-
raphy and Security, 2nd Ed. Springer, 2011.
[28] Chris Piro, Clay Shields, and Brian Neil Levine. Detecting the sybil attack in
mobile ad hoc networks. In Proc. SecureComm, pages 1–11. IEEE Press, 2006.
[29] Chi Zhang, Xiaoyan Zhu, Yang Song, and Yuguang Fang. A formal study of
trust-based routing in wireless ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 29th
conference on Information communications, INFOCOM’10, pages 2838–2846,
Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2010. IEEE Press.
[30] Yinghua Guo and Sylvie Perreau. Detect DDoS flooding attacks in mobile ad
hoc networks. Int. J. Secur. Netw., 5(4):259–269, December 2010.
[31] Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, and David B. Johnson. Rushing attacks and
defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols. In Proceedings of the 2nd
ACM workshop on Wireless security, WiSe ’03, pages 30–40, New York, NY,
USA, 2003. ACM.
[32] Mohammad Al-Shurman, Seong-Moo Yoo, and Seungjin Park. Black hole at-
tack in mobile ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 42nd annual Southeast
regional conference ACM-SE 42, pages 96–97. ACM Press, April 2004.
[33] Megha Arya and Yogendra Kumar Jain. Grayhole attack and prevention in mo-
bile adhoc network. International Journal of Computer Applications, 27(10):21–
26, August 2011.
[34] Lijun Qian and Ning Song. Detecting and locating wormhole attacks in wire-
less ad hoc networks through statistical analysis of multi-path. In Wireless
Communications and Networking Conference, 4:2106 âĂŞ 2111, 2005.
173
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[35] Jonny Karlsson, Laurence S. Dooley, and GÃűran Pulkkis. A new MANET
wormhole detection algorithm based on traversal time and hop count analysis.
Sensors, 11(12):11122–11140, 2011.
[36] Bruce Schneier. Applied Cryptography (2nd Ed.): Protocols, Algorithms, and
Source Code in C. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 1995.
[37] Joseph Migga Kizza. Guide to Computer Network Security. Springer-Verlag,
London, UK, 2010.
[38] D. Coppersmith, D. B. Johnson, S. M. Matyas, T. J. Watson, Don B. John-
son, and Stephen M. Matyas. Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output
Feedback Masking. Research report. IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, 1996.
[39] Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, and John McBrewster. Advanced En-
cryption Standard. Alpha Press, 2009.
[40] Ronald L. Rivest. The RC5 encryption algorithm. In Proceedings 2nd Interna-
tional Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, volume 1008 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 86–96, Leuven, Belgium, 1994. Springer.
[41] Alexander W. Dent. Choosing key sizes for cryptography. Information Security
Technical Report, 15(1):21–27, February 2010.
[42] R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signa-
tures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21:120–126,
1978.
[43] Darrel Hankerson, Alfred J. Menezes, and Scott Vanstone. Guide to Elliptic
Curve Cryptography. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ, USA, 2003.
[44] Adam Shostack. Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., New York, NY, USA, 2014.
[45] Mihir Bellare, Ran Canetti, and Hugo Krawczyk. Keying hash functions for
message authentication. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryp-
174
BIBLIOGRAPHY
tology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO ’96, pages 1–15, Lon-
don, UK, UK, 1996. Springer-Verlag.
[46] Ronald L. Rivest. The MD5 message-digest algorithm. Internet RFC 1321,
April 1992.
[47] D. Eastlake and P. Jones. US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1). RFC 3174,
United States, 9 2001.
[48] CORPORATE NIST. The digital signature standard. Commun. ACM,
35(7):36–40, July 1992.
[49] Kimaya Sanzgiri, Daniel Laflamme, Bridget Dahill, Brian Neil Levine, Clay
Shields, and Elizabeth M. Belding-royer. Authenticated routing for ad hoc
networks. IEEE Journal On Selected Areas In Communications, 23:598–610,
2005.
[50] Seung Yi, Prasad Naldurg, and Robin Kravets. Security-aware ad hoc routing
for wireless networks. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium
on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, MobiHoc ’01, pages 299–302, New
York, NY, USA, 2001. ACM.
[51] B. Dahill, K. Sanzgiri, B. N. Levine, E. M. Belding-Royer, and C. Shields. A
secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks. Technical report, University of
Massachusetts, USA, 2002.
[52] Yih-Chun Hu, David B. Johnson, and Adrian Perrig. SEAD: Secure efficient
distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad hoc networks. In Proceedings
of the 4th IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications,
WMCSA’02, pages 3–13, Callicoon, NY, USA, 2002. IEEE.
[53] Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, and David B. Johnson. ARIANDE: a secure
on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks. Wirel. Netw., 11(1-2):21–38,
January 2005.
175
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[54] Manel Guerrero Zapata. Secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing.
SIGMOBILE Mob. Comput. Commun. Rev., 6(3):106–107, June 2002.
[55] Panagiotis Papadimitratos and Zygmunt J. Haas. Secure link state routing
for mobile ad hoc networks. In Symposium on Applications and the Internet
Workshops, pages 379–383. IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
[56] Baruch Awerbuch, Reza Curtmola, David Holmer, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and
Herbert Rubens. Odsbr: An on-demand secure byzantine resilient routing pro-
tocol for wireless ad hoc networks. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 10(4):6:1–6:35,
January 2008.
[57] Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec. Performance analysis of the con-
fidant protocol. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on
Mobile ad hoc networking & computing, MobiHoc ’02, pages 226–236, New
York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM.
[58] Minji Kim, Muriel MÃľdard, JoÃčo Barros, and Ralf KÃűtter. An algebraic
watchdog for wireless network coding. In Proceedings of IEEE ISIT, 2009.
[59] A. Bandyopadhyay, S. Vuppala, and P. Choudhury. A simulation analysis of
flooding attack in MANET using ns-3. In Wireless Communication, Vehicular
Technology, Information Theory and Aerospace Electronic Systems Technology
(Wireless VITAE), 2011 2nd International Conference on, pages 1–5, 2011.
[60] Nidhi Sharma and Alok Sharma. The black-hole node attack in MANET. In
Proceedings of the 2012 Second International Conference on Advanced Comput-
ing & Communication Technologies, ACCT ’12, pages 546–550, Washington,
DC, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society.
[61] Wan Du, David Navarro, Fabien Mieyeville, and Frédéric Gaffiot. Towards a
taxonomy of simulation tools for wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings of
the 3rd International ICST Conference on Simulation Tools and Techniques,
SIMUTools ’10, pages 1–7, Brussels, Belgium, Belgium, 2010. ICST (Institute
176
BIBLIOGRAPHY
for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineer-
ing).
[62] Teerawat Issariyakul and Ekram Hossain. Introduction to Network Simulator
NS2. Springer Publishing Company, 2 edition, 2012.
[63] Raj Jain. The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis: Techniques for
Experimental Design, Measurement, Simulation, and Modeling. SIGMETRICS
Performance Evaluation Review, 19(2):5–11, September 1991.
[64] Ahmad Ali Abdullah, Fayez Gebali, and Lin Cai. Modeling the throughput
and delay in wireless multihop ad hoc networks. In IEEE Conference on Global
Telecommunications (GLOBECOM), pages 1–6. IEEE, 2009.
[65] F. Liu, C. Lin, H. Wen, and P. Ungsunan. Throughput analysis of wireless
multi-hop chain networks. In Eighth IEEE/ACIS International Conference on
Computer and Information Science (ICIS), pages 834–839, June 2009.
[66] Qualnet communications simulation. http://web.scalable-networks.com/
content/qualnet [retrieved: April, 2016].
[67] Opnet. http://www.riverbed.com/products/steelcentral/opnet.html
[retrieved: April, 2016].
[68] Matlab. http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab [retrieved: April,
2016].
[69] The network simulator ns-2. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/ [retrieved:
April, 2016].
[70] Omnet++. https://omnetpp.org/ [retrieved: April, 2016].
[71] Glomosim. http://pcl.cs.ucla.edu/projects/glomosim/ [retrieved: April,
2016].
[72] W. Kasch, J. Ward, and J. Andrusenko. Wireless network modeling and sim-
ulation tools for designers and developers. Communications Magazine, IEEE,
47(3):120–127, March 2009.
177
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[73] Tracy Camp, Jeff Boleng, and Vanessa Davies. A survey of mobility models for
ad hoc network research. Wireless Communications and Mobile Ccomputing
(WCMC): Special Issue on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking: Research, Trends and
Applications, 2:483–502, 2002.
[74] Christian Schindelhauer. Mobility in wireless networks. In In 32nd Annual
Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Informatics, Czech,
2006.
[75] Jon Viega, Pravir Chandra, and Matt Messier. Network Security with Openssl.
O’Reilly & Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, CA, USA, 1st edition, 2002.
[76] Mohamed A. Abdelshafy and Peter J.B. King. AODV & SAODV under attack:
Performance comparison. In ADHOC-NOW 2014, LNCS 8487, pages 318–331,
Benidorm, Spain, Jun 2014.
[77] Mohamed A. Abdelshafy and Peter J.B. King. Analysis of security attacks on
AODV routing. In 8th International Conference for Internet Technology and
Secured Transactions (ICITST), pages 290–295, London, UK, Dec 2013.
[78] Mohamed A. Abdelshafy and Peter J.B. King. AODV routing protocol perfor-
mance analysis under MANET attacks. International Journal for Information
Security Research (IJISR), 3(1/2):418–426, March/June 2013.
[79] Mohamed A. Abdelshafy and Peter J.B. King. Dynamic source routing un-
der attacks. In 7th International Workshop on Reliable Networks Design and
Modelling (RNDM), pages 174–180, Munich, Germany, Oct 2015.
[80] Ping Yi, Zhoulin Dai, Yi-Ping Zhong, and Shiyong Zhang. Resisting flood-
ing attacks in ad hoc networks. In International Conference on Information
Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC), volume 2, pages 657–662, April
2005.
[81] Bo-Cang Peng and Chiu-Kuo Liang. Prevention techniques for flooding attacks
in ad hoc networks. In 3rd Workshop on Grid Technologies and Applications
(WoGTA 06), pages 657–662 Vol. 2, Hsinchu, Taiwan, December 2006.
178
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[82] Jian-Hua Song, Fan Hong, and Yu Zhang. Effective filtering scheme against
RREQ flooding attack in mobile ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the Seventh
International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing, Applications
and Technologies, PDCAT ’06, pages 497–502, Washington, DC, USA, 2006.
IEEE Computer Society.
[83] V. Balakrishnan, V. Varadharajan, U. Tupakula, and M.E.G. Moe. Mitigating
flooding attacks in mobile ad-hoc networks supporting anonymous communi-
cations. In 2nd International Conference on Wireless Broadband and Ultra
Wideband Communications (AusWireless), pages 29–34, Aug 2007.
[84] Revathi Venkataraman, M. Pushpalatha, Rishav Khemka, and T. Rama Rao.
Prevention of flooding attacks in mobile ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of
the International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communication and
Control, ICAC3 ’09, pages 525–529, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[85] Ujwala D. Khartad and R. K. Krishna. Route request flooding attack using
trust based security scheme in MANET. International Journal of Smart Sensors
and Ad Hoc Networks (IJSSAN), 1(4):27–33, 2012.
[86] Mohamed A. Abdelshafy and Peter J.B. King. Resisting flooding attacks on
AODV. In 8th International Conference on Emerging Security Information,
Systems and Technologies (SECURWARE), pages 14–19, Lisbon, Portugal, Nov
2014.
[87] Mohamed A. Abdelshafy and Peter J.B. King. Flooding attacks resisting mech-
anism in MANETs. Submitted to IEEE International Conference on Commu-
nications (ICC) 2016.
[88] Mohamed A. Abdelshafy and Peter J.B. King. Resisting blackhole attacks on
MANETs. In 13th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Confer-
ence (CCNC), pages 1–6, Las Vegas, USA, Jan 2016.
[89] Seungjoon Lee, Bohyung Han, and Minho Shin. Robust routing in wireless ad
179
BIBLIOGRAPHY
hoc networks. In International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops,
pages 73–78, 2002.
[90] Satoshi Kurosawa, Hidehisa Nakayama, Nei Kato, Abbas Jamalipour, and
Yoshiaki Nemoto. Detecting blackhole attack on AODV-based mobile ad hoc
networks by dynamic learning method. International Journal of Network Se-
curity, 5(3):338–346, 2007.
[91] L. Tamilselvan and V. Sankaranarayanan. Prevention of blackhole attack in
MANET. In 2nd International Conference on Wireless Broadband and Ultra
Wideband Communications, pages 21–21, Aug 2007.
[92] Payal N. Raj and Prashant B. Swadas. DPRAODV: a dynamic learning system
against blackhole attack in AODV based MANET. International Journal of
Computer Science Issues (IJCSI), 2:54–59, 2009.
[93] Nital Mistry, Devesh C Jinwala, and Mukesh Zaveri. Improving AODV protocol
against blackhole attacks. In International MultiConference of Engineers and
Computer Scientists (IMECS), pages 1–5, Hong Kong, China, March 2010.
[94] Xin Li, Zhiping Jia, Peng Zhang, and Haiyang Wang. A trust-based multipath
routing framework for mobile ad hoc networks. In 7th International Conference
on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery (FSKD), volume 2, pages 773–777,
Aug 2010.
[95] Rajdipsinh Vaghela, Divyesh Yoganand, and Monika Changela. A survey on ap-
proaches towards the black hole attack in MANET. Indian Journal of Research,
1(12):58–61, 2012.
[96] Tarek M. Mahmoud, Abdelmgeid A. Aly, and Omar Makram. A modified
AODV routing protocol to avoid black hole attack in MANETs. International
Journal of Computer Applications, 109(6):27–33, January 2015.
[97] N. Choudhary and L. Tharani. Preventing black hole attack in AODV using
timer-based detection mechanism. In International Conference on Signal Pro-
180
BIBLIOGRAPHY
cessing And Communication Engineering Systems (SPACES), pages 1–4, Jan
2015.
[98] C. Perkins, E. Belding-Royer, and S. Das. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector
(AODV) routing. Internet Draft RFC 3561 (Experimental), July 2003.
181
